Supreme Court: The issue in the present appeal was “whether the properties in dispute belong to the estate of Chennayya, in which case appellants who were his daughter’s sons would be entitled to them as his heirs, or whether they were the absolute properties of Venkatamma, in which case respondent, being her grandson, would get them by right of inheritance?”. The 4-Judges Bench of B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan, T.L. Venkatarama Ayyar*, JJ., held that the admission related to properties were subject matter of previous suit and appellant could not lay claim to other items of properties based on the admission of Venkatamma. The Supreme Court held that mere proof of outstandings at a particular time was not sufficient to establish whether they were outstandings due to ancestral estate, or to the person re-investing and dealing in income of the ancestral income. It was necessary to establish that the outstandings in question were outstandings of the ancestral estate to be considered as part of its corpus.
Chennayya died in 1881, leaving behind his surviving widow, Seshamma and two daughters, Venkatamma and Muniamma. Chennayya’s estate consisted of immovable properties and outstandings. Seshamma died in 1891, and Chennayya’s estate devolved on his daughters, Venkatamma and Muniamma. Muniamma died in 1906, and Venkatamma became entitled to the whole of the estate as the surviving daughter. Venkatamma died in 1941, and appellants who were Muniamma’s sons, were heirs entitled to Chennayya’s estate. Venkatamma married Lakshmireddi, and they adopted Pullayya in 1895. Pullayya died in 1933, and respondent was Pullayya’s son.
Respondent instituted the suit, out of which the present appeal arose, to recover the properties on the allegation that they were acquired by Venkatamma out of the income of Chennayya’s estate, that in law they were her absolute properties, and that respondent became entitled to them as her stridhanam heir. Appellants submitted that Venkatamma acquired the immovable properties in satisfaction of outstandings, which were due to Chennayya’s estate, and that they accordingly represented the corpus of the estate and not its income and she had treated them as accretions to the parental estate, and that, in any case, appellants would be entitled to them. It was submitted that in reference to the outstandings, appellants had grown out of the debts due to Chennayya’s estate, and that appellants were entitled to them.
The Temporary Subordinate Judge, Cuddapah held that the suit properties were not acquired out of outstandings belonging to Chennayya’s estate, and accordingly passed a decree in favour of respondent in respect of the properties except some movables and jewels. Against this judgment, appellants filed a suit in the Madras High Court, wherein it was held that some items were acquired by Venkatamma by utilizing the funds belonging to Chennayya’s estate, and that appellants were entitled to them. The suit was dismissed in respect to the said items and in other respects, the trial court’s decree was confirmed. Thus, appellants preferred an appeal against this judgment.
Counsel for appellants submitted that on the reasoning on which the Judges had upheld the claim of the appellants to some items, their claim to rest of the items should also have been allowed. It was submitted that after Lakshmireddi’s death, his adopted son, Pullayya filed a suit in the District Court of Cuddapah for establishing his title. In that suit, Venkatamma filed a written statement stating that the properties had been acquired with the funds of her father and not her husband. In the present case, the High Court held that the written statement of Venkatamma and her deposition, contained clear admissions that the acquisitions had been made not with the income from the estate but by utilizing the funds belonging to Chennayya’s estate, and that respondent was bound by them. It was also submitted that the admissions of Venkatamma in written statement and deposition related not only to the properties which were the subject-matter of that suit but to all properties which had been acquired by her before 1920, and that they should therefore be held, on the same reasoning, to belong to Chennayya’s estate.
The Supreme Court opined that Venkatamma’s admission was limited only to the properties which were the subject matter of the suit, and the Judges of the High Court had given fullest effect to it by granting a decree in favour of appellants. Appellants, therefore, could not claim the other items based on the admissions in Venkatamma’s written statement and deposition.
Counsel for appellants further submitted that considerable outstandings were indisputably due to Chennayya and that Venkatamma must have realized them and re-invested them, and that they should therefore be held to be comprised in the list of outstandings. It was contended that the outstandings due to his estate were stated to be of the value of Rs 14,400 at the time of the litigation and that appellants should be entitled at least to that amount, unless respondent established that those outstandings had not been realized, or that the amounts realized had been expended.
The Supreme Court did not agree with this contention and stated that Venkatamma was enjoying an estate, the income of which was at her disposal, and she was carrying on money-lending business. The Supreme Court stated that appellants had to prove that the promissory notes and bonds stand in Venkatamma’s name, represented the debts originally due to Chennayya but there was no such evidence.
The Supreme Court noted that appellants were living with Venkatamma as members of one family for some 30 years and had been in management of her affairs and appellants had admitted that they were in possession of the bonds which were taken from the debtors from time to time. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the courts below that mere proof that in 1920 there were outstandings due to Chennayya’s estate was not sufficient to show that they were included in the outstandings at one time.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
[Ankireddipalle Seshanna v. Ankireddipalle Vobulu Reddi, (1954) 1 SCC 598, decided on 01-04-1954]
*Judgment authored by: Justice T.L. Venkatarama Ayyar
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Appellants: B. Somayya, Senior Advocate (M.S.K. Sastri, Advocate, with him)
For the Respondent: Sivaprasada Rao and S. Subramaniam, Advocates
**Note: Ancestral Property
Property inherited by a Hindu from his father, father’s father, or father’s father’s father, is ancestral property. Any property acquired by the Hindu great grandfather, which then passes undivided down the next three generations up to the present generation of great grandson/daughter. Ancestral property should be four generation old, and it should not have been divided by the users in the joint Hindu family as once a division of the property takes place, the share or portion which each coparcener gets after the division becomes his or her self-acquired property. The right to a share in ancestral or coparcenary property accrues by birth itself, unlike other forms of inheritance, where inheritance opens only on the owner’s death. Self-acquired property can become ancestral property if it is thrown into the pool of ancestral properties and enjoyed in common.