Delhi High Court: A petition was filed by the parents of the deceased child seeking compensation from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), alleging negligence in controlling the stray dog menace, which they claimed led to the child’s death on grounds violation of the child’s fundamental right to life under Article 21. Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav, J., refrained from exercising its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to address the claims of negligence against the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) due to the presence of disputed facts requiring further adjudication and directed that the matter be resolved through appropriate legal channels.
The Court granted an “ex-gratia lump sum amount of ₹2,50,000/-, to be paid by GNCTD to the petitioner. This payment shall be made to the petitioner within three months of the date of passing of this judgment. Any failure to comply will result in the petitioner being entitled to simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum, accruing from the date of this judgment. It is further clarified that the ex-gratia amount awarded by this Court is independent of, and in addition to, any compensation that may be awarded by the Civil Court.”
The incident occurred inside the petitioners’ home when a dog entered a room where the deceased child was present with his sisters. The dog attacked the child, who was later taken to Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Hospital for treatment. Despite medical intervention, the child succumbed to his injuries. The filing of the petition was driven by the parents’ claim that the death of their child was a result of MCD’s negligence in controlling the stray dog menace. The petitioners invoked judicial precedents where compensation was awarded in cases involving death due to stray dog attacks, both in public and private spaces. They argued that MCD had a statutory duty to manage and regulate stray animals under Section 399 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation (DMC) Act and the Rules of 2001, which outline procedures for sterilization and vaccination of stray dogs to control their population and prevent rabies. The failure of MCD to fulfill these obligations, according to the petitioners, led to their child’s death, warranting compensation under public law.
Counsel for the petitioners invoked the legal maxim res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself), arguing that the mere fact that the incident occurred was sufficient to presume negligence on the part of MCD.
Counsel for MCD denied responsibility for the incident on the grounds that the incident occurred on private property, where MCD’s duty to manage stray dogs did not extend. Furthermore, the MCD contended that there was no conclusive evidence to prove that the dog that attacked the child was indeed a stray. The respondents argued that the child’s parents had a duty of care to ensure their child’s safety, and any failure to prevent the dog from entering their house could amount to contributory negligence.
The Court thoroughly examined the legal precedents presented by the petitioners, including cases where compensation was granted for deaths caused by stray animals, wherein it was established that compensation can be awarded for the violation of Article 21 in instances where State authorities fail to perform their statutory duties, leading to a fatal incident. The Court also reviewed similar cases from other High Courts, where compensation was granted for deaths caused by stray animals.
However, the Court distinguished the present case from those precedents. In prior cases, the incidents occurred in public places or areas under the direct control of municipal authorities, where the State’s duty to prevent such incidents was more apparent. In contrast, the present case involved an incident inside a private residence, raising questions about the extent of MCD’s liability. The Court noted that MCD’s statutory duty under Section 399 of the DMC Act was limited to public spaces and did not extend to private properties.
Moreover, the Court emphasized that for the maxim res ipsa loquitur to apply, it must be established that the state was solely and directly responsible for the incident. In this case, the Court found that the facts were disputed, particularly whether the dog that attacked the child was a stray or an abandoned pet. The contradictions in the petitioners’ statements, including those published in newspaper clippings, raised doubts about the true nature of the incident. Therefore, the Court determined that further factual investigation was necessary to ascertain liability, and the application of the maxim was not appropriate in the absence of clear evidence.
The Court concluded that the petition raised several factual disputes that could not be resolved in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It held that determining whether the dog that attacked the child was a stray or an abandoned pet, and whether MCD was negligent in fulfilling its statutory duties, required further examination of evidence. These questions were better suited for adjudication in a civil court.
Thus, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 to award compensation to the petitioners. It observed that while MCD had a statutory duty to manage stray dogs in public spaces, its liability could not be extended to incidents occurring on private property without clear evidence of negligence. The Court directed the parties to pursue the matter in a competent civil court for a more detailed investigation and resolution.
[Geeta Devi v. GNCTD, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7064, decided on 26-09-2024]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Mr. Ankit Jain, Mr. Brijesh Chaudhary, Mr. Madhav Bhatia, Mr. Shreyas Shankar Joshi, Advocates. Mr. Jai Bansal, Mr. Abhishek Verma for petitioners
Ms. Sonia Arora, Adv. for GNCTD.
Mr. Arun Birbal, Mr. Varun Gupta, Advs for DDA.
Ms. Pratima N. Lakra, CGSC with Mr. Chandan Prajapati, Ms. Yashika Garg, Advs for R-5 and 7.
Ms. Pratima N. Lakra, CGSC with Mr. Chandan Prajapati, Ms. Yashika Garg, Advs for R-5 and 7.
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