Supreme Court: An appeal was filed from the decree of the Allahabad High Court (‘the High Court’) dated 21-01-1947, whereby the appellants’ suit for possession of four villages situated in Bulandshahr and Aligarh districts was dismissed. The Division Bench of M.C. Mahajan* and N.H. Bhagwati, JJ., opined that the Additional Civil Judge, Aligarh (‘Trial Court’) and the High Court had erred in holding that the terminus a quo for limitation was the date on which the tripartite family arrangement was arrived at and not the date of the death of Rani Kushal Kaur (‘the widow’). The Supreme Court opined that the Trial Court and the High Court had decided the case not on the real nature of the document, but on its mere form.
Undoubtedly, it was true that in the documents it was stated that the widow had surrendered her whole estate in favour of Anand Singh, and it was Anand Singh who retransferred a portion of it to the widow. However, the fact remained that the widow kept a substantial portion for herself or with her nominees. Thus, limitation for the present suit could only start on the date of the widow’s death. The Supreme Court opined that since the suit was instituted on time, the appellants were entitled to the decree in the suit and accordingly allowed the present appeal.
Background
Respondent-Rao Raghuvendra Singh, was the grandson of Rao Raghuraj Singh, whose mother was the daughter of Rao Karan Singh, the original owner of the properties in dispute. Whereas the appellant-Sunder Singh was the son of Kanwar Anand Singh who was adopted by another daughter of the Rao Karan Singh. Rao Karan Singh was the owner of Barauli Estate which comprised immovable properties situated in Aligarh and Bulandshahr Districts of Uttar Pradesh. He died on 11-5-1888, leaving him surviving, two widows, Rani Inder Kuar and Rani Kushal Kuar and two daughters, Naraini Kaur and Durga Kaur and the two sons of Naraini Kaur.
On 24-2-1919, Kushal Kaur was alleged to have adopted Rao Raj Kanwar Singh. This adoption was contested by Anand Singh. Meanwhile, Raj Kanwar Singh denied Anand Singh’s adoption. The Trial Court upheld Anand Singh’s adoption and negatived the adoption of Raj Kanwar Singh. This decree was affirmed by the Appellate Court vide judgment dated 21-03-1923. Rani Inder Kaur, the Senior Rani of Rao Karan Singh died on 14-4-1896 and the whole of the estate came into the possession of the widow and since then she was in possession of the estate except the nine villages and some other villages that had been given to Naraini Kaur and her sons for their maintenance.
On 21-8-1924 a tripartite agreement was made between the widow, Kanwar Anand Singh, and Kanwar Raj Kanwar Singh. The result of this agreement was that out of the total income of Barauli Estate, estate fetching income of Rs. 53,446-12-0 fell to the lot of Anand Singh, estate fetching Rs 53,878 fell to the lot of Raj Kanwar Singh and properties fetching income of Rs 12,386-14-0 fell to the lot of the widow. Further, the nine villages that had been awarded to the sons of Naraini Kaur were in the possession of Rao Bharat Singh, her grandson. Four of these villages by this tripartite agreement were allotted to the share of Kanwar Anand Singh and five to the share of Raj Kanwar Singh.
A suit was filed on 2-1-1937, on the ground that Kanwar Anand Singh was the adopted son of Rani Durga Kaur and thus being the daughter’s son of Rao Karan Singh was entitled to succeed to all his properties. Possession was claimed of four villages which were comprised in the villages that had handed over to Naraini Kaur. It was averred that the cause of action accrued to the appellant to sue for possession on the date of the widow’s death i.e. on 30-10-1924. Two months’ period was claimed on account of the notice given under Section 54 of the United Provinces Court of Wards Act, 1912 and in view of the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 (‘Limitation Act’). Excluding the period of two months, the limitation for the suit would expire on 30-12-1936. Appellant stated that on that date the courts were closed due to Christmas vacation and the suit was brought on the reopening date and was thus within time.
The Trial Court held that Anand Singh was the adopted son of the daughter of Rao Karan Singh. He, however, dismissed the suit on the plea of limitation on the finding that the cause of action accrued to the appellant to sue for possession of these villages on 21-8-1924, the date of surrender of her husband’s estate by the widow in favour of Anand Singh. The High Court upheld the adoption of Kanwar Anand Singh, treated the deed of 21-8-1924 as a deed of valid surrender and held that the cause of action of the appellant to sue for possession of the suit properties arose on that date and the suit was barred by limitation.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Supreme Court opined that the arrangement arrived at, though ostensibly a surrender, was in fact not a bona fide surrender by the widow in favour of the next reversioner but was a mere device to divide the estate with the reversioner. The whole purpose was to get from Anand Singh a little more than half the estate for the benefit of an utter stranger, Raj Kanwar who had lost his battle as an adopted son. The Supreme Court relied on Sureshwar Misser v. Maheshrani Misrain, 1920 SCC OnLine PC 48 and Phool Kuer v. Pem Kuer, (1952) 1 SCC 486 and opined that it was settled law that in order that a surrender by a widow might be valid, it must be a surrender of her whole interest in the whole estate in favour of the nearest reversioner and it must be a bona fide surrender and not a device to divide the estate with the reversioner.
The Supreme Court opined that the Trial Court and the High Court had erred in holding that the terminus a quo for limitation was the date on which the tripartite family arrangement was arrived at and not the date of the death of the widow. The tripartite family arrangement was given the form of deed of surrender, though in truth it evidenced an arrangement to divide the estate of Rao Karan Singh between Raj Kanwar Singh, who was a stranger, the widow and Anand Singh. Such an arrangement had not the effect of a surrender and did not reopen succession in favour of the reversionary heir.
The Supreme Court noted that the widow retained more property in her hands and in the hands of her nominee than she surrendered to the next reversioner. All the movable assets which were valuable were kept by her, property fetching income worth Rs. 15,000 was retained by herself, property fetching income over Rs. 53,000 was given to Raj Kanwar Singh and the next reversioner Anand Singh only received property fetching income of Rs 53,000. Such an arrangement by no stretch of imagination could be described a valid surrender under Hindu law by a widow in favour of the next reversioner.
The Supreme Court opined that the Judges in the Trial Court and the High Court had decided the case not on the real nature of the document, but on its mere form. Undoubtedly, it was true that in the documents it was stated that the widow had surrendered her whole estate in favour of Kanwar Anand Singh, and it was Anand Singh who retransferred half of the estate to Raj Kanwar Singh and a portion of it to the widow. However, the fact remained that the widow kept a substantial portion for herself or with her nominees. Thus, limitation for the present suit could only start on the date of the widow’s death under Article 141 of the Limitation Act, and excluding the two months that the appellants were entitled to under Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, the suit was in time as it was filed on the reopening date of the court on 2-1-1937. Therefore, the suit was erroneously dismissed on the point of limitation.
Thus, the Supreme Court opined that since the suit was instituted on time, the appellants were entitled to the decree in the suit and accordingly allowed the present appeal.
[Kunwar Sunder Singh v. Rao Raghuvendra Pratap Singh, (1953) 1 SCC 407, decided on 12-03-1953]
Note: Limitation Act, 1963
The law of limitation specifies the statutory time within which an individual might initiate a legal proceeding, and if the suit is instituted after the expiry of the time prescribed it will be barred by the limitation. Article 65(b) of Part V of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that where the suit for possession of immovable property is filed by a Hindu or Muslim entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of the Hindu or Muslim female, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the female dies. The period of limitation of such suit is twelve years and the time from which period begins to run is when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
*Judgment authored by- Justice M.C. Mahajan
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Appellants: S.K. Dar, Senior Advocate (B.S. Shastri, Advocate, with him);
