Supreme Court: In a criminal appeal against the Bombay High Court’s decision, whereby the accused persons’ revision application against the Trial Court’s order dismissing their discharge applications for death of the deceased-employees, ultimately for the offence under Sections 304 Part II read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision for absence of the basic ingredients of commission of offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The Court added that nothing was discernible from the record of the case that the accused persons had the knowledge that by asking the two employees to work on the sign board would likely cause their death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause their death.
Background
The deceased persons were employees of accused 1, an interior decorator, who undertook the work of decorating a shop. The accused 2 was the store operation manager of the said shop. On the day of the incident, the two deceased-employees got electrocuted while working on the sign board, which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level. Due to the fall from the iron ladder, they suffered head injuries and were declared dead on arrival at the hospital.
The Police Sub-Inspector lodged a First Information Report (FIR) against the accused persons, stating that the deceased were not provided with any safety equipment like belt, helmet, rubber shoes, etc. The chargesheet was filed for offences under Sections 304A/182/201 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
The accused persons filed applications seeking discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The Trial Court dismissed the discharge applications, viewing that both the accused persons were not oblivious of the fact that they had not provided safety gear to the employees, which was certainly dangerous to them as they got exposed to electrocution risk. There was sufficient material justifying framing of charge against them for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 of the IPC.
The High Court also dismissed criminal revision application, viewing that there was strong suspicion against both the accused persons.
Hence, the related special leave petition. Vide order dated 09-01-2018, the Court issued notice and granted stay on further proceedings before the Trial Court.
Analysis and Decision
The Court said that Section 304 Part II of the IPC is attracted if anyone commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
“The requirement of Section 304 Part II IPC is that the doer must have the knowledge that the act performed is likely to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death.”
The Court stated that the basic ingredient of Section 304 Part II IPC is presence of knowledge and absence of intention.
Applying the aforesaid to the matter at hand, the Court said that no prima facie case was made out against the accused persons for committing an offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The Court stated that there was no intention on the part of the two accused persons to cause the death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees. The Court also added that by asking the two deceased employees to work on the sign board as part of the work of decoration of the frontage of the shop, the accused persons did not have the knowledge that such an act was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees. The Court termed the matter at hand as ‘purely accidental’.
Further, the Court perused Section 227 of the CrPC which deals with discharge. The Court noted that it provides that if upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so. The Court clarified that at the stage of consideration of discharge, the Court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the prosecution. It is only to be seen at this stage that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused.
“By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher pedestal than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the end of the trial process, may be for a technicality or on benefit of doubt or the prosecution could not prove the charge against the accused; but when an accused is discharged, it means that there are no materials to justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused. Once he is discharged, he is no longer an accused”, the Court stated.
Conclusively, the Court held that the Trial Court and the High Court fell into error in rejecting the discharge applications of the accused persons. Both the impugned decisions were set aside and quashed. Consequently, the discharge applications were allowed.
CASE DETAILS
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Citation: Appellants : Respondents : |
Advocates who appeared in this case For Petitioner(s): For Respondent(s): |
CORAM :
Abhay S. Oka, J.
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