Crafting a Lasting Legacy in ADR and Legal Aid, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, retires

“When truth meets sunshine, justice will not prevail on the living alone but after Life’s fitful fever, now the departed will also sleep well. Satyameva Jayate.”

— Justice Hrishikesh Roy¹

Born on 01-02-1960, Justice Hrishikesh Roy’s journey has been marked by dedication, excellence, and a commitment to justice. Justice Roy took the oath as a Judge of the Supreme Court on 23-09-2019. Prior to this, he had served as the 35th Chief Justice of the High Court of Kerala, making noteworthy contributions to the legal landscape. As he bids farewell to an illustrious career of 5 years, we reflect on his invaluable contributions to the legal fraternity.

Education

Justice Hrishikesh Roy embarked on his legal journey by obtaining an LL. B Degree from the Campus Law Centre, University of Delhi in 1982. His academic prowess laid the foundation for a stellar legal career that would unfold over the years.

• Did You Know? Till December 2023, the Supreme Court had four Judges from 1982 LL.B batch of the Campus Law Centre, University of Delhi — Dr Justice DY Chandrachud, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice S R Bhat and Justice Hrishikesh Roy.²

As an Advocate

Justice Roy started his litigating career before Delhi High Court and then shifted his base to the Gauhati High Court. He also served as the Senior Government Advocate for the State of Arunachal Pradesh. On 21-12-2004, he was designated as a Senior Advocate by the Gauhati High Court, a testament to his legal acumen and expertise.³

As a Judge

The judicial career of Justice Hrishikesh Roy began when he was sworn in as an Additional Judge of the Gauhati High Court on 12-10-2006. Recognizing his contributions and judicial temperament, he became a Permanent Judge with effect from 15-07-2008.⁴

Justice Roy was appointed as Executive Head of the Assam State Legal Services Authority.⁵ As the senior-most Puisne Judge of the Gauhati High Court, Justice Roy served as Judge-in-charge, Administrative Department (JAD) and Chief Justice’s delegatee Judge under S. 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.⁶

On 29-05-2018, Justice Roy was transferred to the Kerala High Court as its Acting Chief Justice⁷ and later became its 35th Chief Justice on 08-08-2018.

On 23-09-2019, Justice Hrishikesh Roy took oath as a Judge of the Supreme Court.⁸ He was nominated as a member of the National Judicial Academic Council presided by the Chief Justice of India.⁹

Contributions towards ADR and Legal Aid

• Did You Know? Justice Hrishikesh Roy also dabbled a bit in filmmaking (Shako and Apne Ajnabi), albeit it was for the purposes of felicitating knowledge on Alternate Dispute Resolution methods and legal aid.¹⁰

As the head of the Mediation Monitoring Committee at the Gauhati High Court, Justice Roy oversaw the production of the film ‘Shako’ (Bridge) which is still used as a training tool in mediation programmes in India.¹¹

When Justice Roy was the head of the Arunachal Pradesh Legal Services Authority, he led the production of the short film ‘Apne Ajnabi’, on racial discrimination highlighting how legal aid can be extended to victims under Legal Services Authority Act, 1987.

As an Executive head of Assam State Legal Services Authority, Justice Roy implemented the “Reach Out & Respond” programme, to facilitate access to justice for the marginalised sections of Assam. He also spearheaded the training programmes for judicial officers under the Gauhati High Court.¹² During his tenure as Judge of Gauhati High Court, the newsletter titled ATMAN was regularly published under his editorship for the Gauhati High Court.¹³

Justice Roy, while speaking at India ADR Week 2024, addressed the critical issues with arbitration today and challenges faced by legal professionals in this field. Justice Roy said that Arbitration was initially envisioned as a fast, flexible, and cost-effective method for resolving disputes outside the traditional court system. Regarding Arbitration, Justice Roy said that once regarded as the “knight in shining armour” for dispute resolution, Arbitration was supposed to efficiently sweep disputes off their feet. However, in reality, it has become more cumbersome and less efficient, resembling an overloaded truck struggling uphill rather than the sleek sports car it was meant to be. He called for a dedicated and professional arbitration bar and lawyers and arbitrators who prioritize arbitration exclusively, without being tethered to court schedules, can bring the time, efficiency, and quality necessary for the practice to flourish.¹⁴

While addressing at an event hosted by the Indian Arbitration Forum (IAF) on ‘Code of Conduct for Arbitration’, Justice Roy touched on arbitrator expectations, including their behavior, approaches to cost management, and best practices for maintaining the integrity of the arbitration process. Justice Roy further highlighted the importance of selecting arbitrators who are not only experienced in arbitration but also possess expertise in the relevant industry. He stated that “Complex issues may arise that a standard arbitrator may struggle to decide competently, necessitating a practice known as double-hatting.”¹⁵

“Arbitration cannot be a “moonlighting” activity on the side. That cannot be. There has to be an element of seriousness. This would require us to remove any distractions from the arbitration process.”

Notable Judgements at Supreme Court

• Did You Know? Justice Roy became the fourth Judge to recuse from “NLSIU Bengaluru domicile quota case”, after Justices Aniruddha Bose, Abdul Nazeer and former Chief Justice of India, UU Lalit.¹⁶

While considering the instant appeals revolving around Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of the Hindustan National Glass and Industries Ltd. (HNGIL) and set of appeals arising out of the NCLAT order dated 28-07-2023, pertaining to the approval accorded to the combination between HNGIL and AGI Greenpac in Independent Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v. Girish Sriram Juneja,¹⁷ the 3- Judge Bench of Hrishikesh Roy*, Sudhanshu Dhulia and S.V.N Bhatti**, JJ., with a ratio of 2:1 held that the statutory provision and legislative intent unequivocally affirm the mandatory nature of the proviso to Section 31(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The majority opined that for a Resolution Plan containing a combination, the CCI’s approval to the Resolution Plan must be obtained before and consequently, the Committee of Creditors’ (CoC) examination and approval should be only after the CCI’s decision. This interpretation respects the original legislative intent, and deviation from the same would not only undermine the statute but would also erode the faith posed by the stakeholders in the integrity of the legal and regulatory framework.

The majority thus held that AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan is unsustainable as it failed to secure prior approval from the CCI, as mandated under the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC. Consequently, the approval granted by the CoC to the Resolution Plan dated 28-10-2022 without the requisite CCI approval, cannot be sustained.

“Legislative intent behind inserting the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC would suggest that prior approval of the CCI was specifically mandated and it should not be seen as a flexible provision to be ignored in certain exigencies.”

While setting aside the Karnataka High Court’s judgment and restoring the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court’s award which directed the reinstatement of the appellant in service, in Ganapati Bhikarao Naik v. Nuclear Power Corpn. of India Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3323, a division bench of Hrishikesh Roy* and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ., held that factual findings of the Labour Court should not normally be disturbed by a Writ Court without compelling reasons.

In LIC v. Om Parkash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3315, a Civil Appeal challenging the judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court whereunder, the judgment of the Single Judge was upheld by the Division Bench, a division bench of Hrishikesh Roy* and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ., quashed the High Court’s order and held that the delinquent employee was disentitled to equitable relief from the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as he was guilty of suppression of the fact of his employment with the Food Corporation of India.

While hearing two references made to the larger Bench, wherein the correctness of the Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), (2020) 14 SCC 712 (‘ECI-SPIC’) was called in question and the issue of unilateral appointment of arbitrators, and that whether a person who is ineligible to be appointed as arbitrator, can nominate an arbitrator, was to be dealt with, the five-Judge Bench comprising of Dr. DY Chandrachud,* CJI and Hrishikesh Roy*, JB Pardiwala, PS Narasimha* and Manoj Misra, JJ., in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Co., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3219, held that unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Justice Roy concurred with the majority opinion that the principle of equal treatment under Section 18 of the Arbitration Act is applicable at all stages of the proceedings including the stage of appointment of arbitrators. However, he penned that he does not concur with the view- that the principles of constitutional law can be invoked to reinforce the equality doctrine in the realm of arbitration and agreed with Justice Narasimha that, the public law principles evolved in Constitutional and Administrative law, should not generally be imported to arbitration law.

“Arbitration without party autonomy prevailing, will be like a redressal mechanism, without spirit. Liberty for the parties opting for Arbitration without equality being enshrined from the stage of inception to conclusion would be like a soulless process.”

In Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel,¹⁸ a significant decision, the 3-Judge Bench of Hrishikesh Roy, Sudhanshu Dhulia* and S.V.N Bhatti, JJ., while deliberating over whether residence-based reservation in Postgraduate (PG) Medical Courses by a State is constitutionally valid, held that, considering the importance of specialist doctors’ in PG Medical Course, reservation at the higher level based on ‘residence’ would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

In a matter concerning the issue that whether a person holding a driving license in respect of a ‘light motor vehicle’ (LMV), could on the strength of that license, be entitled to drive a ‘transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class’ having unladen weight not exceeding 7500 kg, the 5-Judge Bench comprising of Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJI, Hrishikesh Roy*, PS Narasimha, Pankaj Mithal, and Manoj Misra, JJ., in Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3183, held that a person holding a driving license for a LMV can, without any specific endorsement, drive a transport vehicle having an unladen weight of less than 7500 kg.

While deciding whether all aspirants whose names find place in the revised select list, pursuant to the course correction process, would secure appointment against the notified 1423 posts of Primary Teachers, irrespective of whether they were litigating for appointment in Khunjamayum Bimoti Devi v. State of Manipur, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4088, a 3-judge bench of Hrishikesh Roy,* Sudhanshu Dhulia and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ., directed the State authorities to draw up the revised select list in terms of the High Court’s judgment within 4 weeks from the order. The Court directed to issue appointment orders for those who figure in the revised select list, within 4 weeks of the publication of the select list.

In Sukhmander Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2931, an appeal challenging the decision of the division bench of the High Court which reversed the decision of a Single Judge who annulled the selection process, a 3-judge bench of Hrishikesh Roy,* Sudhanshu Dhulia and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ., held that limiting candidates for the viva voce stage improves recruitment efficiency, transparency, and fairness while reducing bias and promoting meritocracy.

“… limiting the number of candidates for the viva voce segment becomes essential for several reasons. Firstly, it enhances the efficiency of the selection process by providing for a more thorough and fair evaluation of each candidate. Secondly, by restricting the number of candidates, the process becomes more transparent and less susceptible to allegations of favouritism or bias.”

In Chirag Bhanu Singh v. High Court of H.P., (2024) 9 SCC 41, a writ petition filed by the two seniormost District and Sessions Judges serving in the State of Himachal Pradesh, praying for minutes of meeting of the collegium of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, whereby names of officers’ junior to the petitioners have been recommended for elevation as Judges of the High Court ignoring the directions of reconsideration given by the Collegium of the Supreme Court of India, the division bench of Hrishikesh Roy* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. held that the Chief Justice of a High Court cannot individually reconsider a recommendation, and it can only be done by the High Court Collegium acting collectively. Further, the Court directed the High Court Collegium to reconsider the names of Chirag Bhanu Singh and Arvind Malhotra for elevation as Judges of the High Court, following the Supreme Court Collegium decision dated 4-01-2024 and the Law Minister’s letter dated 16-01-2024.

“The Chief Justice of a High Court cannot individually reconsider a recommendation and it can only be done by the High Court Collegium acting collectively.”

In Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Patna, (2024) 7 SCC 262, a petition challenging the prescription of minimum qualifying marks in the viva voce test (oral interview) as part of the selection criteria for appointments to the District Judiciary in Bihar and Gujarat, a division bench of Hrishikesh Roy* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ., upheld the selection process, affirming that the prescription of minimum qualifying marks for interviews was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate.

In Shakti Yezdani v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar, (2024) 4 SCC 642, a civil appeal challenging High Court’s order rejecting the nominees’ absolute ownership claim of fixed deposits and mutual funds based on their nomination under the Companies Act, a division bench of Hrishikesh Roy* and Pankaj Mittal, JJ., held that nomination under Ss. 109-A and 109-B of the Companies Act, 1956/S. 72 of the Companies Act, 2013 and/or Bye-laws framed under S. 26 of the Depositories Act (NSDL Bye-laws 9.11.1 & 9.11.7), is subject to succession laws i.e. such nomination does not override testamentary or intestate succession.

In M.A. Biviji v. Sunita, (2024) 2 SCC 242, the Division Bench of Hrishikesh Roy* and Manoj Misra, JJ., held that when a doctor opts for a particular line of treatment but does not achieve desired result, they cannot be held liable for negligence, provided that said course of action undertaken was recognised as sound and relevant medical practice.

In Ramnivash v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 89, a challenge by the informant against order passed by Rajasthan High Court on 6-09-2023 allowing bail to a woman accused in a triple murder case, the Division Bench of Hrishikesh Roy and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ., refused to interfere with the High Court’s decision to grant bail in a non-bailable offence as per Section 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, since she was a woman.

In Neha Kothari v. Madhya Pradesh High Court,¹⁹ a challenge against order passed by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court on 12-12-2023 refusing to consider plea by petitioners seeking permission to provisionally appear and participate in the upcoming Civil Judges Selection examination to be held on 14-01-2023, the Division Bench of Hrishikesh Roy and Sanjay Karol, JJ. allowed them to fill the application forms and apply for the said examination on a provisional basis.

The Court issued notice for permitting the petitioners “to apply and appear in the recruitment test, subject to the determination of the contention made by the High Court in the pending Writ Petition.” However, the Court clarified that the instant order permitting the petitioners to offer their candidature did not mean determination of their eligibility for the said post.

In Prithvi Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1617, an appeal against the judgment passed by Rajasthan High Court on 4-09-2023 denying bail to the accused for offences under Sections 143, 148, 149, 308, 323, 341, 447, 147, 148, 149, 447, 341, 323, 325 and 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), the Division Bench of Hrishikesh Roy and Sanjay Karol, JJ., granted bail to the petitioner, considering that the petitioner being in custody for 5 years and 3 months as an undertrial prisoner and the less likelihood of the trial being concluded in near future.

In Amar Nath v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1322, an appeal filed by the two convicts against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court, wherein the Court upheld the conviction order by the Trial Court for offences under Sections 147, 302 read with Sections 149 and 324 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), granting them life imprisonment, the division bench of Hrishikesh Roy and Sanjay Karol, JJ. while setting aside the conviction order, said that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the convicts with consistent and acceptable evidence. Thus, the convicts are entitled to the benefit of doubt.

The Court said that normally this Court would not exercise its special jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to set aside such concurrent verdict. However, it reiterated that when there are multiple inconsistencies in the evidence based on which conviction was ordered and possibility of conviction resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, interference with a concurrent verdict is not only possible, but it would be well warranted.

In Bhagwan Das v. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 928, a criminal appeal against the order of Rajasthan High Court, wherein the Court rejected the bail to an undertrial prisoner facing charges of committing murder, the division bench of Hrishikesh Roy and Pankaj Mithal, JJ., while granting leave to appeal, set aside the impugned order after considering the circumstances, particularly the fact that the accused was not represented by his counsel on 17-03-2023, remanded the matter to be decided afresh so that the High Court can hear the accused’s counsel and then pass appropriate orders.

In M.P. High Court Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 639, a case where the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association and the District Bar Association, both with their registered offices at Jabalpur, had raised a challenge to the vires of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 on various grounds, the bench of KM Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy*, JJ held,

1. The National Green Tribunal under Ss. 14 & 22 of the NGT Act does not oust the High Court’s jurisdiction under Arts. 226 & 227 as the same is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

2. The remedy of direct appeal to the Supreme Court under S. 22 of the NGT Act is intra vires the Constitution of India.

3. S. 3 of the NGT Act is not a case of excessive delegation of power to the Central Government.

4. The seat of the NGT benches can be located as per exigencies and it is not necessary to locate them in every State. The prayer for relocating the Bhopal NGT to Jabalpur is unmerited and is rejected.

While rejecting an appeal to quash proceedings under S. 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881 at pre-trial stage, in Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine SC 513, the Division Bench comprising of K.M. Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy*, JJ., held that when there is legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties.

“The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested.”

In Abdul Vahab v. State of M.P., (2022) 13 SCC 310, a case where the District Magistrate had directed confiscation of a Truck under the M.P. Prohibition of Cow Slaughter Act, 2004 despite the criminal proceedings having culminated into acquittal, the Division Bench of KM Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy*, JJ held that in a case where the offender/accused are acquitted in the Criminal Prosecution, the judgment given in the Criminal Trial should be factored in by the District Magistrate while deciding the confiscation proceeding.

“The confiscation proceeding, before the District Magistrate, is different from criminal prosecution. However, both may run simultaneously, to facilitate speedy and effective adjudication with regard to confiscation of the means used for committing the offence.”

In a breather to the candidates challenging the RAS Pre-examination result in Ankit Sharma v. Rajasthan Public Service Commission, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1046, the bench of KM Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ has confirmed the Rajasthan High Court’s division bench directing Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC) to go ahead with the RAS/RTS Combined Competitive Examination-2021 mains examination. It has, however, allowed the 243 candidates, who had approached the Courts, to sit in the Mains Examination to be conducted on March 20-21, 2022.

In SDBI v. SIBCO Investment, (2022) 3 SCC 56, the Division Bench of Hrishikesh Roy* and R. Subhash Reddy, JJ., while deciding on an appeal challenging dismissal of suit by the Calcutta High Court restored the Trial Court’s judgment which was reversed by the High Court and held that the defendant was not entitled to payment till the Company Court’s order.

While rejecting the plaintiff’s claim for interest, the Court compared it to the Shakespearean character Shylock and remarked,

“…the holder of the Bond has received their ‘pound of flesh’, but they seem to want more. Additional sum in our estimation is not merited as SIBCO has already received their just entitlement and burdening the defendant with any further amount towards interest would be akin to Shylockian extraction of blood from the defendant.”

While addressing the appeal against Telangana High Court’s order imposing costs of Rs. 10,000 on Asst. Commissioner of Sales Tax in CST v. Satyam Shivam Papers (P) Ltd., (2022) 14 SCC 157, the Division Bench of Dinesh Maheshwari and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ., refused to interfere with well-considered and well-reasoned order of the High Court and instead proceeded to enhance the cost by Rs. 59000. The Court remarked,

“When the undeniable facts, including the traffic blockage due to agitation, are taken into consideration, the State alone remains responsible for not providing smooth passage of traffic.”

In Union of India v. Manju Arora, (2022) 2 SCC 151, the division bench of R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy*, JJ has held that if a regular promotion is offered but is refused by the employee before becoming entitled to a financial upgradation, she/he shall not be entitled to financial upgradation only because she/he has suffered stagnation. This is because, it is not a case of lack of promotional opportunities but an employee opting to forfeit offered promotion, for their own personal reasons.

In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha, (2022) 13 SCC 401

“…adopt an interpretation which sustains the spirit of public good and not render the environmental watchdog of our country toothless and ineffective.”

While deciding the issue, whether National Green Tribunal has the power to exercise Suo Motu jurisdiction in the discharge of its functions under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, the Bench of A.M. Khanwilkar, Hrishikesh Roy* and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ., held that NGT is vested with suo motu power in discharge of its functions under the NGT Act.

“The hands-off mode for the NGT, when faced with exigencies requiring immediate and effective response, would debilitate the forum from discharging its responsibility and this must be ruled out in the interest of justice.”

In Sai Baba Sales (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1133, a case where a Project Proponent had adhered to the applicable legal framework for Environmental Clearance (EC) during the concerned period but has been left in the lurch due to changes in the EC regimes, the Divison Bench of R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy*, JJ held that such Project Proponent cannot be pushed to a precipice and be made to fall.

Reminding the Courts that the Motor Vehicles Act is in the nature of social welfare legislation and its provisions make it clear that the compensation should be justly determined, the Division Bench of R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy*, JJ., Jithendran v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 983, in held that a realistic recompense having regard to the realities of life, both in terms of assessment of the extent of disabilities and its impact including the income generating capacity of the claimant.

Taking a significant step towards gender equality, the Division Bench of Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ., in Kush Kalra v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1062, issued interim direction permitting the women candidates to take part in the National Defence Academy (NDA) examination.

In Ashok Kumar v. Raj Gupta, (2022) 1 SCC 20, the Division Bench of Justice R. Subash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy*, JJ held that in a declaratory suit, where ownership over coparcenary property is claimed, the plaintiff cannot be subjected to the DNA test against his wishes.

“When the plaintiff is unwilling to subject himself to the DNA test, forcing him to undergo one would impinge on his personal liberty and his right to privacy.”

In State of Bihar v. Arbind Jee, (2021) 14 SCC 38, the Division Bench of R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy*, JJ held that retrospective seniority cannot be claimed from a date when an employee is not even borne in service.

“In this situation, the seniority balance cannot be tilted against those who entered service much before the respondent. Seniority benefit can accrue only after a person joins service and to say that benefits can be earned retrospectively would be erroneous.”

In South Indian Bank v. CIT, (2021) 10 SCC 153, a case where the assessee had not kept their interest free funds in separate account and as such had purchased the bonds/shares from mixed account and the Assessing Officer had made proportionate disallowance of interest attributable to the funds invested to earn tax free income by referring to the average cost of deposit for the relevant year, the bench of Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hrishikesh Roy*, JJ., enquired about the law which obligates the assessee to maintain separate accounts.

Full Report: Interest free funds not kept in separate account. Can proportionate disallowance on interest under Section 14A of IT Act be allowed? SC explains

While invoking the plenary jurisdiction under Art. 142 in Rhea Chakraborty v. State of Bihar, (2020) 20 SCC 184, a single-judge bench of Hrishikesh Roy,* J., upheld the FIR registered by the Bihar Police and asked Maharashtra Police to hand over the evidence and assist the CBI in the case relating to death of Bollywood actor Sushant Singh Rajput.

Relying on the Judgement in the case of Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India, (2020) 14 SCC 12, Justice Roy observed that that “transfer of investigation to the CBI cannot be a routine occurrence but should be in exceptional circumstances. One factor which however is considered relevant for induction of the Central Agency is to retain ‘public confidence in the impartial working of the State agencies’”

“When integrity and credibility of the investigation is discernible, the trust, faith and confidence of the common man in the judicial process will resonate.”

In N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 7 SCC 617, a 3- judge bench headed by Justice Hrishikesh Roy*, held that the appellants were ineligible for compassionate appointment and observed that for consideration of claim for compassionate appointment, the norms prevailing on the date of consideration of the application should be the basis for consideration of claim and the applicant is disentitled to seek consideration in accordance with the norms as applicable, on the day of death of the government employee.

“All government vacancies equal opportunity should be provided to all aspirants as is mandated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. However appointment on compassionate ground offered to a dependant of a deceased employee is an exception to the said norms.”

In State of Odisha v. Manju Naik, (2020) 11 SCC 809, a 3-judge bench comprising of R Bhanumathi, A S Bopanna and Hrishikesh Roy,* JJ., while deciding the petition challenging the order of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal directing the authorities to consider sanction of invalid pension under the provisions of the Orissa Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1992, observed that the Pension Rules are to be harmoniously construed in such a manner that there be no clash between different provisions in the said Rules.

“Pension is earned by stint of continuity and longevity of service.”

The Court observed that “An employee becomes entitled to pension by stint of his long service for the employer and, therefore, it should be seen as a reward for toiling hard and long for the employer.” and held that the minimum qualifying service i.e. 10 years prescribed under the Pension Rules cannot be ignored for the purpose of consideration of invalid pension.

In Chunthuram v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 10 SCC 733, a 3-judge bench comprising of Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Krishna Murari and Hrishikesh Roy,* JJ., while deciding a criminal appeal challenging the judgement of Chhattisgarh High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant under Ss. 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and acquittal of the co-accused, held that the recovery of the alleged weapons of assault on the statement of the accused can be a key evidence to support the prosecution but the recovered articles were not linked to the crime. Moreover, when relevant forensic evidence was withheld by the prosecution, an adverse inference will have to be drawn against the prosecution.

The Court also opined that the Test Identification Parade (TIP) evidence is not substantive evidence but could only be used in corroboration of statements and where TIP is held in the presence of police officers, it is bad under the provision of S. 162 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

“When the identifications are held in police presence, the resultant communications tantamount to statements made by the identifiers to a police officer in course of investigation and they fall within the ban of section 162 of the Code.”

The Court reiterating the principle of Criminal Law “if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to their innocence, the view favourable to the accused should be adopted”, acquitted the appellant.

In Umesh Kumar Sharma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2021) 12 SCC 517, while deciding a petition filed under S. 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules for seeking transfer of three criminal cases pending before different courts in Dehradun to competent courts in Delhi or some other courts outside the State of Uttarakhand, a single-judge bench of Hrishikesh Roy*, J., observed that “Transfer power under section 406 of the Code is to be invoked sparingly. Only when fair justice is in peril, a plea for transfer might be considered. The court however will have to be fully satisfied that impartial trial is not possible. Equally important is to verify that the apprehension of not getting a level playing field, is based on some credible material and not just conjectures and surmises.” and held that in these type of cases, not only the convenience of the accused is important, but also that of the complainant, witnesses, prosecution and also the larger issue of the trial being conducted under the jurisdictional court need to be taken into account. The Court opined that the petitioner has failed to make out a credible case for transfer of trial to alternative venues outside the State.

“Transfer of trials from one state to another would inevitably reflect on the credibility of the State’s judiciary”

Allowing a Criminal appeal in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 200, a 3-judge bench comprising of NV Ramana, Surya Kant and Hrishikesh Roy,* JJ., overturned the conviction of the appellant under S. 306 of the Indian Penal Code 1860.

“As in all crimes, mens rea has to be established.”

The Court observed that to make out the case of abetment under S. 107 IPC, the accused should instigate a person either by act of omission or commission but in the present case there is no direct evidence to show that cruelty was committed by the husband or the in-laws or particular hope or expectation of the deceased was frustrated by the husband or there was wilful neglect of the appellant which led to the suicidal death.

The Court reiterated the necessary ingredients as set out in SS Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190, and relied on Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana, (2014) 12 SCC 595 and observed that

“To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under Sec 107 of the IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible, to determine the culpability. In order to prove mens rea, there has to be something on record to establish or show that the appellant herein had a guilty mind and in furtherance of that state of mind, abetted the suicide of the deceased. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous.”

The Court opined that there is no evidence of any overt act or omission on part of the appellant and the trial court and the High Court had erred in relying on conjecture and speculation in deciding the appellant’s guilt i.e. abetting the suicide of his wife.

Dismissing an appeal in Karulal v. State of M.P., (2021) 13 SCC 391, a 3-bench of NV Ramana, Surya Kant and Hrishikesh Roy,* JJ., upheld the conviction of the appellants under Section 148, 302 r/w 149 IPC.

“The testimony of the related witness, if found to be truthful, can be the basis of conviction”

The Court relied on the judgement in the case of Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364, Khurshid Ahmed v. State of J & K, (2018) 7 SCC 429 and Sushil v. State of U.P., 1995 Supp (1) SCC 363 and opined that

“…The testimony of the related witness, if found to be truthful, can be the basis of conviction (…) If the witnesses are otherwise trustworthy, past enmity by itself will not discredit any testimony. In fact the history of bad blood gives a clear motive for the crime. Therefore this aspect does not in our assessment, aid the defence in the present matter.”

The Court while discussing the about the witnesses not supported the prosecution case and turning hostile, stated that “Some witness may not support the prosecution story for their own reasons and in such situation, it is necessary for the Court to determine whether the other available evidence comprehensively proves the charge.”

While dismissing six transfer petitions filed by petitioners seeking shifting of criminal cases, pending in different courts in districts of Punjab, to nearby states such as Delhi or Chandigarh in Jatinderveer Arora v. State of Punjab, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 952, Hrishikesh Roy*, J. held that there is no threat to the lives of accused or to the fair trial.

“When trial is shifted out from one State to another, it would tantamount to casting aspersions on the Court, having lawful jurisdiction to try the case.”

The Court held that “The transfer of trial from one state to another would inevitably reflect on the credibility of the State’s judiciary. Except for compelling factors and clear situation of deprivation of fair justice, the transfer power should not be invoked. The present bunch of cases are not perceived to be amongst such exceptional categories.”

In State of M.P. v. Chaitram Maywde, (2020) 10 SCC 667, a Division bench of Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ., while dismissing a special leave petition filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh with a delay of 588 days held that there could be no greater certificate of incompetence of the Legal Department.

“What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the legal Department!”

The Court observed that these type of cases are “certificate cases” and are filed with the object of saving officers who may be at fault.

“We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing.”

In Union of India v. Deven Yogesh Kanani, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 487, a 3-judge bench comprising of S A Bobde, A S Bopanna and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ., granted partial relief for Centre and Air India and directed Air India to carry out the operation of relief flights with full capacity for 10 days and there after the non-scheduled flights will be operated in accordance with the interim order to be passed by the Bombay High Court

Overruling the Judgment in the case of Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340, in K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam Siro, (2020) 5 SCC 689, a 3-judge bench of R Bhanumathi, A S Bopanna and Hrishikesh Roy,* JJ., held that seniority cannot be claimed from a date when the incumbent was not borne in service.

Notable Judgements at High Court

In Ramankutty v. Pareed Pillai, 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 3542, a Full Bench comprising of Hrishikesh Roy, CJ., P.R. Ramachandra Menon,* A K Jayasankaran Nambiar, Anil K Narendran and Devan Ramachandran, JJ., while overruling the Judgment in the case of Augustine v. Ayyappankutty, 2015 SCC OnLine Ker 14898, held that any lapse by the owner of the vehicle in relation to possession of a valid fitness certificate would amount to a fundamental breach enabling the insurer to recover the relevant amount from the insured.

“If there was no valid Insurance policy covering the vehicle on the relevant date, which is a basic requirement to identify the insurer and fix the liability, if any, the ‘pay and recover’ principle may not be attracted.”

In C.S. Chacko v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 3497, a Division bench comprising of Hrishikesh Roy,* A.C.J and A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar, J., held that compulsory confession by Church does not violate right to privacy and freedom of religion of Church members.

The Court opined that such intervention by the Court is not constitutionally impermissible as the Church also has constitutionally guaranteed right which is protected under Article 26 of the Constitution.

“We cannot overlook the fact that the respondent churches also have the constitutionally guaranteed rights under Article 26, to manage their religious affairs and it would, therefore, be highly improper for the Court to intervene and declare that confession cannot be made a condition precedent, for enjoyment of any of the spiritual and temporal rights of the member of a Christian church and denial of any such right would thus amount to denial of fundamental right.”

In Sukla Deb v. Union of India, 2008 SCC OnLine Gau 315, while awarding a compensation of Rs. 3 Lakh to the petitioner, a single-judge bench of Hrishikesh Roy*, J., held that the State is vicariously liable for the acts of its armed personnel assigned on official duty and principle of strict liability must be followed, where rights of citizens are violated through the acts of such armed personnel,

“When the claim of the citizen is based on the principle of strict liability, it may not be justified to deny the vicarious liability of the State against a claim for compensation to redress a grievance of established infringement of right to life of a citizen guaranteed by the Constitution of India.”

In Hirendranath Gohain v. Union of India, 2009 SCC OnLine Gau 409, while awarding a compensation of Rs. 1,50,000 (Rupees one lakh fifty thousands), a 3-judge bench comprising of Jasti Chelameswar,* C.J., Hrishikesh Roy* and Ranjan Gogoi,* JJ., stated that “A lot of time, energy and hard work is invested by an author to create a manuscript for publication and the manuscript not being published is not only a loss for the creator who misses out on seeing his latest work published and read by his readers but it is also a loss for the readers.”

The Court held that a direction for payment of compensation can be ordered when there is negligence on the part of postal authorities which led to loss of the petitioner’s notes and manuscripts resulting in curtailment of his precious fundamental rights guaranteed under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

“The manuscripts of the petitioner are creative and intellectual works and such works are meant to be enjoyed and appreciated by the potential readers of the petitioner. These works contained the author’s thoughts and expressions meant for his readers and in the process, the petitioner was exercising a precious right akin to a right of freedom of expression, the protection of which is guaranteed by the Constitution of India.”

While giving expression ‘death in police custody’ a wider meaning in Harendra Kumar Deka v. State of Assam, 2008 SCC OnLine Gau 652, a Division bench comprising of Jasti Chelameswar,* C.J. and Hrishikesh Roy, J., held that the personnel of the police forces of Assam are not entitled to the protection under Armed Forces (Special Power) Act.

“While on one hand the State is bound to protect a law abiding public servant it also has a duty to bring to book the public servants who acted in excess of the authority conferred on him by law.”

The Court, by avoiding technical interpretation of law, treated the death as a death occurred in police custody and held that

“The expression “amounts to death in police custody” is significant. On the facts like the one on hand the deceased may not have been technically in the custody of the police but in the circumstances the death of Prakash Deka amounts to death in police custody. Any other interpretation, in our view, would be inconsistent with the scheme of Section 78.”

The Court clarifying the law on exercise of special powers of the armed forces held that

“The members of the armed forces causing the death of another person must (1) be of the opinion that it is necessary to do for the maintenance of public order; (2) to give such due warning as the situation demands/permits that deadly force is likely to be employed; and (3) employment of deadly force is permissible against only those persons who are acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force which prohibits the assembly of five or more persons or prohibits the carrying of weapons or of things capable of being used as weapons or prohibits the carrying of fire arms, ammunition or explosive substances.”

The Court while explaining S. 197 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 held that

“Section 197, CrPC while conferring the protection to the public servants from unjustified prosecution creates a Corresponding legal obligation on the State to constantly monitor the actions of the public servants, more particularly in the context of the commission of offences. Whenever there is an allegation of commission of an offence by public servants, such as the one in the instant case, the State is bound to examine all relevant facts and form a rational opinion whether the concerned public servant should be prosecuted or not.”

In Cochin Institute of Science & Technology v. Jisin Jijo, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 1800, a Division Bench of Hrishikesh Roy,* CJ. and A K Jayashankaran Nambiar, J. upheld the order of Single Judge and opined that the College shall not stand in the way of the students seeking inter-college transfer to another self-financing college.

The Court relied on the judgement in the case of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 and held that

“Freedom to choose the college of his/her choice for pursuit of their studies is according to us, an aspect of the Fundamental Right to privacy, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.”

While allowing the writ petition in B.S. Syamkumar v. State of Kerala,²⁰ the Division bench of Hrishikesh Roy* and A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar, JJ. directed the political parties to use only eco-friendly material for election campaigns — not to use PVC flex boards and other non-bio-degradable material.

Legacy

Justice Hrishikesh Roy’s tenure as a Judge has been marked by transformative decisions with the objective to enhance judicial efficiency; innovative approach extended to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and legal aid; and his efforts in extending ADR, which underscored his commitment to social justice and community outreach. Justice Roy has consistently advocated for improvements in arbitration practices.

Justice Roy’s career has been a beacon of inspiration for the legal community and as he enters retirement, he leaves behind a legacy of profound contributions. As he steps into the next chapter of his life, the legal community extend their deepest gratitude and best wishes for his future endeavours.

*Judge who has penned the judgment.