Defining the Role of Civil Courts in Religious Disputes

Introduction and brief facts

This article aims to analyse Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma¹. The issue concerns the civil courts’ authority to hear cases involving religion. By contrasting this ruling with the English case Shergill v. Khaira², the article reviews and analyses the decision. This case is the outcome of a conflict that has lasted for more than a century between the Patriarch’s Party and the Catholicos’ Party, two different factions within the Jacobian Christian community of Malabar, regarding temporal and administrative control over assets acquired in a charitable trust. Between the two parties, this was the third lawsuit. The year 1954 marked the first, and 1959 marked the second.³ The 1959 ruling resulted in a mutual adjustment; however, the successfully negotiated adjustments were subsequently disturbed, giving rise to multiple lawsuits, eight of which were merged by the District Court and ultimately determined by the High Court. Due to this, there have been appeals and a number of legal questions raised, such as whether the claim might be maintainable under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the impact of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991⁴ and if past lawsuit pronouncements could apply as res judicata.⁵ This article will examine the decision on the suit’s maintainability under the Civil Procedure Code.

Issues and judgment

The issue in this case was whether the court could allow a suit seeking the declaration of Church’s episcopal status and whether the plaintiff may request an injunction to stop the defendants from meddling in church affairs.⁶

Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy delivered the majority decision on his own behalf as well as for Justice S.C. Sen. Justice R.M. Sahai offered a partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion.⁷ In order to decide on the issue stated above, the Court set out to interpret the meaning of Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. It found that since the fundamental tenet of law is that every right has an equivalent remedy, every civil suit is cognizable unless barred.⁸ It took a broad interpretation of Section 9 for the following reasons. First, the phraseology used — both positive and negative — demonstrates the expansive meaning. All civil lawsuits that are not prohibited are permitted by the positive portion, whereas the negative section prohibits any lawsuits that are expressly or implicitly barred.⁹ Second, it is evident from the two explanations of the clause that the legislature intended for it to cover religious issues involving the right to property or office.¹⁰ Furthermore, the phrase “all suits of civil nature” and the term “shall” serve to further broaden the section’s scope. Compared to “civil proceedings”, the term “civil nature” is broader. Therefore, the clause would be applicable in any situation where a disagreement may impact a party’s civil and/or legal rights.¹¹ Explanation I defines the nature of the present suit. By emphasising unequivocally that lawsuits pertaining to the right to property or office are of a civil nature, even when they entirely centre on religious issues, it eliminates uncertainty.¹² The Court noted that the Parliament was cognizant of the fact that ecclesiastical courts are unique to England, which is why Explanation I was included.¹³ The phrases and expressions used in the section require the Court to use its jurisdiction to uphold a right, and the word “shall” makes this requirement mandatory.¹⁴

Sinna Ramanuja Jeer v. Ranga Ramanuja Jeer¹⁵ was referenced by the Court to support its position about the section’s explanation. In Sinna Ramanuja case¹⁶, the Court noted that prima facie cases pertaining to religious rites and ceremonies cannot be upheld in a civil court. Nonetheless, the section’s explanation suggests two things: (i) an office suit is a civil suit; and (ii) it does not stop being one if the right is solely dependent on a matter of religious ceremonies.¹⁷

Appellant’s contentions and the Court’s response

Both parties’ learned counsels presented detailed arguments on a range of issues, including the religious basis of the trust and the civil courts’ authority to address matters pertaining to religion. The appellants claimed that determining whether a church was episcopal or not required determining which canon to apply, and that determination was entirely dependent on canonical regulations. Such an inquiry could not be conducted by civil courts.¹⁸ In response to this claim, the Court invoked two different legal defences: Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and Article 25 of the Constitution, which protects the right to practise one’s religion and freedom of conscience.¹⁹ As a fundamental right, the freedom to practise one’s religion would include the ability to request an acknowledgement of the church’s episcopal status. Furthermore, since the suit for declaration is a claim to office and there is not an alternate venue for resolving disputes of this kind, it would be maintainable under Section 9.²⁰ Religious office disputes are civil disputes because they involve rights that are civil in nature even though they may have religious overtones. A civil wrong occurs when someone’s rights as a follower of any religion are violated.²¹ The Court further held that injunctions that prohibit intervention in Church affairs are appropriate and maintainable since they relate to religious office.²² This opinion was made for the same reason. The Court did highlight one very significant point, though: because it might be unqualified and lack the necessary competence to make such determinations, it should not decide cases involving purely religious issues that do not implicate legal rights. As a result, the Court decided that, only those prayers in the original suit that could not be justified as strictly religious in nature were subject to civil court review.²³

The appellants’ counsel also produced excerpts from Halsbury’s Laws of England pertaining to colonies in which the Crown continues to have supreme authority over religious matters. He suggested they should not apply to a country like India, which is a secular sovereign. In a nation like India with a secular Constitution, it was argued, the Court could not follow decisions from countries where the Church was an integral element of the State.²⁴ He came to the conclusion that the courts should not get involved in questions of faith. In response, the Court claimed that the texts proved colonists are not subject to English ecclesiastical law. Court jurisdiction is based on common law or statutes.²⁵

The Court came to the conclusion that by reading Section 9 broadly and construing widely the court’s jurisdiction to hear an action seeking to declare a church to be episcopal, it is not making a decision about faith in and of itself, but rather about the exercise of a right related to faith.²⁶ Only lawsuits that are expressly or implicitly barred are prohibited under Section 9, and in this case, there is not a statutory bar that can be identified. As a result, Section 9 CPC permits the litigation to be maintained. Finally, every citizen is guaranteed a fundamental right to practise their religion by Article 25 of the Constitution, and any violation of this right can be brought to justice in civil courts.²⁷

Analysis

I concur with the Court’s decision in this case and believe it ought to serve as a model for resolving cases of a similar nature down the road. I believe that the expansive reading of Section 9 is justified. The section’s language permits “all” cases of civil nature while prohibiting only those that are specifically or implicitly barred.²⁸ Moreover, Explanation 1 makes it quite clear that lawsuits pertaining to property or offices are of a civil nature, even though they can solely centre on issues of religious ceremonies.²⁹ The current case is obviously one in which the right to hold office is contested, and that right is predicated on a matter pertaining to religious ceremonies or the assertion of the church’s episcopal nature. This case, in my opinion, perfectly fits the context of cases in Explanation 1, and it is appropriate to apply Explanation 1 to it directly. The Court has provided strong support for its position by referencing Sinna Ramanuja case³⁰, which clarifies Explanation 1. Since Section 9 also contains the word “shall”, it is a mandatory clause.³¹ By using the word “shall”, it is implied that the Court has an obligation to use its jurisdiction to try any civil action. This case is of a civil character, and the court is required to try it since it has a duty to do so. Moreover, the appellants’ argument that this is a strictly religious matter in which the court cannot become involved does not hold water for the reasons mentioned above. Although this right hinges on a religious issue, the Court has clear jurisdiction over this matter, which is essentially about determining one’s right to office. The Court’s decision to declare the church’s character as episcopal was crucial in determining the right to office because it affected a civil right. By doing so, the Court was not ruling on matters of faith or religion per se, but rather on the members’ legal rights. The Court further stated that it is unable to become involved in topics that are solely religious and have no bearing on civil issues. By doing so, it has clearly delineated the types of matters over which it is competent to make decisions. For these reasons, I think the ruling about the civil courts’ jurisdiction over religious disputes is sound legal precedent and ought to establish the standard for similar instances in the future.

In his article “Intervention of Courts in Religious Matters: Time to Develop ‘Doctrine of Religious Questions’ in India?” Ankit Tripathi has said that the Indian judiciary is ignorant of the parameters governing the judicial restraint of religious matters. The courts must acknowledge that, in contrast to other nations, India is an ethnically diverse society, home to people with a wide range of backgrounds, ideologies, and customs. Under such circumstances, India’s constitutional fabric may suffer grave harm if the courts step in to decide religious disputes.³² Every person in India is guaranteed the freedom to practise their own faith and beliefs by the Constitution. Because we are unable to apply the law everywhere, it is not always the answer to all alleged wrongs. The court should refrain from looking into religious doctrine.³³ The notion that political branches are better qualified to make decisions on political matters is the basis of the doctrine of political questions. The same idea should be used for religious matters; religious authorities should make those decisions.³⁴

Although I partially agree with the above argument, it is crucial to consider how far the courts should become involved in matters of religion. In situations where the real question is one of civil or legal rights, the courts ought to have the authority to make a decision. This is precisely what the Supreme Court decided in Moran Mar Marthoma case³⁵, making it clear that the court will only become involved in civil cases rather than those that are solely religious in nature. Furthermore, although Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of religion, this right is not unrestricted and is subject to a number of restrictions, including those pertaining to social welfare and public health.³⁶ The provision also makes it clear that the State may regulate non-religious activity connected to religious practice.³⁷ The right to office, which is the true issue in Moran Mar Marthoma case³⁸, is a civil right, not a religious one, and the court must intervene when civil rights are in jeopardy because it involves social welfare and public order, which courts are required to uphold.

It has also been argued that since religious questions are frequently characterised as non-justiciable, they should not be decided by Judges. It has been said that as religious and ecclesiastical matters are not subject to the right to judicial review, courts that are requested to interpret religious concerns should normally refrain from making decisions in these cases. The separation of powers between religion and State should be a consideration in judicial resolution of religious disputes.³⁹ But as has been said several times in Moran Mar Marthoma case⁴⁰ and this paper, there is a crucial distinction between issues that are purely ecclesiastical that belong in the hands of religious bodies and issues that are civil rights related, like the right to own property or hold office, but depend on religious issues. I thought it appropriate to discuss the English case Shergill case⁴¹ in order to better clarify this distinction. It was the first case of its sort to come before the Supreme Court, and it raised issues pertaining to identification and legitimacy — that is, having the necessary qualifications to hold office — as well as belief, theology, and church governance.⁴² The appellants in Moran Mar Marthoma case⁴³ and the defendants in Shergill case⁴⁴ made similar points. The defendants in Shergill case⁴⁵ attempted to have the case dismissed on the grounds that it was not subject to judicial review because it concerned the religious doctrine-based appointment of a successor.⁴⁶ The argument that the matter revolved around religious beliefs was not justiciable by courts since there are no judicial criteria to judge such situations and they cannot be objectively justified was rejected by the High Court. However, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the High Court.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s ruling, establishing a crucial precedent that enabled secular courts to hear religious cases involving concerns about individual rights. It ruled that the case qualified as justiciable and that it may resolve disputes over religious theory and practice when doing so was required to ascertain the rights and interests of individuals that were established by public law.⁴⁸ The area of non-justiciability for the courts is far smaller and more limited than has previously been believed, according to Satvinder S. Juss’ argument in his article “The justiciability of religion”.⁴⁹ If there is a legal right to determine, the practice might differ even in places where it is occasionally claimed that the theory of non-justiciability is in effect.⁵⁰ The Supreme Court of Canada has also acknowledged that it might be challenging to decide issues pertaining to an internal conception of religion; as such, the Court should refrain from judicially interpreting and establishing the content of religious requirements that give rise to obligations.⁵¹ However, as was decided in Shergill case⁵², this did not stop them from enforcing the legal ramifications of acts of religion. In Shergill case⁵³ the Court further stated that by removing private law religious disputes from the jurisdiction of the courts, the Court would essentially be making an arbitrary and improper decision in favour of the defendants, who argued that the case was not subject to judicial review because it was based on religious practice.⁵⁴ Juss further states that judgments rendered by the UK’s Supreme Court and High Court in Shergill case⁵⁵ could be viewed as a model for other nations — especially India, where courts might want to review their rulings in similar cases.⁵⁶

Since the borders of justiciability may become hazy, it is an important issue in law.⁵⁷ Courts have the authority to decide whether or not a specific religious group claiming property adheres to the doctrines of the religion for which the trust’s creators made the endowment, but they cannot decide whether or not religious doctrine is legitimate.⁵⁸ The Supreme Court maintained the notion in Shergill case⁵⁹ that a Judge may have to decide whether it is possible to evaluate such matters objectively when a claimant requests the court to enforce private rights and obligations established by public law but that depend on religious problems.⁶⁰ By asserting that the court cannot serve as church insiders and offer “correct” answers to solely ecclesiastical conflicts, the Judges established an air of neutrality. However, they also noted that concerns of theology may be pertinent as factual questions in determining civil rights.⁶¹ This article has suggested that there are few, if any, restrictions to how far the court can go in resolving a religious dispute on the basis of non-justiciability when private rights and interests generated by public law are involved.⁶² This trend is highly welcome in today’s democratic society, especially given the altered circumstances of the modern, multicultural, and heterogeneous society. The individuals’ rights will matter these days, not the dry divisions between religion, dogma, and church practice.⁶³

Conclusion

On the whole, Moran Mar Marthoma case⁶⁴ is a seminal ruling that elucidates and extends the role of civil courts in resolving conflicts involving religious themes, especially in cases where civil rights and religious matters are linked. The idea that cases involving religious issues are not automatically banned from civil courts is furthered by the Supreme Court’s expansive reading of Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Civil courts have authority over such conflicts as long as they involve legal rights to property, offices, or other civil affairs. By reading Section 9 broadly, the Court has acknowledged that religious disagreements can frequently have significant civil ramifications in today’s multicultural society, especially when it comes to issues of administration, governance, and the rights of religious office-holders. The Court made a sensible distinction between instances involving civil rights, such as property or office, and things that are solely religious, such as doctrinal disputes or internal religious activities. This distinction is essential because it safeguards people’s legal rights and guarantees access to justice while preventing the judiciary from overstepping its bounds into religious doctrine. The ruling makes clear that, even if religious freedom is essential, religious organisations are still subject to scrutiny when it comes to civil rights issues. This strategy guarantees that the judiciary can serve as an impartial Judge, giving people and religious communities recourse without infringing upon their right to religious autonomy.

This decision establishes a significant precedent within the larger framework of legal doctrine. It represents a changing perspective on the interplay between religion and the law, one that upholds the internal governance of religious institutions while placing a higher priority on the rights and interests of the person. A definitive framework for the future settlement of religious disputes with civil ramifications has been established by the Supreme Court. This ruling not only represents a significant advancement for Indian law, but it also serves as a model for other pluralistic democracies facing comparable problems.