Punjab and Haryana High Court: In a writ petition filed by a judicial aspirant challenging the rejection of her candidature for the Haryana Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Examination 2023-2024 (‘the Exam’), the Division Bench of Sheel Nagu, CJ., and Sumeet Goel*, J., allowed the petition, holding that the errors in the Scheduled Caste Certificate (‘SC Certificate’) were attributable solely to the competent authority and not the judicial aspirant who was qualified and diligently pursued her legal right. The Court also stated that the present case was an illustration of how litigations are pursued on behalf of the State mechanically and indifferently. Accordingly, the Court imposed a cost of Rs. 1.5 lakhs on the Haryana Public Service Commission (‘HPSC’).
Background
The petitioner-judicial aspirant applied for the Exam as a Scheduled Caste Candidate (‘SC Candidate’) and submitted her SC Certificate. She cleared both written exams and had her viva voce scheduled.
Before the interview, the judicial aspirant received an intimation from HPSC stating that her SC Certificate was without a registration number and date and that she had not attached the domicile of Haryana. She responded that her requisite caste certificate and the domicile certificate had already been submitted but somehow, the registration number and date were missing from the SC certificate. The judicial aspirant pleaded that the SC certificate submitted by her was correct and the same had been issued based on the SC Certificate of her father. She also sought clarification regarding the genuineness of her SC certificate from respondent 4-Tehsildar, Gurugram, and the said certificate was found to be genuine by the said authority. She informed HPSC about it as well.
However, vide the impugned order HPSC rejected her candidature. Hence, the present petition was filed. Thereafter, the Court granted an interim relief allowing her to appear in the viva voce, which she did and achieved the requisite threshold marks for being appointed.
Analysis and Decision
The Court reiterated that a candidate seeking public employment must possess the requisite mandatory qualification(s) as of the prescribed cut-off date. A person who acquires the requisite prescribed qualification, after such a prescribed cut-off date, renders himself ineligible and cannot be shown any relaxation unless the extant rules so provide. The Court further reiterated that the general rule was that a candidate must deposit all requisite certificates at the time of applying, and he ought not to be permitted to rectify such certificates. However, possession of a qualification is starkly distinct from the proof thereof.
In this regard, the Court referred to Charles K. Skaria v. C. Mathew (Dr) (1980) 2 SCC 752, wherein it was held that what is essential is the possession of a qualification before the concerned date, and the mode of proof thereof is ancillary. Following this dictum, the Court stated that thereafter exception(s) had been carved out when it related to the submission of a certificate/testimonial with a technical defect/irregularity, which was beyond the reasonable control of the candidate.
The Court stated that it was an unshaken canon of our jurisprudence that when substantial and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. Procedural and technical hurdles ought not to be allowed to stand in the way of substantial justice. If the procedural violation does not cause prejudice to anyone else, the concept of substantial justice requires that the Courts/authorities must lean towards effectuating justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violations. When substantial & procedural considerations stand in opposition, the former must invariably prevail, for justice is not a mere mechanical exercise but a tangible pursuit of truth and fairness.
The Court noted that the dicta in Dolly Chhanda v. Chairman, JEE (2005) 9 SCC 779 and Ram Kumar Gijroya v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, (2016) 4 SCC 754, essentially, granted latitude to the reserved category aspirants, treating the submission of irregular/technically defective certificate(s) as procedural lapse(s) which may be condoned, given the facts. The common denominator was that even when correct requisite certificate(s) were allowed to be submitted belatedly, such candidates possessed the requisite qualifications as of the cut-off date.
The Court stated that judicial notice could be taken that such reservation certificate(s) are, more often than not, issued by the concerned authority(s), and a candidate does not have any authoritative say in the issuance thereof. The Court further stated that in actual life, it was often exasperatingly cumbersome for a candidate to obtain a requisite certificate in the exact prescribed form from the concerned authority. A technical irregularity/defect in such certificate(s) issued by the concerned competent authority is, thus, beyond the control of an aspirant. Actual excellence or even basic eligibility, thus, cannot be permitted to be obliterated by the choice of an orthodox interpretation of law and procedure.
The Court added that equity ought to overpower technicality where the justice so demands. In the realm of writ jurisdiction, Courts are duty-bound to uphold the paramount cause of substantial justice, ensuring that the dispensation of justice is not thwarted by mere technicalities.
The Court stated that the conundrum faced by the selecting/examining agency was granting latitude to the candidate(s) for submission of correct/technical error-free certificate(s) beyond the last date of applying, which posed a threat of uncertainty and delay. The Court added that document(s)/certificate(s) that were required to be submitted have to be scrupulously checked by the candidate before submission. A candidate cannot be afforded latitude for omission(s) on his part. In case an error has occurred on account of circumstances beyond the control of the applicant, namely, an incorrect/technically defective certificate(s) received by the candidate from the competent authority, then if the candidate actually possesses the requisite qualification, some latitude may be extendable.
Thus, the Court stated that a candidate seeking aforesaid latitude was required to show tangible cause or accentuating circumstances at the earliest opportunity, since the time lapse may proscribe any such latitude. However, no exhaustive set of such circumstances/cause(s) could possibly be laid down as it was neither fathomable nor desirable to lay down any straight jacket formula. Such exercise would thus, indubitably, be dependent upon the factual matrix of the case.
In the present case, the Court stated that the date and registration number were not mentioned in the top-left corner instead it was mentioned in the bottom-left corner. Hence the objection regarding the date was illogical. The Court stated that this was a trivial error and law did not concern itself with trifles. Additionally, the non-mentioning of the registration number on the top left side of the SC Certificate was not the judicial aspirant’s fault as it was the duty of the Tehsildar to do so.
The Court further noted that the factum of non-mentioning of registration number was conceded by the respondents, including the Tehsildar. The previous SC certificate issued in favour of the judicial aspirant, which formed the basis of the issuance of the SC Certificate in question was vouchsafed by the competent authority. The Court added that it emanated from the factual matrix of the by-case in hand that the requisite domicile certificate was uploaded by the judicial aspirant in terms of the advertisement.
After perusing the timeline of the case, the Court stated that the judicial aspirant’s plea could not be proscribed as being time-barred. Additionally, after the interim relief of appearing for the viva voce was granted, she appeared therein and achieved the requisite threshold marks for being appointed.
Thus, the Court held that, given the factual matrix, especially the fact that the Tehsildar ratified the veracity of the SC certificate and the error therein, was not the judicial aspirant’s fault, the fault (if any) was solely the competent authority concerned in issuing the SC certificate. The Court further held that the petitioner pursued her legal right expeditiously and diligently, thus quashing the impugned order would serve the cause of complete substantial and restitutive justice.
The Court remarked that in discharging its role as a litigant, the State must adopt a balanced and judicious approach, resisting the temptation to oppose the claims indiscriminately. The State must exercise due diligence in distinguishing between a baseless and a legitimate claim. In litigation involving the State and its citizens, the welfare-oriented ethos of the State must guide its conduct.
The Court further remarked that Courts across the legal system were choked with litigation. Frivolous and groundless dispute(s) constituted a serious menace to the administration of justice. In our jurisprudential eco-system, the State is the largest litigant today, and the huge expenditure involved makes a big draft on the public exchequer.
The Court stated that the present case was an illustration of how litigations are pursued on behalf of the State in a totally mechanical and indifferent fashion. The proceedings reveal a lack of due diligence, reflective of an apathetic approach that undermines the principles of responsible governance & judicial propriety. Such conduct reflects an absence of serious application of mind, resulting in an unwarranted litigation that burdens the judicial system. The Court added that this tendency could only be curbed if the Courts adopted an institutional approach that penalized such comportment. The imposition of costs was a necessary instrument that had to be deployed to weed out such unscrupulous conduct.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the petition, thereby quashing the impugned order and directing the State to take consequential steps. The Court alsodirected HPSC to pay Rs. 50,000 to the judicial aspirant and deposit Rs. 1 Lakh in favour of Poor Patient’s Welfare Fund, PGIMER, Chandigarh, within two weeks.
[Divya Kalia v. State of Haryana, CWP No. 23835 of 2024 (O&M), decided on 20-03-2025]
*Order authored by Justice Sumeet Goel
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the petitioner: Senior Advocate Anand Chhibbar, Shreya B. Sarin, and Himanshu Malik
For the respondent: Addl. Advocate General Naveen S. Bhardwaj, Sukhdeep Singh Chhatwal, Ajaivir Singh, and Balvinder Singh Sangwan
