Supreme Court: While considering the instant appeal challenging Karnataka High Court’s decision refusing to quash chargesheet filed against the appellants for offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the Penal Code, 1860 and for allegedly using filthy language against the complainant; the Division Bench of Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ., explained that in the instant case it will be essential for the Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the modesty of the complainant or, whether any act was intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a woman.
The Court pointed out that the term “filthy language,” when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant’s modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509 of the IPC.
Background:
A complaint was lodged against the appellants by an individual employed as Technical System Analyst at Juniper Networks India Pvt. Ltd. The complainant alleged that she had been subjected to ongoing harassment by the management. She claimed that she was coerced into resigning under duress, with the threat of immediate termination if she did not comply. The complainant further stated that she was allegedly instructed not to return to work and her personal belongings, including her laptop, bag, wallet, money, credit cards et cetera were confiscated. The complainant further asserted that the laptop contained proprietary intellectual property, specifically codes and other work, that she had personally created. In addition, the complainant alleged that the management ordered her removal from the premises, with security personnel escorting her out and reportedly engaging in behaviour amounting to physical harassment, assault and threatening with dire consequences.
Following the complaint, a non-cognizable report was filed and thereafter a formal complaint seeking investigation was filed following her forcible termination in October 2013. The complainant after lapse of 2 months, filed an FIR against the afore-stated company.
Following the registration of the FIR, an investigation was conducted into the alleged offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC. A chargesheet was filed on April 2014, arraigning the appellants as accused. The chargesheet alleged that the appellants physically assaulted the complainant and confiscated the laptop provided by the Company, preventing her from retrieving the data stored on it. Additionally, the appellants were accused of scolding the complainant in “filthy language” and forcibly terminating her employment.
Aggrieved with the filing of chargesheet, the appellants approached Karnataka High Court. However, the High Court via the impugned order concluded that, prima facie, allegation in the complainant meet the necessary elements to constitute the offences attributed to the appellants.
Court’s Assessment:
Perusing the facts and contentions submitted by the parties, the Court had to consider whether prima facie the ingredients for offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC are made out, even if the allegations are taken at face value and accepted in their entirety; and whether the chargesheet and the related criminal proceedings against the appellants, are liable to be quashed?
In order to determine the afore-said issues, the Court examined the afore-said penal provisions under which the allegations against the appellants were made.
The Court pointed out that for a conviction under Section 323 of the IPC, there must be a voluntary act of causing hurt, i.e., bodily pain, disease, or infirmity, to another person. Therefore, it is essential that actual hurt is caused. The complaint merely stated that the complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company’s office by security personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and threaten her with dire consequences. Therefore, the complaint did not directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant by the accused. Thus, the Court was of the view that the ingredients of offence under Section 323 of the IPC have not been made out, prima facie, either in the complaint or the chargesheet.
Vis-a-vis Sections 504 and 509 of IPC, the Court had to consider whether mere assertion of “filthy language” allegedly used by the appellants in scolding the complainant, is sufficient to establish commission of offences under Sections 504 and 509 of the IPC. The Court stated that mere act of insulting someone does not fulfil Section 504’s requirements; the insult must be of such a nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public peace or engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the ingredients of Section 504 of the IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on the available material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the public peace or the commission of any other offence.
The Court pointed out that in the instant case, no allegation of using ‘filthy language’ was made against the appellants in the complaint. Furthermore, it is nowhere alleged that this act of using filthy language and insulting the complainant by the appellants, has provoked the complainant to commit breach of public peace or to commit any other offence. Hence Section 504 is not applicable in the instant case.
For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section 509 of the IPC was attracted, the Court explained that it is essential to first understand the meaning of the term “modesty”, to determine whether modesty has been insulted. While modesty is not explicitly defined in the IPC, the Court has addressed the essence of a woman’s modesty in several cases.
The Court explained that had there been references to specific words used, contextual details, or any gestures—whether preceding, succeeding, or accompanying these words—that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants under Section 509.
In considering the term “filthy language” objectively, in the overall conspectus of the case, the Court was of the view that the appellants’ actions do not demonstrate the requisite intent or knowledge that would reasonably lead to the conclusion that their conduct could provoke such a severe emotional response as to constitute an insult to a woman’s modesty. “In the present case, the complaint does not indicate that the appellants used language towards the complainant that would warrant an offence under Section 509 of the IPC. However, the chargesheet alleges that the appellants scolded the complainant using ‘filthy language’”.
In light of the employer-employee relationship between the appellants and the complainant; the existing dispute between them relating to the employment; the absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying gestures—whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words—the failure to mention the use of any “filthy language” in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in the chargesheet; the Court pointed out that there are serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants.
Vis-a-vis Section 506, the Court explained that a review of the alleged threat revealed that the complainant is primarily alleging illegal termination, which constitutes a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation. Furthermore, the complainant has filed a reference before the labour court challenging her termination and seeking reinstatement along with back wages.
After a thorough examination of the matter, including a review of the materials on record: viz., the complaint, the FIR, and chargesheet, the Court opined that none of the ingredients of Sections 323, 504, 506, and 509 of the IPC are present, even if they are taken at face value and accepted in their entirety. The complaint is bereft of even the basic facts, which are absolutely necessary for making out an offence.
Therefore, the Court deemed it fit to reverse the High Court’s decision and the chargesheet and proceedings against the appellants was set aside.
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