Delhi High Court: In a petition filed for quashing the complaint filed by the respondent under Section 2002 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’) alleging that the petitioners and other accused persons had committed offences under Sections 3233, 3244, 3415, 4526, 5067 and 348 of Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), Manoj Kumar Ohri, J.*, stated that to interpret Section 468(3)9 of the CrPC, in a manner which considers the relevant offences to be the ones in respect of which summons were issued would lead to absurdity. As on the one hand, the complainant would be expected to be diligent and adhere to the limitation period while filing the complaint, but if the Court subsequently was to drop one of the more serious offences as a consequence of which the limitation period would get reduced, the complaint which was within the limitation period as per the offences alleged in the complaint would now suddenly be rendered time-barred.
The Court observed that in the present case, the complaint was filed by the respondent under Sections 323, 324, 341, 452, 506 and 34 of IPC. The offence which had the most severe punishment was the one under Section 452 of IPC, which provides for imprisonment up to seven years. The Court stated that, since no limitation period was provided for offences punishable with more than three years of imprisonment, therefore, the impugned complaint could not be stated to be barred by limitation. Thus, the Court dismissed the present petition.
Background
The petitioners submitted that the Trial Court erred in not considering that since, the complaint was barred by limitation, it could not have been proceeded with. It was submitted that the alleged incident took place on 05-09-2015, whereas the present complaint was filed on 05-09-2018. Further, the petitioners were summoned only for the offence under Section 323 of IPC, for which the maximum punishment which might be awarded was imprisonment for one year. Thus, as per Section 468(2)(b) of CrPC, the limitation period for filing the said complaint was one year, and hence, the impugned complaint was time barred.
However, the respondent submitted that the limitation would have to be calculated with reference to the offences which were alleged in the complaint, and not by the offences with respect to which the petitioners were summoned. One of the offences alleged in the complaint was under Section 452 of IPC, which was punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. Hence, it was submitted that the impugned complaint would not be barred under Section 468 of CrPC.
Thus, the issue before the Court in the present case, was whether the limitation period would be calculated with respect to the offences alleged in the complaint or the offences for which the accused have been finally summoned.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Court after perusal of Section 468 of CrPC, noted that depending on the severity of punishment provided for in the concerned offence, different periods of limitation was provided under Section 468(2) of CrPC. Further, no limitation period was prescribed for offences punishable with more than three years of punishment.
The Court stated that Section 468(3) of CrPC, laid down the manner of computing the period of limitation in case of occurrence of more than one offence. In such cases, the limitation period had to be calculated with reference to the offence punishable with the most severe punishment. The Court further stated that Section 468(3) referred to the offences which might be tried together, and it did not require that the offences must actually have been tried together. Thus, the mention of multiple offences in the complaint which were alleged to have been committed in the same transaction would be sufficient to comply with the requirement of Section 468(3) of CrPC.
The Court relied on Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62, wherein it was held that the period of limitation had to be followed from the date of offence to the date of filing of the complaint and not the date of the Court taking cognizance of the offences. The Court stated that to interpret Section 468(3) of the CrPC, in a manner which considers the relevant offences to be the ones in respect of which summons were issued would lead to absurdity. As on one hand, the complainant would be expected to be diligent and adhere to the limitation period while filing the complaint, but if the Court subsequently dropped one of the more serious offences, then the limitation period would get reduced, and the complaint which was within the limitation period would now suddenly be rendered time-barred.
The Court stated that reason for the Court to take the date of filing of the complaint as the relevant date for computing period of limitation rather than date of taking cognizance was that in the latter case an otherwise diligent complainant would be left at the mercy of efficiency and quickness of the Court and delay or inaction on the part of the Court would end up deciding whether the complaint was time-barred or not. The Court stated that once a litigant was diligent in approaching the Court, he could not be held responsible for any subsequent delay which occurred on part of the Court.
The Court stated that it was also worth considering that the method of using the more serious offence as a reference when multiple offences were alleged to have occurred was not restricted to only Section 468 of CrPC. Section 155(4) of CrPC also states that where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one was cognizable, the case should be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable. The reason being that it would be unreasonable to expect the complainant to approach the Court and police simultaneously for the same incident, just because some of the offences he alleges were non-cognizable.
The Court observed that in the present case, the complaint was filed by the respondent under Sections 323, 324, 341, 452, 506 and 34 of IPC. The offence which had the most severe punishment was the one under Section 452 of IPC, which provides for imprisonment up to seven years. The Court stated that, since no limitation period was provided for offences punishable with more than three years of imprisonment, therefore, the impugned complaint could not be stated to be barred by limitation. Thus, the Court dismissed the present petition.
[Sivankutty v. P.K. Patra, CRL.M.C. 1319 of 2023, decided on 05-12-2024]
*Judgment authored by- Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Petitioners: Ruchir Batra and Prasanth K., Advocates
For the Respondent: Shiv Chopra, Aadhyaa Khanna and Siddharth Arora, Advocates
Buy Penal Code, 1860 HERE
Buy Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 HERE
1. Corresponding Section 519 of Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’)
2. Corresponding Section 223 of BNSS
3. Corresponding Section 115(2) of Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNS’)
4. Corresponding Section 118 of BNS
5. Corresponding Section 126(2) of BNS
6. Corresponding Section 333 of BNS
7. Corresponding Sections 351(2) and 351(3) of BNS
