Year in Review 2024: Key Arbitration Pronouncements

Introduction

The landscape of arbitration law in India continues to evolve, with courts consistently refining the interpretation and application of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996¹ (Arbitration Act). The year 2024 has been particularly significant, with various courts delivering landmark judgments that clarify crucial aspects of arbitration practice and procedure. These judicial pronouncements have addressed fundamental questions regarding limitation periods, jurisdictional interplay between different legal regimes, the scope of judicial intervention, enforceability of arbitration clauses, and the powers and limitations of Arbitral Tribunals.

This article presents a compilation of nineteen landmark judgments from 2024 that have substantially influenced arbitration jurisprudence in India. From the Supreme Court’s clarification on limitation periods for Section 11(6) applications to High Courts’ interpretations on virtual service of arbitration notices, these decisions reflect the judiciary’s ongoing efforts to balance party autonomy with legal certainty while ensuring efficiency and fairness in arbitration proceedings.

Key arbitration pronouncements of 2024

(1) Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd.²

Issue: Whether an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act³ is subject to a limitation period, and if so, when the limitation period begins?

This issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, wherein the Court held that while Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, does not prescribe a limitation period, Section 43 of the same makes the Limitation Act, 1963⁴, applicable to arbitration proceedings. Since no specific article in the Limitation Act, 1963 governs Section 11(6) applications, the Court held that Article 137, prescribing a three-year limitation period, would apply.

The Court also delved into the question of when the right to apply under Section 11(6) would accrue. It held that the limitation period would begin only after a valid notice invoking arbitration has been sent by the applicant to the other party, and there has been a failure or refusal on the part of the other party to comply with the notice. Thus, the Court held that the limitation period for an application under Section 11(6) commences when the party seeking arbitration has exhausted the process of invoking arbitration and the other party has either failed or refused to act.

The Court further categorised the issues raised in an application under Section 11(6) into “admissibility” and “jurisdictional” issues. While limitation was recognised as an admissibility issue, the Court also stressed the importance of examining the claim at the threshold stage to ensure that non-arbitrable or dead claims are not referred to arbitration, which would otherwise waste time and resources.

The Court laid a two-pronged test to deal with the issue of limitation in applications under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. The first prong is to determine whether the petition is barred by limitation, and the second prong is to assess whether the claims sought to be arbitrated are “ex-facie dead” and barred by limitation at the time of the commencement of the arbitration proceedings. If either of these factors is unfavorable to the party seeking arbitration, the Court may refuse to appoint an arbitrator.

(2) Dani Wooltex Corpn. v. Sheil Properties (P) Ltd.⁵

Issue: Can an Arbitral Tribunal terminate proceedings under Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration Act⁶ on the ground of abandonment of a claim?

This issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, wherein the Court held that abandonment of a claim under Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration Act must be established through compelling evidence, either expressly or impliedly. The Court emphasised that mere non-appearance or procedural lapses by a party do not automatically amount to abandonment.

The Court held that abandonment could not be inferred merely from procedural lapses or non-appearance without compelling evidence of a clear intent to forgo the claim. The Court further noted that the Arbitral Tribunal had a duty to manage the proceedings actively and the failure of a party to schedule hearings or attend meetings did not automatically justify terminating the proceedings.

The Court held that:

25.4. The abandonment of the claim by a claimant can be a ground to invoke clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 32. The abandonment of the claim can be either express or implied. The abandonment cannot be readily inferred. There is an implied abandonment when admitted or proved facts are so clinching that the only inference which can be drawn is of the abandonment. Only if the established conduct of a claimant is such that it leads only to one conclusion that the claimant has given up his/her claim can an inference of abandonment be drawn. Even if it is to be implied, there must be convincing circumstances on record which lead to an inevitable inference about the abandonment. Only because a claimant, after filing his statement of claim, does not move the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date for the hearing, the failure of the claimant, per se, will not amount to the abandonment of the claim.⁷

(3) Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd.⁸

Issue: Under what circumstances can the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award be refused on the ground of bias?

The Supreme Court, herein, held that the refusal to enforce a foreign arbitral award on the ground of bias should be an exception rather than the norm.

The Court held that the bias standards for preventing the enforcement of an award are stricter than those for ordinary judicial review, and courts worldwide typically apply a higher threshold for bias in arbitration cases.

The Court held that:

34. … there can be no difficulty in holding that the most basic notions of morality and justice under the concept of “public policy” would include bias. However, courts must endeavour to adopt international best practices instead of domestic standards, while determining bias. It is only in exceptional circumstances that enforcement should be refused on the ground of bias.⁹

(4) NHAI v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.¹⁰

Issue: Can a court correct errors of fact or reinterpret contracts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act¹¹?

Considering the aforementioned issue before it, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is narrow, and courts therein cannot act as appellate bodies to correct factual errors or reinterpret contracts.

Pertinently, the Court cautioned against adopting a corrective approach typically used in appellate review and held that under Section 34, courts must exercise restraint and not substitute their judgment for that of the Tribunal.

The Court held that dissenting opinions, although valuable in understanding different perspectives, do not form part of the award and cannot be treated as the majority decision. It held that dissenting opinions are intended to inform the parties and may have value in procedural matters, but they cannot be elevated to the status of an award in the absence of a specific statutory power to do so.

(5) Pitambar Solvex (P) Ltd. v. Manju Sharma¹²

Issue: Does the initiation of arbitration proceedings bar a corporate debtor from seeking remedies under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016¹³ (IBC)?

This issue fell for consideration before the Delhi High Court , wherein the Court held that the initiation of arbitration proceedings does not preclude a corporate debtor from seeking remedies under the IBC. It held that the parties retained the right to pursue their claims before the arbitrator, without prejudice to their rights under other legal provisions.

The Court held that:

Merely initiation of the arbitration proceedings does not bar the corporate debtor from pursuing his other remedies including those under the Insolvency Bankruptcy Code.

(6) Dhansar Engg. Co. (P) Ltd. v. Eastern Coalfields Ltd.¹⁴

Issue: Whether an arbitration clause can be deemed incorporated by a subsequent circular?

This issue fell for consideration before the Calcutta High Court , wherein, the Court held that under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act¹⁵, an arbitration clause can be incorporated into a contract by reference, but such incorporation requires the conscious acceptance of both parties. It held that while the circular demonstrated an intent to promote arbitration as a mechanism for resolving disputes with private contractors, it did not explicitly incorporate an arbitration clause into the existing contract.

The Court held that a policy circular issued by a parent company, contemplating arbitration, cannot be considered an arbitration agreement if it requires additional consent from the contractor to initiate arbitration.

It held that:

18. An arbitration clause cannot be deemed to have been incorporated by way of a subsequent circular, unless it is specifically referred to and included in the original agreement between the parties. Section 7(5) mandates a reference in a contract containing an arbitration clause. In the absence of any mutual intention to incorporate the arbitration clause from another document into the existing contract between the parties, there is no valid arbitration agreement.¹⁶

Referring to decisions of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander¹⁷ and M.R. Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd. v. Som Datt Builders Ltd.¹⁸ the Court noted that the incorporation of an arbitration clause requires specific reference in the contract to another document containing the clause

(7) Vedanta Ltd. v. Shreeji Shipping¹⁹

Issue: Whether an arbitration clause stipulating multiple choices of seats is void under Section 29 of the Contract Act, 1872²⁰?

This issue fell for consideration before the Delhi High Court, wherein the Court held that an arbitration clause is not void for uncertainty under Section 29 of the Contract Act, 1872, merely because it provides multiple choices of seats. The Court held that Section 29 pertains to agreements that are uncertain or incapable of being made certain.

Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd.²¹ the Court reiterated that the designation of a seat of arbitration is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. It noted that once a seat is determined, the courts at that seat would have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate arbitral proceedings. Given the arbitration clause’s mention of three potential seats, the Court upheld its jurisdiction to entertain the Section 11 petition, as one of the seat options was Delhi.

(8) ICDS Ltd. v. Bhaskaran Pillai²²

Issue: Whether an arbitration agreement is invalid if it refers to the Arbitration Act, 1940, as the applicable law?

The Karnataka High Court , considering the aforementioned issue, held that references to the Arbitration Act, 1940 (1940 Act) in agreements executed after the enactment of the Arbitration Act (1996) do not invalidate such agreements. Rather, such references must be understood as being subject to the provisions of the new Act unless explicitly stated otherwise by the parties.

The Court noted that incorrect or outdated references to the 1940 Act in arbitration agreements after the Arbitration Act’s enactment should not invalidate the agreement. Instead, the agreement must be construed under the Arbitration Act’s framework to reflect the intent of the parties and ensure continuity in arbitration law.

The Court held that the repeal of the 1940 Act by Section 85 of the Arbitration Act²³ did not destroy rights or liabilities under the repealed enactment unless the parties agreed otherwise. It further held that even if an arbitration agreement executed after the Arbitration Act referred to the 1940 Act, such references would not invalidate the agreement, giving primacy to the intent to arbitrate.

(9) Gajendra Mishra v. Pokhrama Foundation²⁴

Issue: Whether a party can insist on fulfilling pre-arbitral steps after terminating the contract?

This issue fell for consideration before the Delhi High Court , wherein the Court held that once a party unilaterally terminates the contract, it cannot insist that the other party comply with pre-arbitral steps outlined in the agreement.

The Court held that by terminating the agreement without engaging the project manager for resolution or conciliation, the respondent rendered the pre-arbitral steps inapplicable. It held that once the agreement was terminated, any scope for settlement or conciliation under its terms, including the involvement of the project manager, was extinguished because the designated authority under the agreement ceased to exist upon its termination.

(10) Apex Buildsys Ltd. v. Ircon International Ltd.²⁵

Issue: Whether an arbitration clause granting one party the power to appoint two-thirds of the Arbitral Tribunal violates neutrality and fairness principles?

The Delhi High Court , herein, held that an arbitration clause granting one party the power to appoint two out of three arbitrators, including the presiding arbitrator, violates the principles of neutrality, counter-balancing, and broad-based representation.

The Court held that Clause 73 of the agreement provided the respondent with disproportionate control over the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal which empowered it to appoint two out of three arbitrators, including the presiding arbitrator. It was determined that arbitration clauses granting one party excessive control over arbitrator appointments fail to meet the test of neutrality and counterbalancing.

(11) Lease Plan India (P) Ltd. v. Rudraksh Pharma Distributor²⁶

Issue: Whether virtual service of arbitration notice via email and WhatsApp is sufficient?

The Delhi High Court , herein, determined that the service of arbitration notice through virtual modes, such as email and WhatsApp, is sufficient to establish due service.

The Court noted that the petitioner filed an affidavit which demonstrated that service on the respondents was complete through virtual modes especially through email and WhatsApp, as directed by the Court. It noted that the address used for service by speed post was the address mentioned in the lease agreement between the parties under Clause 10.3, which was also the address where the notice of arbitration had been duly served. While the notice sent by speed post indicated that no such person was available at the address, the Court held that it was satisfied that virtual service was properly affected.

(12) Telecommunication Consultants India Ltd v. Shivaa Trading²⁷

Issue: Whether the unilateral appointment of an arbitrator renders the arbitral award void ab initio?

This issue fell for consideration before the Delhi, High Court , wherein the Court held that a unilateral appointment of an arbitrator renders the arbitral award void ab initio and even the appointing party can challenge such an award.

The Court, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd.²⁸ noted that a unilateral appointment of an arbitrator can be challenged, even by the appointing party, and that mere participation in the arbitral proceedings cannot be construed as a waiver of the right to object. The Court noted that Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act²⁹ renders an arbitrator unilateral appointment by a party de jure ineligible and any such appointment inherently lacks jurisdiction. Consequently, it held that any proceedings conducted, or awards rendered by such an arbitrator are void ab initio.

(13) Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. v. Kataria Sales Corpn.³⁰

Issue: Whether a fresh Section 21 of the Arbitration Act notice is required for recommencing arbitration after an award is set aside?

The Bombay High Court held that once arbitration proceedings have been triggered by a prior notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996³¹, there is no requirement for a fresh invocation notice if the arbitral award is set aside.

The Court held that since the arbitration mechanism was already triggered through the issuance of a prior notice, and arbitral proceedings had commenced, there was no requirement for a new invocation notice. The Court held that the dispute between the parties remained unchanged, and the petitioner was merely seeking the appointment of a neutral and competent arbitrator after the earlier award was set aside due to the ineligibility of the unilaterally appointed arbitrator.

The Court noted that Section 21 serves as the starting point for arbitration and that once arbitration proceedings are triggered, the section does not require a fresh invocation notice if the first award is set aside under Section 34.

(14) Power Mech Projects Ltd. v. Doosan Power Systems India (P) Ltd.³²

Issue: Whether courts can extend the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate after expiry under Section 29-A(4)?

Herein, the Delhi High Court held that under Section 29-A(4) of the Arbitration Act³³, courts have the authority to extend the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal even after its expiry.

The Court referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Rohan Builders (India) (P) Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd.³⁴ (Rohan Builders) where it was held that if an arbitral award is not delivered within the specified time limits under Section 29-A(1) and/or Section 29-A(3) of the Arbitration Act, the Tribunal’s mandate automatically expires. The Calcutta High Court further held that parties must file a petition under Section 29-A(4) before the Tribunal’s mandate expires, as seeking an extension post-expiry is impermissible due to the legislative intent, which uses the term “terminate” in Section 29-A(5) and does not provide for “revival” or “renewal”.

However, the Court referred to decisions of the other courts, including the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court and the Keral High Court a, have taken a different approach. For instance, the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court in H.P. Singh v. G.M. Northern Railways³⁵ held that the Court has the authority to extend the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal beyond the initial period specified under Section 29-A(4). Similarly, the Kerala High Court, in Hiran Valiiyakkil Lal v. Vineeth M.V.³⁶ allowed for an extension based on sufficient cause, either before or after the expiry of the period under Sections 29-A(2) and (3).

The Court also referred to the Bombay High Court in Nikhil H. Malkan v. Standard Chartered Investment and Loans (India) Ltd.³⁷ wherein the Court disagreed with the Calcutta High Court’s decision in Rohan Builders³⁸ and held that the Court can entertain extension petitions even after the expiry of the mandate, provided there are sufficient grounds.

The Delhi High Court referred to Section 29-A(4) and noted that the phrase “prior to or after expiry of the period so specified” gives the Court the power to extend the mandate even after the expiry of the originally specified period. Therefore, the Court held that it retained full authority to extend the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal beyond the expiration date.

(15) NHAI v. Musafir³⁹

Issue: Can an Arbitral Tribunal recall or modify its award under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act⁴⁰?

This issue fell for consideration before the Allahabad, High Court, wherein the Court held that an Arbitral Tribunal lacks the power to recall or modify its Award under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act.

The Court noted that Section 33 permits the Tribunal to correct any clerical or computational errors, interpret the award, or issue an additional award to address claims inadvertently omitted from the original award. However, the Court held that these actions are contingent upon a party’s request, although the Tribunal may, on its own initiative, correct errors within 30 days of the award. The Court held that the Arbitral Tribunal is not empowered to recall or modify its award which distinguishes its limited powers from the broader discretionary authority of courts.

(16) Allied-Dynamic JV v. Ircon International Ltd.⁴¹

Issue: Can an arbitral award be challenged on the ground of bias if no objection was raised during the arbitral proceedings?

This issue fell for consideration before the Delhi High Court , wherein the Court held that an arbitral award cannot be challenged on the ground of bias if no formal objection was raised during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings.

(17) Fortuna Skill Management (P) Ltd. v. Jaina Mktg. and Associates⁴²

Issue: Is an Arbitral Tribunal justified in rejecting a late application for additional evidence?

The Delhi High Court held that an Arbitral Tribunal is justified in rejecting an application for additional evidence if it is made at the final stage of proceedings without valid reasons for the delay.

The Court pressed on the importance of fair, speedy, and inexpensive trials in arbitration. It held that allowing the application would have set the case back to the stage of trial and examination of witnesses.

The Court held that an application for additional evidence could be allowed at the fag end of proceedings, but only if the evidence could not have been produced earlier or there were valid reasons for its non-production. The Court held that the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the petitioner’s application as permitting the additional evidence would have caused unnecessary delay and disrupted the efficient and expedient conduct of arbitration.

(18) PLUS91 Security Solutions v. NEC Corpn. India (P) Ltd.⁴³

Issue: Can an Arbitral Tribunal award damages for loss of profit if the contract expressly excludes such claims?

This issue fell for consideration before the Delhi High Court in PLUS91 Security Solutions case⁴⁴ wherein the Court held that an Arbitral Tribunal cannot award damages for loss of profit if such claims are expressly excluded under the contract.

The Court noted that Clause 10 of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) therein clearly stated that neither party would be liable for indirect, special, or consequential losses, including loss of goodwill, revenue, or profit. The Court held that the Tribunal’s decision to award such damages was in direct conflict with the aforementioned clause.

Referring to Section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act⁴⁵, the Court reiterated that arbitral decisions must align with the terms of the underlying contract. The Court held that the Tribunal’s decision to grant damages for loss of profit and to award interest violated the express terms of the MoU which precluded such claims.

(19) Pallab Ghosh v. Simplex Infrastructures Ltd.⁴⁶

Issue: Whether the existence of an alternative remedy under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) (RERA) Act, 2016 bars the invocation of arbitration if an arbitration clause governs the dispute?

The Gauhati High Court determined that the existence of an alternative remedy under the RERA Act does not preclude the invocation of arbitration if an arbitration clause governs the dispute.

The Court held that:

35. … there is nothing to show that there is any inconsistency or repugnancy between the provisions of the RERA Act and arbitration as an alternative. Even otherwise, the parties have both agreed to the arbitration clause being provided in the contract agreement for settlement of their disputes including the issue raised by the petitioners herein.

The Court referred to para 55 of Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn.⁴⁷ where it was held that the doctrine of election to select arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism by mutual agreement is available only if the law permits the existence of arbitration as an alternative remedy and freedom of choice is present. It further noted that there should be no inconsistency or repugnancy between the provisions of the mandatory law and arbitration as an alternative. Conversely, where there is repugnancy and inconsistency, the right to choose arbitration is denied. It held that when arbitration cannot enforce such rights or the award cannot be implemented in the manner provided by law, the right to elect arbitration in preference to courts or other public forums is either completely denied or curtailed.

The Court held that if additional specific or special remedies are available, the right to choose arbitration over a public forum should be denied or curtailed. However, it held that there is no indication of any inconsistency or repugnancy between the provisions of the RERA Act and arbitration as an alternative.

Conclusion

The arbitration landscape in 2024 reveals an effort by various courts to develop an arbitration regime focused on balance of party preferences and procedural requisites under the Arbitration Act. Courts have consistently narrowed the scope for judicial intervention while reinforcing procedural safeguards. The distinction between jurisdictional and admissibility issues has been refined, particularly in limitation matters. Notably, courts have prioritised substantive fairness over technical formalities, as seen in rulings on virtual notice service and pre-arbitral steps after contract termination. The judiciary has balanced party autonomy with fairness principles by invalidating unilateral appointment structures and upholding multi-seat clauses. Most significantly, courts have clarified boundaries between various competing legal regimes — insolvency, real estate, and arbitration — demonstrating a commitment to harmonising India’s evolving arbitration framework rather than creating regulatory silos. These trends point toward a maturing arbitration ecosystem that values efficiency, autonomy, and principled judicial restraint.