Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS): While considering that whether application of Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act on popular social media platform TikTok, violated the First Amendment of the US Constitution; the 9-Judge Bench of John Roberts, CJ., and Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett and Ketanji Brown Jackson, JJ., held that the provisions of the Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, does not violate First Amendment rights of TikTok.
The Court said that undoubtedly for more than 170 million Americans, TikTok offers a distinctive and expansive outlet for expression, means of engagement, and source of community; but the Congress has determined that divestiture is necessary to address its well-supported national security concerns regarding TikTok’s data collection practices and relationship with a foreign adversary.
Background:
TikTok is a social media platform that allows users to create, publish, view, share, and interact with short videos overlaid with audio and text. Since its launch in 2017, the platform has accumulated over 170 million users in the United States and more than one billion worldwide.
TikTok is operated in the United States by TikTok Inc., an American company incorporated and headquartered in California. TikTok Inc.’s ultimate parent company is ByteDance Ltd., a privately held company that has operations in China. ByteDance Ltd. owns TikTok’s proprietary algorithm, which is developed and maintained in China. The company is also responsible for developing portions of the source code that runs the TikTok platform. ByteDance Ltd. is subject to Chinese laws that require it to “assist or cooperate” with the Chinese Government’s “intelligence work” and to ensure that the Chinese Government has “the power to access and control private data” the company holds.
Recently, the US Government has taken repeated actions to address national security concerns regarding the relationship between China and TikTok via issuing several Executive Orders including ordering ByteDance Ltd., to divest all interests and rights in any property “used to enable or support ByteDance’s operation of the TikTok application in the United States,” along with “any data obtained or derived from” U. S. TikTok users.
Throughout 2021 and 2022, ByteDance Ltd. negotiated with Executive Branch officials to develop a national security agreement that would resolve those concerns. Executive Branch officials ultimately determined, however, that ByteDance Ltd.’s proposed agreement did not adequately mitigate the risks posed to U. S. national security interests and the negotiations stalled, and the parties never finalized an agreement.
Against this backdrop, the US Congress enacted the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (the Act). The Act makes it unlawful for any entity to provide certain services to “distribute, maintain, or update” a “foreign adversary-controlled application” in the United States. The Act defines “covered company” to include a company that operates an application that enables users to generate, share, and view content and has more than 1,000,000 monthly active users. The Act excludes from that definition a company that operates an application “whose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel information and reviews”. Furthermore, the Act exempts a foreign adversary-controlled application from the prohibitions if the application undergoes a “qualified divestiture.”
ByteDance Ltd. and TikTok Inc., along with several TikTok users and content creators, filed petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that the Act’s prohibitions, TikTok-specific foreign adversary-controlled application designation, and divestiture requirement violate the First Amendment.
Court’s Assessment:
Considering the petitioners’ challenge on the threshold of First Amendment scrutiny, the Court pointed out that laws that directly regulate expressive conduct can, but do not necessarily, trigger such review. The Court further stated that it is not clear that the Act itself directly regulates protected expressive activity or conduct with an expressive component. Indeed, the Act does not regulate the creator-petitioners at all; the Act directly regulates ByteDance Ltd. and TikTok Inc. only through the divestiture requirement.
The Court said that a law targeting a foreign adversary’s control over a communications platform is in many ways different in kind from the regulations of non-expressive activity that has been subjected to First Amendment scrutiny. Those differences—the Act’s focus on a foreign government, the congressionally determined adversary relationship between that foreign government and the United States, and the causal steps between the regulations and the alleged burden on protected speech—may impact whether First Amendment scrutiny applies. “This Court has not articulated a clear framework for determining whether a regulation of non-expressive activity that disproportionately burdens those engaged in expressive activity triggers heightened review. We need not do so here. We assume without deciding that the challenged provisions fall within this category and are subject to First Amendment scrutiny”.
Relying on precedents, the Court explained that Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. Whereas content-neutral laws, in contrast, are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue. The Court took aid of 2 forms of content-based regulation — First, a law is content based on its face if it “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed; Second, a facially content-neutral law is nonetheless treated as a content-based regulation of speech if it “cannot be ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech’” or was “adopted by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message the speech conveys.
Applying the afore-stated forms, the Court found that the challenged provisions are facially content neutral and are justified by a content- neutral rationale. The challenged provisions are facially content neutral. They impose TikTok-specific prohibitions due to a foreign adversary’s control over the platform and make divestiture a prerequisite for the platform’s continued operation in the United States. They do not target particular speech based upon its content, contrast.
The Court explained that requiring divestiture for the purpose of preventing a foreign adversary from accessing the sensitive data of 170 million U. S. TikTok users is not “a subtle means of exercising a content preference”. The prohibitions, TikTok-specific designation, and divestiture requirement regulate TikTok based on a content-neutral data collection interest. And TikTok has special characteristics—a foreign adversary’s ability to leverage its control over the platform to collect vast amounts of personal data from 170 million U. S. users—that justify this differential treatment.
Explaining that differential treatment was justified herein, the Court emphasized the inherent narrowness of the holding. “Data collection and analysis is a common practice in this digital age; but TikTok’s scale and susceptibility to foreign adversary control, together with the vast swaths of sensitive data the platform collects, justify differential treatment to address the Government’s national security concerns. A law targeting any other speaker would by necessity entail a distinct inquiry and separate considerations”.
The Court further pointed out that the Act’s prohibitions and divestiture requirement are designed to prevent China—a designated foreign adversary—from leveraging its control over ByteDance Ltd. to capture the personal data of U. S. TikTok users. This objective qualifies as an important Government interest under intermediate scrutiny.
The provisions clearly serve the Government’s data collection interest “in a direct and effective way”. The prohibitions account for the fact that, absent a qualified divestiture, TikTok’s very operation in the United States implicates the Government’s data collection concerns, while the requirements that make a divestiture “qualified” ensure that those concerns are addressed before TikTok resumes U. S. operations. Neither the prohibitions nor the divestiture requirement, moreover, is “substantially broader than necessary to achieve” this national security objective. Rather than ban TikTok outright, the Act imposes a conditional ban. The prohibitions prevent China from gathering data from U. S. TikTok users unless and until a qualified divestiture severs China’s control.
Concurring in part, Sotomayor, J., however said that Laws that “impose a disproportionate burden” upon those engaged in expressive activity are subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Act plainly imposes such a burden: It bars any entity from distributing TikTok’s speech in the United States, unless TikTok undergoes a qualified divestiture. The Act, moreover, effectively prohibits TikTok from collaborating with certain entities regarding its “content recommendation algorithm” even following a qualified divestiture. the Act implicates content creators’ “right to associate” with their preferred publisher “for the purpose of speaking”; which calls for First Amendment scrutiny as well.
In his concurring opinion, Gorsuch, J., expressed reservations about whether the Act is “content neutral” and thus escapes “strict scrutiny”. However, he stated that the Act seeks to serve a compelling interest: preventing a foreign country, designated by Congress and the President as an adversary, from harvesting vast troves of personal information about tens of millions of Americans. “The record before us establishes that TikTok mines data both from TikTok users and about millions of others who do not consent to share their information”.
[TikTok Inc. v. Merrick B. Garland, Nos. 24—656 and 24—657, decided on 17-1-2025]