Supreme Court: Considering the instant appeal filed by the appellant accused in Pune Triple Murder case of 2012, challenging the confirmation of conviction and death sentence by Bombay High Court, the 3- Judge Bench of B.R. Gavai*, Prashant Kumar Mishra and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ., taking note of discrepancies in testimony of key prosecution witness and failure of prosecution to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, quashed his conviction and sentence and deemed it fit to acquit him.
Background:
On 4-10-2012, the appellant called the Police control room informing them about robbery at his house; the killing of his mother, wife and 2-year-old daughter and injury to his neighbour. Subsequently an FIR was registered against unknown persons. However, the investigation led to recovery of the robbed items within the house. It was further revealed that the appellant was involved in an extra-marital affair. Furthermore, based on the CCTV footage of the appellant’s house the appellant was suspected of having committed murders by the Police and so he was arrested on 5-10-2012.
The appellant made a disclosure about keeping his blood-stained clothes and Mangalsutra of his wife at a place in M.I.D.C., Hadapsar Area, Pune and he further disclosed about throwing the hammer used for committing the crime. Another disclosure was made by the appellant about a consent letter for divorce by his wife which was found in a drawer inside his house.
After completion of the investigation, a chargesheet was filed against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 201 of IPC. Since the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, it was committed to the Sessions Court for trial. Charges were framed against the appellant by the trial court for the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 201 of IPC.
The prosecution examined 16 witnesses. At the conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court found that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused (appellant) beyond reasonable doubt.
On 26-8-2016, the Trial Court convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 201 of IPC and vide order dated 31-8- 2016 he was sentenced to death along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default whereof to suffer rigorous imprisonment of 1 year for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC; rigorous imprisonment for 10 years along with fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default whereof rigorous imprisonment of 1 year for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC and rigorous imprisonment of 3 years along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default whereof rigorous imprisonment of 6 months for the offences punishable under Section 201 of IPC.
For confirmation of the execution of the death sentence, a reference was made by the Trial Court to Bombay High Court. Via the impugned judgment and order, the High Court upheld the conviction of the appellant and confirmed the death sentence imposed on him. However, in view of Section 415(1) of CrPC the operation and effect of the impugned judgment was stayed till the expiry of period allowed for preferring an appeal before Supreme Court.
Contentions:
Counsel for the appellant argued that the Trial Court and High Court erred in holding the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. It was submitted that the prosecution case mainly rested on the evidence of the injured neighbour (PW-12). It was argued that PW-12’s statement under S. 161, CrPC was recorded belatedly i.e. after 6 days with no reasons given for the delay. Furthermore, PW-12’s statement was recorded by the Police after he was informed that an FIR has been registered against the appellant for committing the murder of his wife, daughter and mother.
The appellant’s counsel pointed out that if the PW-12’s statement is discarded then the only circumstances upon which the prosecution relied were recovery of hammer and clothes at the instance of the appellant. However, it was submitted that the said recoveries were all farcical and cannot be relied on.
Per contra, the respondent argued that the Trial Court and High Court based on the evidence placed before them, concurrently come to a considered conclusion that the prosecution had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further submitted that ocular testimony of PW-12 was corroborated by other circumstantial evidence. It was argued that PW-12 was an injured witness and therefore, greater credence would be attached to his testimony.
Court’s Assessment:
Perusing the matter, the Court noted that the prosecution case mainly rested on PW-12’s testimony. PW-12 stated that he knew all the three deceased persons as well as the appellant. He stated that the deceased persons as well as the appellant used to reside in his neighbourhood. The witness further stated that there used to be quarrels between the appellant on one hand and his mother and wife on the other. He stated that the appellant was intending to marry another lady and that he was intending to give divorce to his wife.
The Court further took note of PW-12’s examination-in-chief wherein he had stated that he was attacked by the appellant with a hammer and was admitted to hospital for 6 days. PW-12 could not identify the hammer as to whether it was the same hammer used by the appellant for the commission of crime.
The Court found PW-12’s statements to be full of contradictions. Though, he stated in his examination-in-chief that the appellant was holding hammer in his hand, and he was going away, the same did not find place in the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC by Judicial Magistrate, First Class. The Court also took note of PW-12’s contradictory statement vis-a-vis his consciousness when he was taken to the hospital.
The Court further deliberated that if PW-12 was conscious and oriented at the time of admission in the hospital, then why was his statement not immediately recorded. Moreover, not a single neighbour was examined to corroborate the version of PW-12. Furthermore, his testimony did not show that he has witnessed the incident and he himself admitted that he had given the statement after he was informed by the police that the present appellant had committed the crime.
Considering the testimony of the Investigating Officer, the Court pointed out that the delay of 6 days in recording the statement of PW-12 particularly when the evidence of the attending doctor showed that PW-12 had given the history of the incident and was conscious and oriented, cast serious doubt on the testimony of PW-12. “No doubt that a conviction could be based solely on the basis of the evidence of a solitary witness, however, the testimony of such a witness is required to be found to be credible and trustworthy. It is also necessary to examine the testimony of such a witness critically”.
The Court hence found that PW-12’s testimony did not inspire confidence in the mind of the Court to base the conviction for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.
Upon discarding the PW-12’s testimony, the case thus became one of circumstantial evidence. The Court reiterated the principles regarding when and how convictions can be based on circumstantial evidence and that suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It was stated that an accused cannot be convicted solely on the grounds of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Considering the circumstantial evidence in the instant case, the Court pointed out that the prosecution could not prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court also did not rule out the possibility of tampering of evidence.
Vis-a-vis motive, the Court found that a conviction can’t be based solely on circumstance of motive. It is a primary principle that the accused “must be” and not merely “may be” guilty before a court can convict and every possible hypothesis except the guilt of the accused has to be ruled out.
Therefore, the Court opined that the prosecution failed to rule out every possible hypothesis except the guilt of the appellant. Hence the Court held that the impugned order and judgment of the Trial Court and High Court are not sustainable in law. Hence the appellant’s conviction and sentence were quashed.
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