Delhi High Court: In an appeal filed by the wife against order of the Family Court dismissing her application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) for dismissal of the divorce petition filed by the husband, the Division Bench of Rajiv Shakdher* and Amit Bansal, JJ., dismissed the appeal and stated that a petition could not be rejected in a piecemeal manner upon an application being moved under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
It was asserted by the wife that the divorce petition filed by the husband was pivoted on the grounds of cruelty, desertion, and adultery. It was further submitted by the wife that the pre-requites for desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (‘HMA’) had not been fulfilled as divorce could be granted on the ground of desertion only if the wife would have deserted the husband for not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. It was submitted by the wife that she cohabited with the husband till July 2022 and the petition was filed on 25-05-2024, therefore, the ground of desertion under Section 13 (1) (ib) of the HMA Act for grant of divorce was not available to the husband. The husband, on the contrary, argued that the wife had deserted him since November 2021.
It was further contended by the wife that as far as the ground for adultery was concerned, the person with whom the wife allegedly had an adulterous relationship had not been arrayed as a party, hence, the plaint was liable to be rejected.
The Court stated that although the contention of the wife was correct that even if November 2021 was assumed to be the date of desertion, the ground would still not be available to the husband as the divorce petition was filed only in May 2023, it could not have led to rejection of the divorce petition on the ground of cruelty.
The Court referred to Manjul Joshi v. Bhavna Khurana1, wherein it had been observed that a divorce action was a lis centred around the couple who had entered into matrimony, and a third party, who did not have the status of a spouse, had no locus to intervene or seek impleadment in such a cause. The Court said that the alleged adulterer (third party) could either be summoned as a witness or other evidence could be placed before the Family Court to prove adultery.
In concluding that the application preferred under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC was not sustainable, the Family Court reasoned that the divorce petition could not be rejected merely because a part of the cause of action was not viable in law if the Court otherwise had jurisdiction to entertain the action.
The Court said although the wife did not dispute the assertions of cruelty as levelled by the husband in the divorce petition, however, if taken on a standalone basis, it could not lead to dismissal of the divorce petition.
The Court observed that since the allegations concerning cruelty had been embedded in the divorce petition, it could be rejected in a piecemeal manner upon an application being moved under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The Court referred to Geetha v. Nanjundaswamy2, wherein it had been held that the plaint as presented must either be proceed with as a whole or be rejected as a whole but not in part.
In the given circumstances, the Court dismissed the appeal, being devoid of merits.
[X v. Y., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5078, decided on 16-07-2024]
*Judgment by Justice Rajiv Shakdher.
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Advocates for the appellant: Prateek Goswami, Dhiraj Goswami, Shashank Goswami, Advocates
1. 2024: DHC:4170-DB