Supreme Court: In an appeal challenging the judgment and order dated 20-09-1951 passed by the Hyderabad High Court (‘the High Court’) whereby the convictions and sentences of the appellants was confirmed, the three-Judges Bench of B.K. Mukherjea, N.H. Bhagwati, and B. Jagannadhadas*, JJ., stated that this was a case in which as many as ten murders and some unspecified acts of arson and looting were said to have been committed by the joint participation of more than 100 persons with a common intention. Even though, due to the exceptional provisions prescribed for the trial by the Special Tribunal, it was not possible to find illegalities in the procedure vitiating the trial, it could not be doubted that, considering the gravity and complexity of the case, the evidence given at the trial required very careful and searching consideration.
The Supreme Court stated that the High Court did not show any such consideration of these points, probably because these aspects were not sufficiently urged before that Court. The Supreme Court stated that it was necessary and desirable in the special circumstances of this case that the High Court should rehear the appeals so that they might give adequate consideration to the various points referred to in this judgment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed a rehearing of the appeals with reference to the evidence on record.
Background
In the present case, on 19-9-1948, six persons along with a numerous other Muslims came to Barud Village, raided it, murdered ten villagers, burnt some houses and looted some property. The incident occurred within a few days after the well-known police action taken by the Government of India against Hyderabad State. It was alleged that, on account of the apprehension felt due to police action, the Muslim inhabitants of Barud Village fled to Jafferabad, about ten miles away, where Muslims were in larger number.
It was the prosecution case that these Muslims and some others from Jafferabad organised a raid on Barud Village, to convince its Hindu inhabitants that the Muslims were not cowards. The defence was that when the Muslims of Barud left the place for Jafferabad and other places for safety, the Hindus of the place took away their movable and immovable properties. However, the appellants stated that none of them were present in Barud at the time of the alleged incident and pleaded alibi.
On the day next after the alleged incident, eight injured persons from Barud presented themselves at the Police Station and stated that on the previous day, the Razakars raided their village and attacked the inhabitants with guns, swords and spears and committed murders, arson and loot. It was on the record that in the area in which Barud and Jafferabad were situated, the villagers had fled away to other places for safety immediately after the police action and that even the police machinery got dislocated and that it took some time for normal conditions to get restored.
On 7-8-1949, the case was brought up before the Special Tribunal and as many as 37 witnesses were examined for the prosecution. After consideration of the entire evidence, the Special Tribunal concluded that only 13 out of the 27 persons were satisfactorily identified but out of them only the present six appellants were found guilty on reliable evidence. Thereafter, the appellant filed appeals to the High Court and the death sentences on the three appellants also came up for confirmation. The High Court dealt with these appeals and death references and vide judgment dated 20-9-1951, confirmed the convictions and sentences passed by the Special Tribunal and dismissed the appeals.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
Since, there was absence of formal charges against the accused persons at the Trial, the Supreme Court observed that it was contended that there was statutory obligation to frame charges in the present case. The Supreme Court stated that considering the gravity and the complicated nature of the prosecution, the absence of the charges would not have been a mere irregularity but a serious illegality vitiating the entire trial. However, after a close consideration of the relevant statutory provisions, the Supreme Court stated that it was satisfied that there was no such obligation in a trial by the Special Tribunal.
The Supreme Court stated that since 23-2-1949, trials before the Special Tribunal were regulated by the procedure for summary trials prescribed by the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code (‘Hyderabad Code’). Since 10-7-1949, an option was given to the Special Tribunal to depart from it and follow the procedure for warrant cases. However, before making that departure, the Tribunal was enjoined to record its reasons in writing for adopting such a course.
Thus, the Supreme Court stated it was clear that under the Hyderabad Code, there was no obligation cast on the court to frame a formal charge when a person was tried summarily for an alleged offence. It might be noticed that the Hyderabad Code differed in this respect from the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 which provided for omission of a formal charge only in cases where no appeal lies. It was also observed that under Section 248 of the Hyderabad Code, the summary trial could be held only for certain specified offences, while under the Hyderabad Special Tribunals Regulation, every offence however grave and whatever the sentence might be, was triable summarily.
The Supreme Court stated that whatever view one might hold regarding the expediency or necessity of a charge in trials as regards grave offences of the kind with which we are concerned in this case, there can be no doubt on the review of the relevant sections of Hyderabad State law that such a trial by a Special Tribunal in respect of any and every offence without the framing of a charge was perfectly legal. Regarding the contention that considering the complexity of the charges and the other circumstances of the case, the Special Tribunal ought to have exercised the option vested in it for adopting warrant procedure, the Supreme Court stated that it might be that the Special Tribunal would have been well advised to do so. However, no application in this behalf had been made by the accused and it could not be said that in the absence of any statutory obligation cast upon the Tribunal to the contrary, the trial according to summary procedure was illegal.
The Supreme Court stated that this was a case in which as many as ten murders and some unspecified acts of arson and looting were said to have been committed by the joint participation of more than 100 persons with a common intention. Even though, due to the exceptional provisions prescribed for the trial by the Special Tribunal, it was not possible to find illegalities in the procedure vitiating the trial, it could not be doubted that, considering the gravity and complexity of the case, the evidence given at the trial required very careful and searching consideration.
The Supreme Court observed that, it was pointed out that quite a few important circumstances existed in favour of the accused, that had not been even noticed in the judgments of the courts below. The Supreme Cout stated that one could not help feeling that there was considerable room for the comment made that these judgments were perfunctory and that they did not indicate on their face a consideration of the material and circumstances adequate to the gravity and complexity of the case.
The Supreme Court noted that the appellants had urged quite a few circumstances which appeared to have required serious consideration. The appellants urged that there was no definite or reliable proof of the fact that the alleged raid resulted in deaths of any specific individuals. Further, the evidence did not make out that the particular acts ascribed to each of these appellants bring about the death of any of the persons against whom these acts were directed. On the other hand, the evidence itself showed that on those persons injuries were inflicted by other persons as well.
The Supreme Court stated that the High Court did not show any such consideration of these points, probably because these aspects were not sufficiently urged before that Court. The Supreme Court stated that it was necessary and desirable in the special circumstances of this case that the High Court should rehear the appeals so that they might give adequate consideration to the various points referred to in this judgment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed a rehearing of the appeals with reference to the evidence on record.
[Yasin Khan v. State of Hyderabad, (1953) 2 SCC 478, decided on 18-11-1953]
*Judgment authored by- Justice B. Jagannadhadas
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Appellants: A.A. Peerbhoy and J.B. Dadachanji, Advocates; J.B. Dadachanji, Advocate;
For the Respondent: Porus A. Mehta, Advocate.
*Note: Murder and Dacoity
Murder and Dacoity is defined under Sections 3001 and 3912 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) respectively. Section 300 of the IPC states that the culpable homicide is murder- i.) if the act by which the death was caused, was done with the intention of causing death; or ii.) if it was done with the intention of causing bodily injury as the offender knows was likely to cause death; iii.) done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or iv.) the person committing the act knows that the act was so imminently dangerous, that in all probability, it would cause death. Further, dacoity is defined under Section 391 of IPC, which states that when five or more conjointly commit/attempt to commit a robbery and persons present and aiding such commission/attempt, commits dacoity.
1. Corresponding Section 101 of Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNS’)
