Delhi High Court: A petition was filed under section 482 CrPC challenging the order dated 18-05-2024 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari District Courts, Delhi whereby the Magistrate remanded the petitioner to police custody for 02 days in FIR registered under sections 342, 344, 365, 368, 370, 370(A), 372, 373, 376, 120B and 34 of Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act 1956 (ITP Act). Anup Jairam Bhambhani, J., set aside the arrest of the petitioner on the grounds of non-compliance of the mandatory requirements of section 50 of the CrPC and Article 22(1) of the Constitution.
The petitioner alleged that he was the ‘Manager’ of an establishment which was inter alia engaged in the sexual abuse and exploitation of victims and was living-of the gains of such activity, based on which the FIR was registered against the petitioner. Subsequently, the Investigating Officer (‘IO’) moved an application seeking the petitioner’s custody; and vide order dated 18-05-2024 passed by the learned Magistrate, the petitioner was remanded to police custody for 02 days. The petitioner was thereafter remanded to judicial custody for 14 days vide order dated 20-05-2024 passed by the learned Magistrate. Pursuant to the notice being issued on the present petition on 28-05-2024, the State has filed Status Report dated 08-06-2024 in the matter.
This case concerns an analysis of the precise definition of the word “forthwith” as used in Section 50 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) and the scope of the legal obligation it imposes on the State to supply the ‘grounds of arrest’ to an arrestee.
The Court noted that the phrase “grounds for such arrest” appears both in section 50 CrPC as well as in section 19 of the PMLA. However, there is a significant difference between the words that precede the phrase “grounds for such arrest” in the said two provisions. In section 50 CrPC, the phrase grounds for such arrest are preceded by the word “forthwith”. On the other hand, section 19 PMLA qualifies the requirement of informing an accused of the grounds for such arrest with the phrase “as soon as may be”.
Relying on Prabir Purkayastha v. State, (2024) 8 SCC 254, the Court examined the distinction between “grounds of arrest” and “reasons for arrest” and noted that the grounds of arrest must contain specific details justifying the arrest and be personal to the accused, whereas the reasons for arrest are general parameters such as preventing further offenses or ensuring proper investigation. The Court also analyzed the difference between Section 50 CrPC, which requires immediate communication (“forthwith”), and Section 19 of the PMLA, which allows for some delay (“as soon as may be”).
Relying on Pranav Kuckreja vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine Del 9549, the Court discussed the significance and meaning of the word “forthwith” appearing in section 50 of the CrPC with reference to serving the grounds of arrest upon an arrestee. The Court in the case opined that the constitutional safeguards available against curtailment of liberty, the word “forthwith” appearing in section 50 CrPC must be interpreted strictly, meaning thereby that the grounds of arrest or the grounds for arrest must be communicated to an arrestee immediately and without delay. Thus, the Court held that the word “forthwith” appearing in section 50 CrPC mandates the Arresting Officer (‘A.O.’) to serve upon an arrestee the grounds of arrest simultaneously with the issuance, or as part, of the arrest memo.
The Court observed that though a person may be detained for enquiry or interrogation, it is only when an I.O. forms an opinion that there are some justifiable grounds to arrest a person that he would place the person under arrest. Once the grounds for requiring a person’s arrest have been formulated in the investigating officer’s mind, there can possibly be no reason why those grounds cannot be reduced into writing and communicated to the person simultaneously at the time of arrest. Therefore, in the opinion of this court, any other connotation of the word “forthwith” would not only dilute the plain meaning of that word but would also erode the fundamental right of a person not to be deprived of his liberty, without being expressly and formally informed as to why he was being arrested, so also to enable him to seek legal recourse against such arrest.
The Court remarked that “there can be no contest that the petitioner was formally arrested when the arrest memo was issued to him i.e., at 06:30 p.m. on 17-05-2024. In compliance with section 50 of the CrPC, as interpreted above, the I.O. was required to serve the grounds of arrest upon the petitioner simultaneously with the issuance of the arrest memo. This was admittedly not done. Thus, the arrest of the petitioner is vitiated for non-compliance with the mandate of section 50 of the CrPC and Article 22(1) of the Constitution”
The Court also remarked that “the via media adopted by the Magistrate, whereby the Magistrate directed the I.O. to serve the grounds of arrest in writing upon the petitioner after the petitioner had already been produced in court; and then observing that since the remand hearing took-place about an hour later, it was sufficient compliance of the law, reduced the petitioner’s right under section 50 CrPC to a farce.”
Thus, the Court set aside the remand order and directed the petitioner to be released from custody.
[Marfing Tamang v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 548, decided on 04-02-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Mr. Adit S. Pujari and Ms. Shaurya Mittal, Advocates for petitioner
Mr. Utkarsh, APP for the State. SI Virender and SI Devi Prasad, P.S.: Kamla Market.
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