Jharkhand High Court: In a case concerning contempt proceedings under the Director General of Police, Government of Jharkhand (‘DGP’) and the Superintendent of Police, Hazaribag (‘SP’), Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J., stated that earlier the Court had initiated the suo motu contempt in Court on its own motion v. Rajiv Ranjan, 2024 SCC OnLine Jhar 1224, (‘Rajiv Ranjan case’) and the procedure followed by this Court in that case was not accepted by the Division Bench and to avoid proceeding in haste, clarification on the procedure was necessary before proceeding in the present matter.
Considering the aforesaid situation, the Court would not proceed further for initiation of contempt proceeding against the DGP and SP, before having any answer for the procedure. The Court opined that the judgment of Rajiv Ranjan case, which was regarding contempt case against Advocate General and Additional Advocate General, was required to be reconsidered by the larger bench. Thus, the Court referred the matter to the larger bench of the Court to consider the procedure to be followed for initiation of contempt proceedings.
Background
By order dated 08-04-2024, it was stated that the State was directed to take an instruction regarding the investigation of the case and was also directed to file supplementary counter affidavit within two weeks, however, till date, the said supplementary counter affidavit was not filed. Thus, the DGP was directed to look into the matter.
Further, in Order dated 29-04-2024, the Court observed that the DGP had filed the supplementary counter affidavit in the matter. The Court observed that in the supplementary counter affidavit, it was disclosed that the SP upon further investigation, submitted supplementary chargesheet against the petitioner, showed them to be absconder. The Court noted in the supplementary chargesheet, it was stated that the petitioner was on bail, but in counter affidavit, disclosure was made that petitioner was absconding. Thus, in order dated 29-04-2024, the Court observed that SP had misguided the DGP and as such the DGP was required to file a supplementary affidavit.
Subsequently, by order dated 06-05-2024, the Court observed that again the misleading affidavit was filed. It appeared that another page was missing of the supplementary charge sheet which further suggested that it was done only to mislead this Court as further false affidavit was filed by the DGP. The Court in that order stated that this aspect of filing of false affidavit was the subject matter before the several High Courts and the Supreme Court and it had been repeatedly emphasized that averments in the affidavit should be clear and specific and to the dismay of the Court it was not only vague but highly unsatisfactory. It was well settled that a person makes a false statement before Court and tried to deceive the Court, was guilty of contempt of Court. The Court stated that prima facie, the DGP and SP were in contempt of Court.
In the present case, pursuant to the order dated 06-05-2024, Interim Application 1 (‘IA 1’) was filed by the DGP for withdrawal of the supplementary counter affidavits dated 26-04-2024 and 04-05-2024 respectively. Further, Interim Application 2 (‘IA 2’) was filed for allowing the DGP to file fresh consolidated supplementary counter affidavit in the matter. In IA 1, it was admitted that the mistake was done, but the mistake was bonafide and due to typographical error. Same ground was taken in earlier supplementary counter affidavit. Thereafter, the present interim application was filed.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Court suggested that filing of interim applications clearly suggested that it was an afterthought to save the skin of issuing the contempt proceeding. The Court stated that it found that the word ‘apology’ used in the interim applications and supplementary counter affidavits was belated and it was merely tendered as a weapon of defence and no cogent ground was taken. Thus, the Court rejected the IA 1 and IA 2.
In the order dated 06-05-2024, the Court observed that prima facie, the DGP and SP were in contempt of Court. However, on that day, the Court had not issued notice of contempt and observed that this aspect would be considered on the next date. The Court stated that it was facing difficulty in the present case, as on earlier two dates, notice of contempt was not issued. If the Court was issuing notice today, the charge was required to be framed before the notice itself or could it be framed after cognizance and appearance. Thus, the Court was confronted with the following situations:
1. When the Court had not issued the notice on previous dates, could it issue the notice now;
2. Whether the charge was required to be framed along with notice;
3. The Court had initiated the suo motu contempt in Court on its own motion v. Rajiv Ranjan, 2024 SCC OnLine Jhar 1224, (‘Rajiv Ranjan case’) and the procedure followed by this Court in that case was not accepted by the Division Bench and to avoid proceeding in haste, clarification on the procedure was necessary before proceeding in the present matter.
The Court stated that when a decision of a coordinate bench of the same High Court was brought in notice of the Bench, it was to be respected and was binding to the Bench of such co-equal strength. For taking a different view, it was required to refer the question to the larger bench, as it was the only course of action open to a Bench of a co-equal strength.
The Court stated that the judgment in Rajiv Ranjan case (supra), was prima facie contradictory to the judgments passed by the Supreme Court in Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC 335; Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P., 1993 Suppl (1) SCC 529 and In Re, Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584. The Court stated that it did not want to proceed after distinguishing the judgment of the Division Bench in view of principle of judicial propriety, as this Court was of the view that the Rajiv Ranjan case(supra) was per incuriam, which did not have binding effect.
Thus, considering the aforesaid situation, the Court would not proceed further for initiation of contempt proceeding against the DGP and SP, before having any answer for the procedure. The Court opined that the judgment of Rajiv Ranjan case was required to be reconsidered by the larger bench.
Following reference was made for consideration by larger bench that:
1. Whether on the first date of contemptuous act, the Court was required to take cognizance, or it should move with circumspection and, after being satisfied, cognizance could be taken and taking cognizance later was unfortunate or not? Moreover, was it necessary to record every word in the order, as language on the Bench and in judgments must comport with judicial propriety.
2. Whether the charges were to be framed on the very first date or on the date of taking cognizance, and after notice/cognizance, could the charges be framed on the first date of appearance?
3. When a contemner was put on notice along with all the documents and only after appearance, he could be provided to go through all the documents. Thereafter, was he required to be given full opportunity to review all the documents and respond after their appearance?
4. When a Single Judge of a constitutional court takes suo motu cognizance of contempt and sent the matter to the Division Bench, could it be considered as a reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (‘the Contempt Act’)? Further, could a constitutional Court Judge’s cognizance be considered as initiating the motion of contempt rather than merely a reference?
5. When an Advocate General was in contempt, then whether the procedure prescribed under Section 15(1)(c) and 15(3) of the Contempt Act was required? Was there any bar on the Court’s power to take suo motu action?
Thus, the Court directed all the papers and records before the Chief Justice of Jharkhand High Court for appropriate order.
[Mansoor Ansari v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 SCC OnLine Jhar 2129, decided on 05-07-2024]
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Petitioner: Praveen Shankar Dayal, Advocate
For the Respondent: Ashutosh Anand, A.A.G.-III and Sahbaj Akhtar, A.C. to A.A.G.-III.
