Supreme Court: An appeal by special leave was filed from the judgment of the High Court of Pepsu (‘High Court’) affirming appellant’s conviction under Section 3021 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and the sentence of death passed against him by the Sessions Judge of Bhatinda. The 4-Judges Bench of M.C. Mahajan*, S.R. Das, Vivian Bose, and N.H. Bhagwati, JJ., held that it was difficult to subscribe to the proposition that where the eyewitnesses happen to be relations their evidence could not be accepted without corroboration. The rule of corroboration applicable to the case of accomplices or such like persons could not be extended and made applicable to cases where the eyewitnesses happen to be relations or inmates of the house and whereby reason of the nature and time of the occurrence no independent witnesses could possibly be present. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal to the extent that it commuted the sentence of death to one of transportation for life and the sentence under the Arms Act, 1959 (‘Arms Act’) would run concurrently.
Background
Mohan Singh, husband of Jai Kaur and appellant’s collateral, died about ten years ago leaving him surviving two sons, Jagrup Singh and Malkiat Singh and a daughter, Baltej Kaur. Jagrup Singh was married to Dalip Kaur and appellant-Harnam Singh’s wife had died and it was stated that Harnam Singh developed a liaison with Jai Kaur and used to sleep in her house off and on, and sometimes, took his meals there. The villagers began to taunt Jagrup Singh about his mother’s intimacy with Harnam Singh, thus, Jagrup Singh spoke to his mother, Jai Kaur and requested that she should not permit Harnam Singh to come to the house. Jai Kaur agreed, however, soon after Harnam Singh arrived at her house. Harnam Singh resented when Jai Kaur told him not to come to her house and was alleged to have stated that he would see if he could be stopped from coming to her house.
One day, Harnam Singh again appeared armed with a single-barrel gun and challenged Jai Kaur to come out and she humbly appealed to him not to fire, however, when she tried to run, she was fired upon from a distance of two-and-a-half karams. The shot struck her near the femur and when Harman Singh-accused was reloading the gun, he was grappled by Jagrup Singh, but he managed to escape. Jagrup went to the house of lambardar, who asked him to fetch another lambardar and then Jagrup informed both the lambardars that Harnam Singh had shot his mother. Both the lambardars made enquiries from Jai Kaur and she stated that it was Harnam Singh who had injured her. The FIR was recorded at 9.15 a.m. and then the Station House Officer left for the spot and reached there at about 11 am, and before his arrival Jai Kaur died. Later, the accused was arrested around 7 pm.
The statement of Dr Tilak Ram was recorded, and he stated that Jai Kaur died of internal haemorrhage in the peritoneal cavity on account of the firearm injury to the right pelvis, small intestines, uterus and large intestines and their vessels. The Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of Jai Kaur’s murder and convicted him for the offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him to death. The accused was also convicted under Section 19(f) of the Arms Act and sentenced him to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment. The accused preferred an appeal to the High Court and the record was also submitted to the High Court for confirmation of the death sentence. The appeal was dismissed, and the death sentence was confirmed.
Counsel for appellant submitted that the majority in the High Court were in error in holding that appellant was guilty of Jai Kaur’s murder. It was contended that there was no satisfactory explanation for the delay in making the FIR; there was a strong motive for Jagrup Singh to falsely implicate appellant; and there was no reasonable cause for appellant to murder Jai Kaur. It was also submitted that the recovery of the unlicensed gun from Jagrup Singh made the prosecution case doubtful and there was a valid ground for suspecting that Jagrup himself had a motive to kill his mother on account of her persistent unchastity and the circumstance that the investigating officers examined number of witnesses but did not produce them as witnesses and that a lambardar who was an important witness in the case was abandoned without any reasonable cause, furnished grounds to doubt the prosecution case. Counsel further submitted that Jagrup Singh’s conduct in not taking steps immediately to inform the lambardars about the occurrence and in not even asking his relations to do so and the fact that he called in no medical aid for his mother, Jai Kaur and allowed her to bleed to death indicated that he was the real accused.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Supreme Court opined that the exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution was not attracted. The Supreme Court stated that all the different considerations were related to the credibility of the eyewitnesses and the weight to be attached to their evidence and they did not raise any question of material error in the procedure followed at the trial and were not of such an extraordinary nature that would make the prosecution version impossible of belief or palpably false.
The Supreme Court relied on Pritam Singh v. State, 1950 SCC 189, wherein it was held by this Court that in an appeal by special leave, appellant was not free to contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised in the High Court and that in order to warrant a review of the decision appealed against, it was necessary to show that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice was done and that the case in question presented features of sufficient gravity. The Supreme Court opined that the present case did not fall within that rule or that it presented any special features of sufficient gravity to warrant interference with the decision of the Sessions Judge and of the majority in the High Court.
The Supreme Court held that it was difficult to subscribe to the proposition that where the eyewitnesses happen to be relations their evidence could not be accepted without corroboration. The rule of corroboration applicable to the case of accomplices or such like persons could not be extended and made applicable to cases where the eyewitnesses happen to be relations or inmates of the house and whereby reason of the nature and time of the occurrence no independent witnesses could possibly be present.
The Supreme Court opined that there was nothing very extraordinary in the conduct either of Jagrup Singh or of appellant which made the evidence given by the eyewitnesses impossible of belief. The Sessions Judge and the High Court took the conduct of both into consideration and felt satisfied that in the circumstances of the present case, there was nothing abnormal in the conduct of any one of those persons from which any inference could be drawn.
The Supreme Court held that there were no substantial grounds for disturbing appellant’s conviction for the offence under Section 30 of IPC and stated that the ends of justice would be sufficiently met by awarding appellant the alternative sentence of transportation for life.
The Supreme Court stated that it seemed that when Harnam Singh was accused of liaison with Jai Kaur by her son, or when Jai Kaur asked Harnam Singh not to visit her house anymore, the conversation that took place between them must have engendered heat and excited passions. In all likelihood, appellant took this open insult to heart and his mind was so worked up that he returned soon after and under the influence of this and in a spirit of bravado fired at Jai Kaur but while firing he avoided to aim at any of her vital organs. He had otherwise no reason to cause any injury to her. Thus, in the present circumstances, it was a fit case for commuting the sentence of death into one of life imprisonment.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal to the extent that it commuted the sentence of death to one of transportation for life and the sentence under the Arms Act would run concurrently.
[Harnam Singh v. State of Pepsu, (1953) 2 SCC 604, decided on 01-12-1953]
*Judgment authored by: Justice M.C. Mahajan
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Appellant: Dewan Chaman Lal, Senior Advocate (T.N. Sethi, Advocate, with him)
For the Respondent: N.S. Bindra, Senior Advocate (Porus A. Mehta, Advocate, with him)
**Note: Related Eyewitness
In Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (1954) 1 SCC 104, the Supreme Court held that corroboration required in case of evidence of related eyewitness is not the same as required in case of evidence of approver. Thus, circumstances which lend some assurance to evidence of related eyewitness would be sufficient corroboration. In Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200, the Supreme Cout held that when evidence of related or interested witnesses is clear, cogent and has withstood the rigour of cross-examination, it becomes sterling, not requiring further corroboration, however, judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence.
Buy Constitution of India HERE
Buy Penal Code, 1860 HERE
1. Corresponding Section 103(1) of the Nyaya Sanhita, 2023