Punjab and Haryana HC refuses to quash FIR based on compromise in abetment to suicide case

Punjab and Haryana High Court: In a petition filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’), seeking quashing of FIR registered under Sections 306 ¹, 506 ², 34 ³ of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), on the ground of compromise between the parties, a Single Judge Bench of Manjari Nehru Kaul, J., rejected the petition, reiterating that abetment to suicide was not a compoundable offence.

Background

The accused-wife and the deceased got married in 2022. It was alleged by the complainant- the brother of the deceased, that the wife would often fight with the family and the deceased. Further, he alleged that the wife and her family pressured the deceased to divorce the accused with 20-50 Lakhs otherwise, they would harass him to the point of committing suicide.

The deceased recorded a video wherein he stated that the accused and her family threatened him that they would file a case against him for harassing the wife. Thereafter, he ended his life. Accordingly, the complaint was filed. Hence, the present petition.

Analysis

The Court stated that it was imperative to examine the scope and limitation of the Court’s inherent power under Section 582 of the BNS, 2023. The Court reiterated that while the Court had broad discretionary powers to quash criminal proceedings in appropriate cases, such discretion must be exercised with caution, particularly where the offences in question were not only serious and non-compoundable but had wider societal implications.

The Court reiteratedon the limitations of quashing criminal proceedings in serious and non-compoundable offences, such as murder, rape, dacoity, abetment to suicide, etc. The Court had consistently emphasised fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence, the nature of offences affecting society at large, and the duties of the Court to ensure justice for victims who could no longer advocate for themselves.

The Court remarked that there was a fundamental distinction between cases arising from private disputes and those involving heinous offences, where the criminal act had ramifications beyond the immediate parties. These crimes could not be trivialized or nullified through a private settlement. Such indiscriminate quashing of FIRs in serious criminal cases based on a compromise could set a dangerous precedent leading to the misuse of the criminal law wherein false complaints may be filed for extortion or influential persons may evade liability by coercing or inducing a compromise.

The Court said, “Once a criminal case is initiated, it is no longer a matter between the complainant and the accused. Instead, the State assumes the responsibility of prosecution. The complainant only has a right to be heard in ensuring justice but does not have absolute discretion to withdraw charges in serious non-compoundable offences. Therefore, the State bears the duty to prosecute offenders and ensure that justice is served in the interest of society, even if the complainant later chooses to settle.”

Furthermore, the Court stated that quashing an FIR based on a compromise was only permissible when both the accused and the direct victim were parties to the settlement.

Thereafter, the Court described who the “Victim” was in cases involving death. Victims were categorized into three distinct categories:

The Direct Sufferer of Harm, i.e., the individual who has suffered the harm firsthand. In cases of abetment to suicide or homicide, the deceased is the primary victim.
While legal heirs (such as family members) may have procedural rights (for example, to claim compensation, file appeals, or participate in proceedings), they do not stand in the same position as the direct victim. They cannot unilaterally settle criminal liability in serious cases, as their rights are limited to procedural aspects, not substantive exoneration of the accused.
The Society at large, since the law recognizes a societal interest in protecting individuals from harm and ensuring accountability. Thus, the legal system does not merely focus on individual grievances but also considers the wider implications for public safety and justice.

Noting the above, the Court explained that in offences resulting in death, such as those under Sections 302 ⁴, 304-A ⁵, 304-B ⁶, 306, etc., of the IPC, the deceased was the primary victim. Since the harm suffered was inevitable, no compromise by legal heirs could substitute the voice of the deceased. By allowing legal heirs to settle such cases unilaterally, the justice system would fail in its duty to hold perpetrators accountable since the crime does not affect only the family but has wider ramifications for society at large.

The Court stated that there was another crucial legal principle at play, i.e., the principle of “Parens Patriae”, which empowers the State and the Courts to act as guardians of those who are unable to defend themselves, including deceased victims. Therefore, the Court stated that it was not for the accused and the complainant to negotiate, especially when the primary victim had lost his life. The duty to ensure that justice is done lies with the Court and the State, not with private individuals who may settle matters for personal convenience.

Furthermore, the Court remarked that in cases like the one at hand, where the victim dies, the Court must act as if it is directly answerable to the deceased, and such cases be approached with the highest sense of responsibility and gravity, ensuring that the rule of law is upheld.

While placing reliance on Daxaben v. State of Gujarat (2022) 16 SCC 117, wherein the Supreme Court held abetment to suicide as a grave, non-compoundable offence, the Court held that there was no scope for divergence from the settled law laid down hereinabove.

Thus, the Court rejected the present petition, holding that it was devoid of any merit. The Court held that the doctrine of Parens Patriae obligated the Court to ensure that justice was not reduced to a mere private settlement, particularly when the primary victim was no longer alive.

Further the Court stated that the doctrine of Stare Decisis further mandated adherence to settled law. Any departure from the binding legal position laid down in Daxaben (supra) would constitute a direct violation of Article 141 of the Constitution, thereby undermining the consistency, stability and predictability that are the cornerstone of our judicial system.

[Paramjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, CRM-M No. 8170 of 2025, decided on 07-03-2025]

Advocates who appeared in this case :

For the petitioner: Navkiran Singh

For the respondent: Shiva Khurmi, AAG, Punjab