2022 SCC Vol. 9 Part 3

    Constitution of India — Art. 21 — “Victim” of crime: Scope of rights of “victim” of crime, to participate in

   

Constitution of India — Art. 21 — “Victim” of crime: Scope of rights of “victim” of crime, to participate in criminal proceedings, at various stages, including at stage of bail proceedings, particularly after insertion of S. 2(wa) vide CrPC Amendment Act of 2008, explained. [Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321]

Constitution of India — Art. 32: In this case, there was incident of violence leading to multiple deaths and injuries involving son of senior politician/sitting Minister of the Union Government, which took place during public protests against Government action, in home region/State of such Minister/his son. But protests were being carried out by members of public hailing mainly from another State. Special Investigation Team (SIT) constituted to investigate the same as there is need to ensure that justice is seen to be done as well. [Violence in lakhimpur kheri (U.P.) Leading to Loss of Life, In re, (2022) 9 SCC 337]

Consumer Protection — Services — Housing and Real Estate — Possession — Delivery of possession — Delay — Refund of principal amount along with simple interest @ 10.25% p.a. to allottee — Grant of: Date of issuance of fire NOC i.e. the principle laid down in Abhishek Khanna, (2021) 3 SCC 241 is not relevant when flat not ready even by taking into account such date. [IREO (P) Ltd. v. Aloke Anand, (2022) 9 SCC 412]

Consumer Protection — Services — Housing and Real Estate — Possession — Delivery of possession — Delay: Date of issuance of fire NOC, for computing/determining date of delivery of possession is not relevant, when developer raises demand based upon stage of construction even prior to issuance of fire safety clearance. [Ireo Victory Valley (P) Ltd. v. Shamshul Hoda Khan, (2022) 9 SCC 423]

Education Law — Employment and Service Matters re Educational Institutions — Appointment/Recruitment — Appointment of Lecturer — Criteria/Eligibility: It is duty of courts, whether trying original proceedings or hearing appeal, to take notice of change in law affecting pending actions and to give effect to same. Further held, if it is found that an amendment speaks language which expressly or by clear intendment takes in even pending matters, court must have regard to intention so expressed and court of appeal may give effect to such law even after judgment of court of first instance. Where an enactment or an amendment is declaratory, curative or clarificatory, impelled by felt need to make intention clear, such amendment usually operates from antecedent date. [University of Kerala v. Merlin J.N., (2022) 9 SCC 389]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Ss. 238-A and 7 — Limitation: Condonability of delay in approaching adjudicating authority (NCLT) i.e. beyond the period of three years from the date of accrual of the right to sue, that is, the date of default, explained. Grant of opportunity to financial creditor to explain delay i.e. that there was sufficient cause for delay, prior to rejection of application is necessary. [Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Kew Precision Parts (P) Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 364]

Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — Ss. 16 and 56 — Refund — Interest on account of delay in refund: Wherever a statute specifies or regulates the interest, the interest will be payable in terms of the provisions of the statute. However, wherever a statute is silent about the rate of interest and there is no express bar for payment of interest, any delay in paying the compensation or the amounts due, would attract award of interest at a reasonable rate on equitable grounds. [Union of India v. Willowood Chemicals (P) Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 341]

Maharashtra Protection of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (16 of 2000) — Ss. 2(c) & (d) and S. 4 — Exchange for spot trading in commodities: Consideration of exchange for spot trading in commodities, as a financial establishment within the purview of the MPID Act, 1999, determined.Scope and ambit of term “financial establishment”, defined under S. 2(d) as any person accepting a “deposit” and meaning of the expression “deposits”, explained. Receipt of money/commodities, when can be regarded as “deposits” within the meaning of S. 2(c) of the MPID Act, 1999 and satisfaction of test of “return” i.e. return in cash, kind or service without the necessity of it being with the benefit of interest, bonus or profit, for determining if receipts are deposits, also explained. [State of Maharashtra v. 63 Moons Technologies Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 457]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 392 — Robbery with murder: Recovery of some cash, when not sufficient by itself, to establish guilt, explained. [Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 9 SCC 402]

Securities, Markets and Exchanges — Insider Trading: Determination of insider trading, explained. [Balram Garg v. SEBI, (2022) 9 SCC 425]

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