Appellate Tribunal for Electricity: In an appeal filed by the New Delhi Municipal Council (‘NDMC’) for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, the two-member bench of Ramesh Ranganathan, Chairperson and Seema Gupta, Technical Member said that there is no reason to condone the inordinate delay of more than a year in filing the present appeal, as the cause shown by NDMC does not constitute sufficient cause, as it is difficult to accept that all officials, concerned , were deputed to the G-20 Summit, and even if this period in connection with the G-20 Summit is excluded, the delay would still be of around 264 days i.e. of nearly nine months, for which the only explanation is of administrative reasons.
The Tribunal noted that the delay in filing the present appeal is of 371 days i.e. a delay of more than one year, as NDMC, being a Government body, could not take a prompt decision for filing of the appeal; the delay was due to administrative reasons i.e. the time spent in the process of obtaining approval at various levels; and in view of the G 20 Summit the staff was diverted from their routine work to assist and take part in the work relating to the G-20 Summit.
In examining whether sufficient cause has been shown, for condonation of this inordinate delay of more than one year, the Court noted that Section 111(2) of the Electricity Act requires every appeal, under Section 111(1), to be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order made by the Appropriate Commission is received by the aggrieved person. The proviso thereto enables the Appellate Tribunal to entertain an appeal, after expiry of the said period of forty-five days, only if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation of forty-five days. The Court emphasised that crucial words in the proviso to Section 111(2) are “if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period”. Thus, it is only if this Tribunal were to be satisfied, for just and valid reasons, that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation, that the delay can be condoned.
The Court mentioned that the word “cause” in the proviso to Section 111(2) is preceded by the word “sufficient”. It is not every cause for the delay which can be condoned, as the Tribunal should record its satisfaction that there was sufficient cause, justifying condonation of delay. The Tribunal said that “Sufficient cause” means an adequate and enough reason which prevented NDMC to approach the court within limitation. Consequently, the cause which NDMC is required to show should not only be adequate to justify his failure to file an appeal within the period of limitation, but also such as would justify condonation of the delay in invoking the appellate jurisdiction of this Tribunal beyond the stipulated period of limitation of 45 days.
The Tribunal clarified that, while it may not have explicitly stated that it would refuse to condone any delay beyond 180 days, it emphasized that the decision to condone such a delay depends on whether the applicant has demonstrated sufficient cause for the delay. However, the Tribunal highlighted that, when deciding whether to condone a delay, it must carefully consider whether allowing the delay—despite showing sufficient cause—would ultimately undermine the very purpose of the statutory framework. This framework requires the Tribunal to dispose of appeals within 180 days, and condoning a delay beyond this period could defeat this statutory objective.
The Tribunal mentioned that it cannot ignore the length of the delay in invoking its appellate jurisdiction, irrespective of whether or not sufficient cause is shown. Adoption of a liberal approach would only require this Tribunal not to take a rigid view and to examine on the facts of each given case, whether the cause shown, for belatedly invoking the appellate jurisdiction, would justify condonation of the delay.
Further, the Tribunal said that as the sufficient cause to be shown by an applicant, for the delay to be condoned, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, this Tribunal would not be justified in applying a uniform criterion, or adopting a single yardstick, to determine whether the cause shown is sufficient to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The test of “sufficient cause” would vary from one case to another.
Thus, the Court concluded that in the present case, the cause shown by NDMC does not constitute sufficient cause, as it is difficult to accept that all officials, concerned with the filing of the present appeal before this Tribunal, were deputed to the G-20 Summit, and even if this period in connection with the G-20 Summit is excluded, the delay would still be of around 264 days i.e. of nearly nine months, for which the only explanation is of administrative reasons.
The Court also referred to Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563, wherein it was held that the time allegedly spent in processing the appeal and in obtaining administrative sanction, neither constitutes sufficient cause for condonation nor does it absolve the applicant of blame for the inordinate delay in invoking the appellate jurisdiction of this Tribunal.
[New Delhi Municipal Council v. Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2024 SCC OnLine APTEL 107, decided on 21-10-2024]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Counsel for the Appellant: Kanika Agnihotri, Saad Mustafa Shervani
Counsel for the Respondent: Saurav Agarwal
