50th Chief Justice of India Dr D.Y. Chandrachud Retires

“Our ability to recognise others who are different, is a sign of our own evolution. We miss the symbols of a compassionate and humane society only at our peril”.

– Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.¹

As Dr Justice DY Chandrachud bid adieu to the hallowed halls of the Supreme Court of India, where he had delivered great many significant judgments for 8 years, we take a step back in time to recapitulate his journey so far.

Early Life and Advocacy

Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud was born on 11-11-1959 to former Chief Justice of India, Justice Y.V. Chandrachud and Prabha Chandrachud. He did his graduation from St. Stephens College in Delhi with a degree in economics and mathematics in 1979, before obtaining a degree in Law from the Faculty of Law at Delhi University in 1982. He completed his LL.M from Harvard University in 1983 after obtaining the ‘Inlaks’ scholarship. He stayed at Harvard until 1986 to complete his Doctorate in Juridical Sciences. He also received the Joseph H. Beale prize for securing the highest marks in the Conflict of Laws course².

On completing his studies, he enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council of Maharashtra. He practiced law at the Bombay High Court and Supreme Court of India. He was designated as Senior Advocate by the Bombay High Court in June 1998 and in the same year was appointed as the Additional Solicitor General of India. He appeared in several important cases involving Rights of Bonded Women Workers, Rights of HIV Positive Workers, Contract Labour and Rights of Religious and Linguistic Minorities.³

Judgeship

On 29-03-2000, Justice Dr. Chandrachud was appointed as Additional Judge of the Bombay High Court. On 31-10-2013, he took oath as the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court until he was appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court on 13-05-2016⁴.

On 09-11-2022, Justice Dr Chandrachud took oath as the 50th Chief Justice of India. He will serve as the Chief Justice of India for a period of 2 years till November 2024.

Notable Judgments

*Did you Know? Justice Dr D.Y. Chandrachud has authored more than 590 judgments during his tenure as Judge of the Supreme Court including his time as CJI, which includes more than 30 Constitution/ Larger Bench judgments⁵.

We have curated some very important judgments delivered by Dr Justice Chandrachud during his tenure of 8 years,

RG Kar/ Kolkata Rape and Murder Case

In Alleged Rape & Murder Incident of a Trainee Doctor in R.G. Kar Medical College & Hospital, Kolkata & Related Issues, In re, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2056 concerning the rape and murder of a doctor at the RG Kar Medical College Hospital at Kolkata, the three Judge Bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJI, JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ. said that it was deeply concerned about the absence of conditions of safety for doctors and medical professionals across the country, and ordered the constitution of a ten-member National Task Force, comprising doctors all over the country to give recommendations on the modalities to be followed all over the country to ensure safety at the workplace.Article 370 Verdict

In Article 370 of the Constitution, In re, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1647, The five-Judge Constitution Bench comprising of Chief Justice of India Dr. DY Chandrachud, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, B.R. Gavai, and Surya Kant, JJ., delivered its verdict pertaining to the petitions filed against abrogation of Article 370 by the Central Government. The Bench unanimously upheld the Union’s action of abrogating Article 370. It further directed the restoration of statehood. Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJI particularly directed the Election Commission of India to conduct elections to the J&K assembly by 30-9-2024.

Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, CJ, said that the Exercise of power by the President under 370(1)(d) is not mala fide. President did not have to take concurrence of State and can act on Union’s concurrence. The President had the power to issue notification declaring that Article 370 ceases to operate without a recommendation of the J&K Constituent Assembly. It is a culmination of integration process.

Validity of Unstamped Arbitration Agreement

In Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under A&C Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, concerning the validity of unstamped arbitration agreement, a 7 Judge bench comprising of Dr. DY Chandrachud, C.J.I, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna*, BR Gavai, Surya Kant, JB Pardiwala, and Manoj Misra, JJ. gave a unanimous judgment, holding that the unstamped agreement is inadmissible under the Stamp Act, but cannot be rendered void ab initio. Thus, arbitration clauses in unstamped or inadequately stamped agreements are enforceable.

Electoral Bonds

In Assn. for Democratic Reforms (Electoral Bond Scheme) v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 1, challenging the constitutional validity of the Electoral Bond Scheme which introduced anonymous financial contributions to political parties, the 5-Judge Constitution Bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJ., Sanjiv Khanna, BR Gavai, JB Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, JJ. arrived at a unanimous verdict, giving two opinions, one authored by Dr. Justice DY Chandrachud for Justice Gavai, Justice Pardiwala and Justice Misra, and other by Justice Sanjiv Khanna arrived at same conclusion, with slight variance in the reasoning, and held that anonymous electoral bonds are violative of the right to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Thus, the Electoral Bonds scheme was struck down for being unconstitutional.

Immunity for MPs and MLAs

The 7-Judge Constitution Bench comprising of Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJI*, AS Bopanna, MM Sundresh, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, JB Pardiwala, Sanjay Kumar and Manoj Misra, JJ., in Sita Soren v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 629, overturned the 5-Judge Bench 1998 verdict in P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), (1998) 4 SCC 626, wherein it was established that the Member of Parliaments (‘MP’) and Member of Legislative Assemblies (‘MLA’) enjoyed immunity if they cast vote in the House after taking bribe for it.

Taxation of Mineral Rights

In Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1796, concerning the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States on the taxation of mineral rights, the Nine Judge Constitution Bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJI, Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, BV Nagarathna, JB Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih JJ. has held that royalty paid by mining operators to the Central government is not a tax and that States have the power to levy cesses on mining and mineral-use activities.

Reservation- Creamy Layer amongst SC/ST

In State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1860, the seven Judge Constitution Bench comprising of Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJI, B.R. Gavai, Vikram Nath, Bela M. Trivedi, Pankaj Mithal, Manoj Misra, and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ., by a majority of 6:1, held that sub-classification of Scheduled Castes among reserved categories is permissible for granting separate quotas for more backwards within the SC categories.

The Majority opinion overruled the E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P., (2005) 1 SCC 394, wherein, it was held that SCs cannot be further classified for the purpose of reservation because they constitute an internally homogenous class by virtue of their inclusion in the Presidential list and thus, as a class, groups within the SCs cannot be treated differently and any further classification and consequent preferential treatment were held to violate Article 14, as it would amount to a constitutionally proscribed ‘micro-classification’.

Section 6-A Citizenship Act

In Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, In re, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2880 concerning the constitutionality of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, the 5-Judge Constitution Bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud*, CJI, Surya Kant*, MM Sundresh, JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ. upheld the validity of Section 6A in a 4:1 majority.

State’s Power to regulate Industrial Alcohol

In State of U.P. v. Lalta Prasad Vaish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3029, which raised issues pertaining to the scope of the power of the State Legislatures under Entry 8 and the meaning of the phrase “intoxicating liquor”; whether “intoxicating liquor” in Entry 8 only includes potable alcohol, such as alcoholic beverages or also includes alcohol which is used in the production of other products; the 9 Judge Constitution Bench, with a ratio of 8:1, held that Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is both an industry-based entry and a product-based entry. The words that follow the expression “that is to say” in the Entry are not exhaustive of its contents. It includes the regulation of everything from the raw materials to the consumption of ‘intoxicating liquor’.

Material resources of community

The Nine-Judge Constitution Bench comprising of CJI Dr. DY Chandrachud, Hrishikesh Roy, B.V. Nagarathna, Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ., in Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, delivered its judgment on the issue of whether private resources form part of the ‘material resource of the community’ under Article 39(b) of the Constitution. The majority judgment delivered by CJI Dr. DY Chandrachud by ratio of 7:2 held that that all the ‘private properties’ cannot form part of the ‘material resources of the community‘ under Article 39(b) of the Constitution. The Court unanimously held that Article 31 C of the Constitution to the extent that it was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 remains in force.

AMU Verdict

In an appeal against Allahabad High Court’s Order in Naresh Agarwal (Dr.) v. Union of India, 2005 SCC OnLine All 1705, whereby, Aligarh Muslim University’s (‘AMU’) action of 50 percent seat reservation in postgraduate medical courses for Muslim candidates by claiming it to be a minority institution, was struck down and held that AMU cannot have an exclusive reservation because it is not a minority institution, the Seven-Judge Constitution Bench comprising of Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJ., Sanjiv Khanna, Surya Kant, JB Pardiwala, Dipankar Datta, Manoj Misra and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. in 4: 3 overruled the Five-Judge Bench verdict in S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 321, which held that an institution incorporated by a statute cannot claim to be a minority institution. Thus, Aligarh Muslim University as created by an Act of Parliament, is not a minority institution so as to be covered under Article 30 of the Constitution.

Madarsa Education Act

While considering the correctness of Allahabad High Court’s judgment in March 2024 wherein it had declared U.P. Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 (Madrasa Act) to be unconstitutional; the 3 Judge Bench of Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, CJ*., J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ., in Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3129, upheld Madarsa Act’s validity holding that it is consistent with the positive obligation of the State to ensure that students studying in recognised Madarsas attain a level of competency which will allow them to effectively participate in society and earn a living. The Court further held that Article 21-A of the Constitution and the Right to Education Act, 2009 must be read consistently with the right of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

Decoding Maharashtra Political Crisis: Supreme Court’s ‘Big’ Verdict

Putting an end to the Maharashtra’s Political Crisis that was witnessed by the nation after the split between Eknath Shinde and Uddhav Thackeray factions within Shiv Sena, leading to a change in the State government in the year 2022, the five Judge Constitution Bench of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud*, CJI and M.R. Shah, Krishna Murari, Hima Kohli and P.S. Narasimha JJ., in Subhash Desai v. Governor of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 607, has upheld the Governor’s decision of inviting Eknath Shinde to form the Government in the State and has refused to quash Udhav Thackeray’s resignation as it was submitted voluntarily before the floor test.

[Delhi Govt. vs LG]

In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2023) 9 SCC 1, concerning administrative control over transfers and postings of civil servants in National Capital Territory of Delhi (‘NCTD’), the Constitution bench of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud*, C.J., M.R. Shah, Krishna Murari, Hima Kohli and P.S. Narasimha J.J. held the following:

• There does not exist a homogeneous class of Union Territory (‘UT’) with similar governance structures.

• NCTD is not similar to other UTs, as by virtue of Article 239-AA it is accorded a sui generis status, setting it apart from other UTs. The legislative assembly of NCTD have competence over entries in List 2 and List 3 except over expressly excluded entries of List 2.

• In addition to entries in List 1 Parliament has legislative competence over all matters in List 2 and List 3 in relation to NCTD, including entries which have been kept out of the legislative domain of NCTD by virtue of Article 239-AA.

• The Union has executive power only over the three entries in List 2, over which NCTD does not have legislative competence. The executive power of NCTD will respect to entries in List 2 and List 3 shall be subject to the executive power on the Union conferred by the Constitution or law by the Parliament.

• The phrase “insofar in any such matters applicable to UT ” in Article 239-AA (3)(a) cannot be read to further exclude the legislative power of NCTD over entries in State List and Concurrent List except which are expressly excluded.

• NCTD has legislative and executive power over “services” that is Entry 41 of List 2, Schedule 7 because the definition of State under Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, applies to the term ‘State’ in Part XIV of the Constitution, thus Part XIV is applicable to UT.

• The exercise of Rule-making power under proviso to Article 309, does not oust the legislative power of the appropriate authority to make laws over entry 41 of the State List.

The issue in this case was, who would have control over the services in the NCTD: The government of the NCTD or the Lieutenant Governor (‘LG’) acting on behalf of the Union Government.

Women sexual violence in Manipur

Supreme Court in Dinganglung Gangmei v. Mutum Churamani Meetei, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 965 constituted an all-women three-member committee to examine probe being conducted by Manipur police and the Central Bureau of Investigation (‘CBI’) vis-a-vis the incidents of violence in Manipur, specifically to be looked into by the former Maharashtra DGP and NIA officer Dattatray Padsalgikar. The Bench comprising of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI*, J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ. further refused to transfer the trial of Manipur violence cases outside the State.

‘Two-finger’ test

In this unfortunate case of State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1494, where a sexual assault survivor was subjected to “twin-finger” test by the Medical Board, the bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud* and Hima Kohli, JJ., held that the “two-finger test” or pre vaginum test must not be conducted as it has no scientific basis and neither proves nor disproves allegations of rape. It instead re-victimizes and re-traumatizes women who may have been sexually assaulted and is an affront to their dignity.

Unmarried Woman’s Right to Abortion | Marital Rape as a form of Sexual Assault

In a historic decision rendered in X v. Health and Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 905, the 3-judge bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud*, Surya Kant and AS Bopanna, JJ., gave a progressive ruling by holding that a woman cannot be denied the right to a safe abortion only on the ground of her being unmarried.

“Denying an unmarried woman, the right to a safe abortion violates her personal autonomy and freedom.”

In another landmark verdict given in X v. Health and Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321, the Bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud*, AS Bopanna and JB Pardiwala, JJ held that “Sexual assault” or “rape” under Medical Termination of Pregnancy laws includes “marital rape”. The Supreme Court took over two months to write this historic verdict touching upon various aspects like purposive interpretation of Medical Termination of Pregnancy laws, equal status of married and unmarried or single women, right to reproductive autonomy, right to dignity, effect of unwanted pregnancy on mental health of women, etc.

LGBTQIA+ Rights | Inclusion of Queer Relationships in the definition of “Family” | Definition of “Woman”

In the landmark 5 -Judge Bench decision in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, which became instrumental in upholding the rights of the LGBTQIA+ community, Dipak Misra, CJ., and R.F. Nariman, A.M. Khanwilkar, Dr D.Y. Chandrachud and Indu Malhotra, JJ., held Section 377 IPC to be unconstitutional insofar it criminalised gay sex between consenting adults. The Bench reversed the 2-Judge Bench decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1. In his concurring opinion, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., while stating that, “It is difficult to right the wrongs of history. But we can certainly set the course for the Future”, held that lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenders have a constitutional right to equal citizenship in all its manifestations. Sexual orientation is recognised and protected by the Constitution.

In another historic decision recently rendered in X v. Health and Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321, the Bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud*, AS Bopanna and JB Pardiwala, JJ., used the term “woman” in this judgment as including persons other than cis-gender women who may require access to safe medical termination of their pregnancies.

Further on in Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Services, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1088, a case relating to maternity leave benefit to a woman not fitting in the popular imagination of a family, the bench of Dr DY Chandrachud* and AS Bopanna, JJ has observed that “familial relationships may take the form of domestic, unmarried partnerships or queer relationships.”

The Court was of the opinion that the predominant understanding of the concept of a “family” both in the law and in society is that it consists of a single, unchanging unit with a mother and a father (who remain constant over time) and their children, ignores the fact that many circumstances lead to a change in one’s familial structure, and that many families do not conform to this expectation to begin with.

“A household may be a single parent household for any number of reasons, including the death of a spouse, separation, or divorce. Similarly, the guardians and caretakers (who traditionally occupy the roles of the “mother” and the “father”) of children may change with remarriage, adoption, or fostering. These manifestations of love and of families may not be typical but they are as real as their traditional counterparts. Such atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not only of protection under law but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation. The black letter of the law must not be relied upon to disadvantage families which are different from traditional ones. The same undoubtedly holds true for women who take on the role of motherhood in ways that may not find a place in the popular imagination.”

Right to Privacy

Justice Chandrachud was part of the 9 Judge Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (Privacy- 9 Judge), (2017) 10 SCC 1, which unanimously held that, Right to Privacy is a basic fundamental right. The Bench, which also comprised of J.S. Khehar, CJ. and J. Chelameswar, S.A. Bobde, R.K. Agrawal, R.F. Nariman, A.M. Sapre, S.K. Kaul and S.A. Nazeer, JJ., observed that Right to Privacy forms an intrinsic part of Art. 21 and freedoms guaranteed in Pt. III. It permeates core of Preambular philosophy underlying “liberty” and “dignity” as also human concepts of “life” and “personal liberty” enshrined in Art. 21 and wide- ranging freedoms guaranteed under Pt. III, considered essential for a meaningful human existence.

Dr. Chandrachud, J., writing for himself and on behalf of J.S. Khehar, CJ, R.K. Agrawal and S.A. Nazeer, JJ, said that Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation. He added, “While the legitimate expectation of privacy may vary from the intimate zone to the private zone and from the private to the public arenas, it is important to underscore that privacy is not lost or surrendered merely because the individual is in a public place. Privacy attaches to the person since it is an essential facet of the dignity of the human being”.

*Did you Know? The Privacy case also marked a unique moment in judicial history of India; as Justice Dr. Chandrachud overruled the ADM Jabalpur decision in which his father, Late Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, was part of the majority. Terming the judgments rendered by the majority as “seriously flawed”, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., observed that-

“H.R. Khanna, J. was clearly right in holding that the recognition of the right to life and personal liberty under the Constitution does not denude the existence of that right, apart from it nor can there be a fatuous assumption that in adopting the Constitution the people of India surrendered the most precious aspect of the human persona, namely, life, liberty and freedom to the State on whose mercy these rights would depend”.

Women’s Rights | Empowerment and Employment

In major win for women Officers in Indian Army, the Division Bench of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and M.R. Shah, JJ., in Nitisha v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 261, held that the administrative requirement imposed by the Indian Army authorities while considering the case of the Women Short Service Commissions Officers (WSSCO) for the grant of Permanent Commission (PC), of benchmarking these officers with the officers lowest in merit in the corresponding male batch is arbitrary and irrational. The Court hence directed that such requirement shall not be enforced while implementing the decision in Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469

“It is not enough to proudly state that women officers are allowed to serve the nation in the Armed Forces, when the true picture of their service conditions tells a different story. A superficial sense of equality is not in the true spirit of the Constitution and attempts to make equality only symbolic.”

In this major verdict rendered in Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469, the bench of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Ajay Rastogi, JJ., ordered that the permanent commission will apply to all women officers in the Indian Army in service, irrespective of their years of service. Holding that the blanket non- consideration of women for criteria or command appointments absent an individuated justification by the Army cannot be sustained in law, the Court said that the Army has provided no justification in discharging its burden as to why women across the board should not be considered for any criteria or command appointments. Command assignments are not automatic for men SSC officers who are granted PC and would not be automatic for women either.

The 3-judge bench of Dipak Misra, CJ and AM Khanwilkar and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ., Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M, (2018) 16 SCC 368, termed the instant case to be perfect example of, “patriarchal autocracy and possibly self-obsession with the feeling that a female is a chattel” and set aside the verdict of Kerala High Court wherein it had annulled the marriage between two consenting adults, namely, Hadiya and Shafin Jahan. Noting that the Kerala HC erred in its decision, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., in his concurring opinion, came down heavily upon the Kerala HC, stating that,

“The schism between Hadiya and her father may be unfortunate. But it was no part of the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide what it considered to be a “just” way of life or “correct” course of living for Hadiya. She has absolute autonomy over her person. There was no warrant for the High Court to proceed further in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. The High Court has entered into a domain which is alien to its jurisdiction in a habeas corpus petition. How Hadiya chooses to lead her life is entirely a matter of her choice”.

Mental Health

In Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129, where the Single Judge of Karnataka High Court had termed person committing suicide a ‘weakling’ and also made observations on how the behavior of the deceased before he committed suicide was not that of a person who is depressed and suffering from mental health issues, the bench of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud* and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ., held that such observations describing the manner in which a depressed person ought to have behaved deeply diminishes the gravity of mental health issues and that “The mental health of a person cannot be compressed into a one size fits all approach.”

“Individual personality differences manifest as a variation in the behavior of people. Therefore, how an individual copes with a threat- both physical and emotional, expressing (or refraining to express) love, loss, sorrow and happiness, varies greatly in view of the multi-faceted nature of the human mind and emotions.”

Discourse Generating Decision regarding Adultery

The 5-Judge Constitution Bench in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39, held Section 497 IPC and Section 198 (2) CrPC to be unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 15(1) and 21 of the Constitution. Referring to several foreign courts’ judgments and opinions of celebrated authors, Dr. Chandrachud, J. observed that-

“If the ostensible object of the law is to protect the ‘institution of marriage’, it provides no justification for not recognising the agency of a woman whose spouse is engaged in a sexual relationship outside of marriage. She can neither complain nor is the fact that she is in a marital relationship with a man of any significance to the ingredients of the offence. Section 497 is founded on the notion that a woman by entering upon marriage loses, so to speak, her voice, autonomy and agency. Arbitrariness is writ large on the provision”.

Fundamental Rights: Liberty | Right to Life and Right to Die | Euthanasia

In Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 SCC 427, case where the Bombay High Court failed to evaluate even prima facie of the most basic issue, thereby refusing bail to the accused, the bench of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Indira Banerjee, JJ., reminded the High Courts and District Courts of their duty to ensure human liberty. Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, observed that, “Law should not become a ruse for targeted harassment”.

“Liberty survives by the vigilance of her citizens, on the cacophony of the media and in the dusty corridors of courts alive to the rule of (and not by) law. Yet, much too often, liberty is a casualty when one of these components is found wanting”.

The 5-judge Constitution Bench of Dipak Misra, CJ., and AK Sikri, AM Khanwilkar, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Ashok Bhushan, JJ., in Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1, held that the right to die with dignity is a fundamental right as held in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648 and that ‘passive euthanasia’, both, voluntary and involuntary, is permissible. In his concurring opinion, Dr. Chandrachud, J., observed that,

“While upholding the legality of passive euthanasia (voluntary and non-voluntary) and in recognising the importance of advance directives, the present judgment draws sustenance from the constitutional values of liberty, dignity, autonomy and privacy. In order to lend assurance to a decision taken by the treating doctor in good faith, this judgment has mandated the setting up of committees to exercise a supervisory role and function”.

Live Streaming | Cases of constitutional and national importance to be live streamed

A Bench comprising of CJ Dipak Misra and A.M. Khanwilkar* and Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ., in Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India, (2018) 10 SCC 639, decided in favour of live streaming of cases of constitutional or national importance before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. Justice Khanwilkar delivered the leading judgment for the CJI and himself. While Justice Dr. Chandrachud rendered a separate concurring opinion wherein, he formulated Model guidelines for the broadcasting of the proceedings and other judicial events of the Supreme Court of India

Notable Dissents

[Supriyo v. Union of India, (Same-sex Marriage/ Marriage Equality), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1348]

The 5-judge Constitution Bench of Dr DY Chandrachud, CJI and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, S. Ravindra Bhat, Hima Kohli, PS Narasimha, JJ wrote 4 opinions on the Same Sex Marriage/Marriage Equality matter where they agreed on some points and disagreed on others. In a 366 pages long verdict, heavy on words, all judges said in one voice that there was no fundamental right to marry and that the Supreme Court could not enter judicial legislation to read words into the Special Marriage Act and make it a gender-neutral legislation. The Court left it to Parliament to undertake this process.

There were however some disagreements on certain points where Bhat, Kohli and Narasimha, JJ formed the majority and Chandrachud, CJI and Kaul, J were in dissent.

CJI Chandrachud and Kaul, J held that the word “sex” in Article 15 of the Constitution includes within its fold other markers of identity which are related to sex and gender such as “sexual orientation”. Thus, a restriction on the right to enter into a union based on sexual orientation would violate Article 15 of the Constitution. They also refused to hold that permitting non-heterosexual unions would lead to allowing incestuous, polyandrous, and polygamous unions for all communities (the personal laws of some religious and trial communities currently permit polygamy or polyandry). The restriction on the ground of sexual orientation will violate Article 15 of the Constitution.

Committee to define scope of the entitlements of queer couples who are in Unions During the course of arguments, Tushar Mehta, the Solicitor General had assured that the Union Government will constitute a Committee chaired by the Union Cabinet Secretary for the purpose of defining and elucidating the scope of the entitlements of queer couples who are in unions.

The CJI enumerated following factors to be considered by the Committee:

• Enabling partners in a queer relationship to be treated as a part of the same family for the purposes of a ration card; and to have the facility of a joint bank account with the option to name the partner as a nominee, in case of death;

• Medical practitioners have a duty to consult family or next of kin or next friend, in the event patients who are terminally ill have not executed an Advance Directive.

• Parties in a union may be considered ‘family’ for this purpose; Jail visitation rights and the right to access the body of the deceased partner and arrange the last rites; a

• Legal consequences such as succession rights, maintenance, financial benefits such as under the Income Tax Act 1961, rights flowing from employment such as gratuity and family pension and insurance.

[Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar Review-5 J.), (2021) 3 SCC 1]

Seeking a review of the decision delivered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (Aadhaar-5 Judge), (2019) 1 SCC 1, the 5 Judge Bench of the Court comprising of A.M. Khanwilkar, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Ashok Bhushan, S. Abdul Nazeer and B.R. Gavai, JJ., with a ratio of 4:1 dismissed this petition, while observing that, change in the law or subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.

However, Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud gave his dissenting opinion on the issue and observed that constitutional principles of consistency and rule of law would require that a decision on the Review Petitions should await the reference to the Larger Bench.

“It is important to draw a distinction with a situation where a judgment attains finality and the view propounded by it is disapproved by a larger bench subsequently”.

[K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (Aadhaar-5 Judge), (2019) 1 SCC 1]

The 5- Judge Bench comprising of CJ Dipak Misra and A.K. Sikri, A.M. Khanwilkar, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Ashok Bhushan, JJ., by a majority of 4:1, upheld the constitutional validity of Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016. Justice Chandrachud gave a 23-point conclusion to the opinion wherein he dissented from the majority. In his opinion, the entire Aadhaar programme, since 2009, suffers from the constitutional infirmities and violations of fundamental rights-

“Creating strong privacy protection laws and instilling safeguards may address or at the very least assuage some of the concerns associated with the Aadhar scheme which severely impairs informational self-determination, individual privacy, dignity and autonomy”.

In a sharp criticism on passing of the Aaadhar Act as Money Bill within the meaning of Art. 110 of the Constitution, Dr. Chandrachud, J., observed that-

“There is a constitutional trust which attaches to the empowerment of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha to decide whether a legislative measure is a Money Bill. Entrustment of the authority to decide is founded on the expectation that the Speaker of the Lok Sabha will not dilute the existence of a coordinate institution in a bicameral legislature. A constitutional trust has been vested in the office of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. By declaring an ordinary Bill to be a Money Bill, the Speaker limits the role of the Rajya Sabha. This power cannot be unbridled or bereft of judicial scrutiny”.

[Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629]

In a 4:3 verdict, the 7-Judge Bench held that an appeal in the name of religion, race, caste, community or language is impermissible under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and would constitute a corrupt practice sufficient to annul the election in which such an appeal was made regardless whether the appeal was in the name of the candidate’s religion or the religion of the election agent or that of the opponent or that of the voters. Writing the dissenting opinion for himself and Adarsh K. Goel and U.U. Lalit, JJ.; Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., made a very significant observation in his dissent-

“Our Constitution recognises the broad diversity of India and, as a political document, seeks to foster a sense of inclusion. It seeks to wield a nation where its citizens practise different religions, speak varieties of languages, belong to various castes and are of different communities into the concept of one nationhood. The Indian State has no religion nor does the Constitution recognise any religion as a religion of the State. India is not a theocratic State but a secular nation in which there is a respect for and acceptance of the equality between religions”.

[Romila Thapar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 753]

In the instant case wherein 5 human rights activists were charged and arrested under the provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the 3 Judge Bench of the Court with a ratio of 2:1 (Dipak Misra CJ., and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.) rejected their prayer seeking appointment of SIT and court-monitored investigation; Justice D.Y. Chandrachud dissented with the majority. He observed that, “Dissent is a symbol of a vibrant democracy. Voices in opposition cannot be muzzled by persecuting those who take up unpopular causes”. Taking the view that a Special Investigating Team should be appointed to pursue the matter, Dr. Chandrachud, J., stated that,

“The purpose of the direction which I propose to give is to ensure that the basic entitlement of every citizen who is faced with allegations of criminal wrongdoing, is that the investigative process should be fair. This is an integral component of the guarantee against arbitrariness under Article 14 and of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. If this Court were not to stand by the principles which we have formulated, we may witness a soulful requiem to liberty”.