Supreme Court: In a case where the genuineness of a will was put in question, the three-Judges Bench of M.C. Mahajan, CJ., and Vivian Bose* and Ghulam Hasan, JJ., noted that the will was scribed by one Krishanji Benadikar and was attested by six persons. Five of them were dead, but one survivor was called as a witness. The Supreme Court stated that these witnesses were believed by the lower courts and that ends the matter, as the Supreme Court did not normally interfere on the concurrent finds of fact.
The Court stated that the use of time-honoured phrases like “the conscience of the Court being satisfied” could not convert a question of fact into one of law. The phrase was only a rule of prudence and was nothing more than a picturesque way of saying that when the legal heirs to property were being divested in whole, or in part, of their inheritance by a man who was no longer available for examination as a witness great caution should be employed before upholding such an act. However, despite all this the question remained one of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the present appeal.
Background
In the present case, the property covered by the will was the one belonging to one Yeshwantrao, who died on 28-04-1918. The respondents, who were the nephews of one Yeshwantrao, stated that the one Yeshwantrao made a will on 6-2-1918, leaving this property to them. One Yeshwantrao left behind his 2 widows and one of the widows had adopted a son.
The respondents had challenged the adoption of a son on the ground that the widows were expressly prohibited from adopting, and such prohibition was provided in the will. Both, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court held that the will was proved and because of that they held that the adoption was invalid. It was held that as the will expressly prohibited any adoption, and the Courts had agreed in holding that the widows knew of the will and the prohibition. Thus, the present appeal was filed by the appellants.
The appellant contended that though the will was said to have been made in 1918, its existence was not disclosed till 1944, shortly after the adoption also. Further, the will was said to have been handed over to one Dadu Sakharam Patil, who was only 16 or 17 years old at the time. In addition, the one Dadu Sakharam Patil was a brother of one of the widows, who was disinherited by the will. The counsel of the appellant stated that all this was most unlikely and, added to that, the suppression of the will for 28 years was so suspicious that no court’s conscience could, or ought to, be satisfied.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Court stated it was not able to agree with the appellants. The use of time-honoured phrases like “the conscience of the Court being satisfied” could not convert a question of fact into one of law. The phrase was only a rule of prudence and was nothing more than a picturesque way of saying that when the legal heirs to property were being divested in whole, or in part, of their inheritance by a man who was no longer available for examination as a witness great caution should be employed before upholding such an act. However, despite all this the question remained one of fact.
The Supreme Court noted that the will was scribed by one Krishanji Benadikar and was attested by six persons. Five of them were dead, but one survivor was called as a witness. The Supreme Court stated that these witnesses were believed and that ends the matter, as it did not normally interfere on the concurrent finds of fact.
The Supreme Court stated that the High Court had considered and weighed all the objections and one strong point was made against the appellants in both the lower courts was that, according to their story, the will was fabricated in 1943 to prevent the adoption. However, the five attesting witnesses who were dead, died long before 1943 and no attempt was made to show that any of their signatures was a forgery. On the other hand, there was much evidence to show that the signatures were genuine. Thus, that was conclusive to prove that the will could not have been forged in 1943.
The Supreme Court observed that the lower courts had also considered the long silence of twenty-eight years and the answer that appealed to them was that there was no need to produce the will, as no one ever thought that the widows would act contrary to its directions. Under the will, they had to manage the property during their lives, and they were doing so in much the same way as they would have done had there been an intestacy. Further, there was mutual confidence between the respondents and the widows and there was neither conflict nor friction till the adoption; they all lived harmoniously together.
The Supreme Court noted the appellant’s argument that Yeshwant would hardly have entrusted the custody of the will to Dadu Sakharam Patil, a boy of only sixteen, was met in the lower courts by finding that Dadu was in fact twenty-four years old at the time and that he was the natural person to give the will to as he was with Yeshwant in his last illness and as his sister was to have management of the property along with her co-widow during their lives.
The Supreme Court stated that the question of adoption was bound with that of the will, for the prohibition was contained in the will itself. The only query on this point was whether a prohibition, which was not communicated could affect an adoption. However, the lower Courts had already found that the widows knew the will and its contents. The evidence of Dadu Sakharam Patil, which was believed by both the lower courts, established that the widows did know about the prohibition and this also was a pure question of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the present appeal.
[Mansinghrao Yeshwantrao Patil v. Ramchandra Govindrao Patil, (1954) 1 SCC 688, decided on 12-04-1954]
*Judgment authored by- Justice Vivian Bose
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Appellants: K.R. Bengari and Sardar Bahadur, Advocates;
For the Respondents: N.C. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate (G.A. Desai and Naunit Lal, Advocates, with him)
*Note: Supreme Court’s interference in concurrent findings of fact
The Supreme Court in Sudama Pandey v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 679, held that:
“This Court under Article 136 of the Constitution seldom interferes with the factual findings recorded by two concurring courts but if this Court is satisfied that the High Court has committed a serious error of law and that there was substantial miscarriage of justice, this Court could interfere with the concurring findings of the High Court and that of the trial court. This Court also does not normally enter into a reappraisal or review of the evidence unless the assessment of the evidence by the High Court is vitiated by an error of law or procedure or there was misreading of evidence.”
Further, in Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398, it was held that:
“While it is true that normally this Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances, where legal process is disregarded, or principles of natural justice are violated, or substantial and grave injustice has otherwise resulted.”