Supreme Court: In an appeal filed for the partition and separate possession of the properties, wherein the question of separation and adoption arose to determine the share in the properties, the three Judges bench of M.C. Mahajan, Vivian Bose* and B. Jagannadhadas, JJ., regarding the question of adoption, examined the Exhibit, wherein express prohibition was given against the adoption citing shastras and stated that it was direct prohibition against adopting one Kondayya’s eldest son. It did not matter, whether one Gopayya’s view of the shastras was right or wrong. That was how he felt and what he thought, therefore, there was a strong reason in his mind for prohibiting such an adoption.
The Supreme Court stated that it was not concerned with his reasons for giving such prohibition, but with whether he gave such a prohibition and whether the prohibition was intended to be absolute. So far as one Venkataramayya was concerned, it was. The Supreme Court stated that, the appellants had proved that there was an express prohibition against the adoption, consequently, even if a ceremony of adoption was gone through, it was of no avail. Thus, the Supreme Court held that there was no valid adoption. Further, the Supreme Court examined the various properties claimed by the appellants, and accordingly set aside the High Court’s decree and restored the Trial Court’s decree with certain modifications in the parties share in the properties.
Background
In the present case, the common ancestor of the parties, was one Kondayya Guru. He died leaving behind two sons, Venkataramayya and Gopayya. Venkataramayya died before 1857 leaving a son, one Chelikani Kondayya (‘Kondayya’).
The appellants’ case was that, at about ten years before Gopayya Garu’s death, Gopayya Garu separated in status from his nephew Kondayya. But, apart from the movables, only a village called Lingala was divided. The most important item of family property, a mokhasa village called Kakaravada, was kept joint along with certain other items of family property. Each branch had a half-share in these properties.
From that time the appellants stated that the shares descended as follows. Gopayya Garu whose share were being traced, had three wives. Of the three wives he had, two predeceased him and at the date of his death, he left behind one Challamma, the third of his three wives, and no sons. His share accordingly devolved on her. Challamma died on 28-08-1917 and on her death, estate went to one Pitchamma, a daughter of Gopayya by his second wife. Challamma’s own daughter, as well as the first wife’s two daughters, all predeceased Challamma, so Pitchamma succeeded.
Pitchamma died on 22-7-1923 and the estate went to Gopayya’s daughters’ sons. They were at that date four in number. The first three were Appellants 1-3 and the fourth was the Appellant 4’s father, another Gopayya. This second Gopayya died on 2-9-1930 and his son, Appellant 4, succeeded to his share. Thus, the four appellants between them were entitled to a half-share in the properties which were left undivided at the date of the separation.
The respondents deny the separation and state that the family has always been joint. Their case was that when Gopayya Garu died on 14-8-1867 the whole family property survived to Kondayya. Gopayya’s widow Challamma was only entitled to maintenance and that was all she ever received. The appellants, who claim through the daughters, thus have no title. The respondents also stated that Gopayya’s widow Challamma adopted Kondayya’s son Venkataramayya and thus the appellants, who claim through the daughters, were out of court.
The two main issues in the case were separation and adoption. The Trial Court found in the appellants’ favour on both these points. It held the partition proved and the adoption not proved. Accordingly, it decreed the claim. Subsequently, the High Court reversed this decree and held that the partition was not proved, and the adoption was proved. Thus, the appellants filed the present appeal.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
Regarding the question of separation, the Supreme Court examined various exhibits and one of the earliest documents i.e. inam fair register documents and observed that the High Court had doubted the genuineness of the documents. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Trial Court and stated that the documents had eight anna stamps, so the paper on which it was written was authentic. The Supreme Court stated that we have a circumstance in which a reasonable judicial mind could reach one conclusion almost as easily as the other. In a case like that, an appellate court ought not lightly to set aside a Trial Court’s conclusion unless it satisfactorily showed that the Trial Court was wrong. Since, in the present case, the Supreme Court was unable to find that, it disagreed with the High Court’s finding and upholding the Trial Court’s finding, held that Gopayya Garu and Chelikani Kondayya separated some years before the former’s death.
Further, regarding adoption, the Supreme Court noted that the Trial Court held that the adoption was not proved. However, the High Court differed from the Trial court and decided in favour of the adoption. The Supreme Court stated that once the factum was established every presumption regarding its legal validity should be made, especially after so many years. However, the presumption could not be used to destroy evidence which was positive and conclusive.
The Supreme Court examined the Exhibit R, which was made fifteen days after Gopayya’s death, wherein Challamma stated that, “The son that Kondayya Garu has now got, is his eldest son. Hence my husband stated that the adoption is not proper according to the shastras and authorised me to adopt a suitable boy from out of the male issue to be born to him hereafter and then died, etc.” The Supreme Court stated that in their opinion, this was direct prohibition against adopting Kondayya’s eldest son in fact, at that time it was his only son. It did not matter, whether Gopayya’s view of the shastras was right or wrong. That was how he felt and what he thought, therefore, there was a strong reason in his mind for prohibiting such an adoption.
The Supreme Court stated that it was not concerned with his reasons for giving such prohibition, but with whether he gave such a prohibition and whether the prohibition was intended to be absolute. So far as Venkataramayya was concerned, it was. The Supreme Court stated that, the appellants had proved that there was an express prohibition against the adoption of Venkataramayya, consequently, even if a ceremony of adoption was gone through, it was of no avail. Thus, the Supreme Court held that there was no valid adoption.
Further, the Supreme Court examined the various properties claimed by the appellants, and accordingly set aside the High Court’s decree and restored the Trial Court’s decree with certain modifications. The Supreme Court stated that in Schedule E, only the 100 sq yd purchased in 1927 and 1932 under the Exhibits would be included in the decree, and the rest would be excluded. Further, Schedule F properties would be excluded from the decree but the High Court’s directions regarding this with reference to the Schedule A properties would be included in the decree.
[Inuganti Venkata Surya Rao v. Chelikani Kondayya Rao, (1953) 1 SCC 656, decided on 10-04-1953]
*Judgment authored by- Justice Vivian Bose
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Appellants: M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General of India, and Achhru Ram, Senior Advocate (R. Ganapathy Iyer, Advocate, with him);
For the Respondents: D. Narasaraju, Advocate.
Note: Adoption by a Hindu female
The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (‘the Act’) was brought in force to amend and codify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance among Hindus. Section 8 of the Act specifies the capacity of a female Hindu to take in adoption. As per the provision, any female Hindu, who was of sound mind and was not a minor has the capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption. However, if she has a husband living, she shall not adopt a son or daughter except with the consent of her husband unless the husband has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind.
