Delhi High Court: A petition was filed under Articles 226 and 227 challenging the impugned judgment of the Delhi School Tribunal (‘DST’) dated 18-05-2017 as well as the order of Respondent 3 School dated 24-05-2014 imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement, with consequential benefits. Jyoti Singh, J., quashed the impugned judgment, charge memo, inquiry proceedings, and penalty order, citing procedural lapses, unsupported findings, and a lack of independent application of mind by the disciplinary committee.
The petitioner was appointed as Class IV employee in Khalsa Girls Senior Secondary School (Respondent 3) on 19-06-1978. He was promoted as a Lab Assistant w.e.f. 08-12-1981 and was granted selection grade w.e.f. 01-08-1982. In contemplation of departmental proceedings, the petitioner was suspended on 22-09-2011. The charge sheet was issued and after conclusion of the inquiry, IO tendered his report rendering a finding that the charges were proved. The inquiry report together with documents was sent to the Directorate of Education (‘DoE’) for approval of proposed penalty of ‘removal from service’ of the Petitioner under Rule 120(2) of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973 (‘DSEAR’).
The Director of Education observed that Articles of Charge levelled against the Petitioner do not warrant imposition of penalty of removal from service except Charge at Article-VI, which was not proved beyond doubt and in this context, recommended penalty of compulsory retirement on the Petitioner. Based on the recommendation of DoE, Chairman of the School passed an order on 24-05-2014 imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement on the Petitioner w.e.f. 28-04-2014. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority but there was no response. The petitioner filed a writ petition which was withdrawn vide order dated 19-11-2014 and the petitioner was granted liberty to approach the DST for appropriate relief against the impugned order. The petitioner thereafter approached DST and filed an appeal, DoE and the School filed their replies to the appeal and vide the impugned judgment dated 18-05-2017, DST dismissed the appeal and upheld the punishment order. Thus, the present petition was filed.
The Court observed that the petitioner has taken a stand and supported it with Tracking IDs that letter dated 11-03-2013, intimating the next date of hearing for examination of witnesses i.e. 14-03-2013, was dispatched only on 12-03-2013 and was received by the Petitioner on 16-03-2013. Thus, the Petitioner was unaware that the next date of hearing before the IO was 14-03-2013 and/or that on the said date, the material witnesses were to be examined. Even as per DoE, the petitioner was regularly attending the inquiry proceedings along with his DA prior thereto and hence the petitioner’s absence not being deliberate, he can neither be blamed for not appearing before the IO on 14-03-2013 nor made to suffer the consequences thereof. Thus, the finding of DST is erroneous and deserves to be set aside.
The Court stated that there is a pattern in the findings of the IO, inasmuch as for every charge, the IO has simply referred to the contents of the memos/documents relied upon by the School, presumed the allegations contained therein to be the gospel truth and completely discarded the defence of the Petitioner on the ground that it was irrelevant. The DST did not look into the aspect whether the charges were proved by the IO based on any evidence and/or whether the IO was correct in rejecting the defence of the Petitioner as being irrelevant.
The Court scrutinized the findings of the departmental inquiry and identified several procedural lapses and unsupported conclusions by the Inquiry Officer (IO). Regarding the charge of unauthorized absence, the Court observed that the absences were brief and did not justify serious disciplinary action. On Charges II and VII, it was held that raising service-related grievances through representations does not breach conduct rules. Similarly, for Charge IV, the IO failed to provide evidence showing the petitioner provoked students to make representations. In Charge III, the allegation of circulating photographs or involving media lacked any evidence beyond a memo issued by the manager, and obtaining information under the RTI Act was not a violation of conduct rules.
The Court further noted that for Charge VIII, the petitioner was within his rights to seek redressal for salary deductions, especially since the school’s actions were unauthorized by district authorities. Most significantly, on Charge VI, the Court found that the IO violated principles of natural justice by closing the evidence of the complainant in the petitioner’s absence without allowing cross-examination. These lapses undermined the inquiry’s credibility, and the Court criticized the Tribunal for overlooking the procedural flaws and supporting the school’s actions despite the lack of substantial evidence.
The Court concluded that on perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the DST has gone a step forward to hold that several ladies had complained against the Petitioner alleging sexual harassment, oblivious of the fact that there was no charge to this effect. Another glaring error in the impugned judgment is reliance on the judgments, which were wholly inapplicable to the present case. Reading of impugned order dated 24-05-2014, whereby penalty of compulsory retirement was imposed on the Petitioner shows that the punishment was imposed purely on the recommendation of DoE with no independent application of mind by the Disciplinary Committee. Therefore, Section 8(2) was unable to be read to mean and connote that DoE has the power to modify the proposed penalty and assuming that there is any such power, the recommendation to impose the harsh penalty of compulsory retirement does not fit into the observations of the DoE.
Thus, the Court quashed and set aside the judgment of the DST as well as the charge memo, inquiry proceedings and the penalty order. The Court granted notional reinstatement with all consequential retiral benefits a as the petitioner reached the age of superannuation on 30-09-2015, during the pendency of the writ petition.
[Ajmer Singh v Director of Education, W.P.(C) 5741/2017, decided on 29-11-2024]
Judgment By: Justice Jyoti Singh
Advocates who appeared in this case :
Mr. Jai Anant Dehadrai, Advocate with Mr. Siddharth Sharma, Mr. Chaitanya Singh, Mr. Mohd. Tasnimul Hassan and Mr. Martin G. George, Advocates with Petitioner in person
Ms. Latika Choudhary, Advocate for R1. Ms. Kawalpreet Kaur, Mr. Vinod Kumar Singh and Ms. Nayab Gauhar, Advocates for R3.
