Supreme Court: In the present case, two people, namely Shyam Kaur and Gurmej Singh, were murdered and appellant was convicted of murdering them and thus was sentenced to death in respect to Shyam Kaur and to transportation for life in respect to Gurmej Singh and on appeal, the sentence was upheld by the Rajasthan High Court (‘the High Court’). The 3-Judges Bench of Vivian Bose*, N.H. Bhagwati, and B. Jagannadhadas concluded that though there was Gurmej Singh’s dying declaration, it was unsafe to accept it without corroboration and the only corroboration was the evidence of Kripal Singh and both the lower courts had held that Kripal Singh standing by himself was not a reliable witness and that his testimony could not be accepted unless it was itself corroborated. Thus, the Supreme Court held that there was insufficient evidence to convict appellant and thus set aside the conviction and acquitted him.
Background
It was stated that Shyam Kaur with her two sons-in-law, namely Jangir Singh and Kripal Singh, and Gurmej Singh, who was Kripal Singh’s brother, were proceeding from Ganganagar to Bhagsar on camel back and later, were joined by Inder Singh and his nephew Jaggar Singh. While they were coming back, they were ambushed by appellant, Vikram Singh (who was absconding), and an unknown person. These three people were later joined by appellant’s nephew Kishan Singh. It was submitted that appellant and Vikram Singh, opened fire on Shyam Kaur and her party and Shyam Kaur died almost immediately. Vikram Singh hit Gurmej Singh, and appellant attacked him with a kirpan and inflicted injuries.
Jangir Singh and Kripal Singh went straight to the police station and raised an alarm and thus, the police went to the spot and found Shyam Kaur and Gurmej in a very serious condition, so they removed them to the hospital but Shyam Kaur died on the way and Gurmej died a few hours later after his dying declaration was recorded by a Magistrate. Vikram Singh absconded and thus, only appellant and Kishan Singh were brought to trial, whereby appellant was convicted, and Kishan Singh was acquitted.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Supreme Court, after noting that there were inaccuracies in Gurmej Singh’s dying declaration, opined that whatever the general law might be, it would not be safe in the present case, to rely on the declaration without corroboration and it was evident that Gurmej Singh was ready to jump to unjustifiable conclusions. The Supreme Court stated that in Ram Nath Madhoprasad v. State of M.P., (1953) 1 SCC 178, this Court had held that every dying declaration requires corroboration.
The Supreme Court found discrepancies with respect to the following incidents:
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There were some Aak bushes in the vicinity and Jangir Singh and Kripal Singh submitted that three of the assailants were hiding there and emerged from these bushes at the time of the attack and thereafter, Kishan Singh, who was going along the path which the victims took, joined the assailants after they had emerged from the Aak bushes. But Gurmej Singh’s dying declaration stated that all four assailants emerged from the bushes. The Supreme Court agreed that this might be a reasonable mistake but opined that this even indicated that Gurmej Singh was prone to jump to conclusions.
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Gurmej Singh stated that appellant hit him and Shyam Kaur and his brother with shots from his gun and with his Kripan and then ran away. However, prosecution submitted that appellant hit Shyam Kaur and did not hit Gurmej Singh with his gun.
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Gurmej Singh stated that all four assailants had pistols, and the Counsel submitted on his behalf that this was a reasonable assumption to make because six or seven shots were fired and so a man who was hit could reasonably believe that they were all armed with pistols. The Supreme Court stated that might be the case, but the issue was whether Gurmej Singh’s observation was accurate and whether what he said could be accepted without the necessity of corroboration.
The Supreme Court, on the issue that whether there was corroboration, noted that the High Court found corroboration in the evidence of Jangir Singh and Kripal Singh, but the first court disbelieves Jangir Singh altogether, and regarding Kripal Singh, the Sessions Judge stated that he could not rely on him without corroboration. The Supreme Court noted that regarding Jangir Singh and Kripal Singh, the High Court stated that neither witness could be relied on standing by himself, as both witnesses told lies. But despite this, the High Court believed these two witnesses because they said that the circumstances were such that it was possible for these two witnesses to recognize their assailants. But the High Court opined that if the dying declaration had not been there, this evidence of the witnesses alone would not have inspired sufficient confidence for convicting appellant.
The Supreme Court opined that the High Court’s reasoning was fallacious as it was based on the assumption that both the witnesses knew appellant beforehand and thus, recognised him. The Supreme Court opined that the High Court overlooked the fact that the Sessions Judge, who saw these witnesses, reached the very definite conclusion that Jangir Singh did not know the assailants beforehand and that as he did not know them beforehand, he could only have ascertained their names from Kripal Singh. The Supreme Court stated that the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for concluding that Jangir Singh did not know appellant were strong.
The Supreme Court opined that it was evident then that Jangir Singh did not meet appellant and Kishan Singh and did not know them, otherwise he would not have said that these two accused lived in a house 25 to 30 paondas from Shyam Kaur’s house when in fact they were living in an adjoining house with a common wall.
The Supreme Court opined that when an appellate court wishes to rely on witnesses who had been disbelieved by the Judge who conducted the trial and saw them in the box and who gave strong and convincing reasons for rejecting their testimony, it was the duty of the appellate court to examine those reasons and show how and where they were wrong. The Supreme Court further opined that the High Court ignored the strong reasons given by the Sessions Judge and proceeded on the assumption that these witnesses knew appellant from beforehand and therefore their joint testimony could be accepted though had either stood alone it would not have been sufficient. Thus, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial Judge that Jangir Singh’s information regarding the name of appellant was obtained from Kripal Singh.
The Supreme Court further opined that Kripal Singh’s testimony could not be accepted standing by itself as the bulk of it was unreliable. The Supreme Court stated that when the witness was already rejected by one court as unreliable and had been found to be unreliable by the appellate court, it was necessary for the appellate court to give far stronger reasons than had been given in this case for believing him.
The Supreme Court concluded that there was a dying declaration which was unsafe to accept without corroboration and the only corroboration was the evidence of Kripal Singh and both the courts held that Kripal Singh standing by himself was not a reliable witness and that his testimony could not be accepted unless it was itself corroborated. The Supreme Court opined that the High Court used the dying declaration as corroboration of Kripal Singh’s evidence but as it was founded on the fallacious assumption that Jangir Singh knew appellant beforehand because Jangir Singh stated that he recognised the assailant, this could not be accepted as good corroboration, therefore, this doubtful testimony could not be used to corroborate the dying declaration.
The Supreme Court thus held that there was insufficient evidence to convict appellant and thus set aside the conviction and acquitted him.
[Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1954) 2 SCC 208, decided on 04-08-1954]
*Judgment authored by: Justice Vivian Bose
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Appellant: Jai Gopal Sethi, Senior Advocate (R.L. Kohli and Naunit Lal, Advocates, with him)
For the Respondent: K.S. Hajela, Advocate General of Rajasthan (P.A. Mehta and P.G. Gokhale, Advocates, with him)
**Note: Corroboration for dying declaration
In State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai, (2022) 14 SCC 299, it was stated that a dying declaration can be acted upon without corroboration and there was not even a rule of prudence which had hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration could not be acted upon unless it was corroborated. The primary effort of the court was to find out whether the dying declaration was true and if it was, no question of corroboration arose. It was only if the circumstances surrounding the dying declaration were not clear or convincing that the court might, for its assurance, look for corroboration to the dying declaration.
