Bombay High Court: The present writ petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by petitioner, whereby the Revised Circular No. 543 dated 04-07-2018 (‘the Circular’) issued by the Charity Commissioner, Maharashtra, Mumbai, was challenged. The Circular directed notices to be issued to the Trustees of the Trust which used phrases “Bhrashtachar Nirmulan Mahasangh”, “Bhrashtachar Virodhi Andolan”, “Bhrashtachar Mukta Bharat” or “Human rights” in the title of the Trust name and further directed them to remove the same.
The Division Bench of M.S. Sonak and Jitendra Jain*, JJ., opined that if the intention of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 (‘the 1950 Act’) was to prohibit use of such phrases, then the legislature would have made a provision empowering the authorities under the 1950 Act to not register such Trusts. The Court stated that in the absence of any such provision, the Charity Commissioner was not justified in issuing the impugned Circular. The Court thus quashed the Circular and directed that respondents were free to take any action in accordance with law if it was found that any trust or organisation registered under the 1950 Act were acting like kangaroo Courts or impersonating themselves by way of their activities as instrumentalities of this State.
The Court took note of the Circular and observed that the reason for issuance of the Circular was that eradication of corruption was the duty of the Government and the Government machinery had powers to take action against the corruption and, therefore, by using the said phrases, the Organisation/Trust assumed to itself, the power to take action against the persons facing corruption complaints and, therefore, the names of such organisation resulted into misuse. The Circular stated that eradication of corruption and protection of human rights could not be the social, religious, or educational objective of any organisation as per Bombay High Court’s decision and it also referred to a letter addressed by the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission for taking action against the organizations that had the words “human rights” in their title.
The Court referred to Section 9 of the 1950 Act which defined ‘charitable purpose’ to include relief of poverty or distress; education; medical relief; provision for facilities for recreation or other leisure time occupation if the facilities were provided in the interest of social welfare and public benefit and advancement of any other object of general public utility, but did not include a purpose which was related exclusively to religious teaching or worship. The Court opined that the phrase “advancement of any other object of general public utility” would mean benefit to the public in all sections of the public as distinguished from an individual or group of individuals would be of charitable purpose and the expression “object of general public utility” would include all objects which promote the welfare of the general public.
The Court opined that it could not be said that the purpose would cease to be charitable even if public welfare was intended to be served, thereby including taking steps to urge or oppose legislation and if the primary purpose was the advancement of objects of general public utility, it would remain charitable even if an incidental entry resulted into political domain for achieving that purpose. The Court stated that an object of public utility need not be an object in which the whole of the public was interested, and it was sufficient if a well-defined section of the public benefited by the object.
The Court opined that as the Circular stated that as per the provisions of the 1950 Act, the objective of eradicating of corruption and protecting of human rights could not be social, religious, or educational; the objective was contrary to the definition of charitable purposes as defined by Section 9 of the 1950 Act inasmuch as the impugned Circular ignored and did not take notice of Clause 4 of Section 9 of the 1950 Act which stated that charitable purpose would include the advancement of any other object of general public utility. The Court also opined that the Circular did not provide any details of the reference of the Bombay High Court’s judgment, which stated that such an objective could not be a social objective of any organisation.
The Court agreed that an organisation formed for fighting corruption could not take law in its own hands since the enforcement and redressal of the grievance must be in accordance with the law, and there were enough machinery and enforcement agencies which were formed for examining the issue of corruption. The Court further opined that merely because such phrases were used in the title of the Trust would not mean that such Organisation/Trust was functioning as a kangaroo Court and if any such Trust/Organisation was acting like a kangaroo Court, then certainly the State rightly must take action by curbing the activities of such kangaroo Courts but not by forcing to change the name.
The Court opined that the use of such phrases would not give any impression that such Organisation/Trust had the power to take action against the person who was facing corruption charges or who was violating human rights.
The Court referred to the provisions of the 1950 Act and opined that once the authorities issued certificate of registration under the 1950 Act they did not have the power to direct the Trustees to change the name of the Trust and if the name of the Trust gave an impression of it belonging to the Government or patronage by the Government then the provisions of the Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950 could certainly be invoked by the authorities under the 1950 Act.
The Court opined that if the intention of the 1950 Act was to prohibit the use of such phrases, then the legislature would have made a provision empowering the authorities under the 1950 Act to not register such Trusts. The Court stated that, without such a provision, the Charity Commissioner was not justified in issuing the impugned Circular. Further, the Court stated that mere use of the name ‘prevention of corruption’ or ‘protection of human rights’ would not mean that the Trust could be said to have any patronage from the State.
The Court referred to Section 22(1) of the 1950 Act provided for change when same was desired in the interest of the administration of public trust. The Court stated that the phrase “administration of public trust” would mean the Trust was not functioning properly and it was working of the Trust that required a change, therefore, changing name at the behest of and on the directions of Charity Commissioner would not fall within the provisions of Section 22(1) of the 1950 Act. The Court stated that the impugned Circular could not fall within the provision of Section 22(1) read with Section 69(a) of the 1950 Act.
The Court quashed the Circular and directed that respondents were free to take any action in accordance with law if it was found that any trust or organisation registered under the 1950 Act were acting like kangaroo Courts or impersonating themselves by way of their activities as instrumentalities of this State. The Court concluded by stating that “Naam me kya rakha hai, kaam dekhna chahiye. Agar kaam galat ho to sakht karvaai karni chahiye”.
[Manvi Hakka Sanrakshan and Jagruti v. State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition No. 3072 of 2019, decided on 06-12-2024]
*Judgment authored by: Justice Jitendra Jain
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioners: Dr Abhishek Subhash Haridas a/w Vikas Shravan Kuchekar for Petitioners-in person present.
For the Respondents: A.I. Patel, Addl. G. P. a/w S. L. Babar, AGP for Respondent-State.
Amicus Curiae: Abhay Anturkar
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