Allahabad High Court: In an application filed to quash the chargesheet and the proceedings under Sections 420, 323, 376, 344 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and Section
Background
A First Information Report (‘FIR’) was lodged in 2021 by the victim against three accused persons, alleging that she became friendly with one of the accused through Facebook. The accused obtained her mobile number and repeatedly called her. After nearly a year of communication via Facebook, the accused proposed marriage to her. From their telephone conversations, the victim grew fond of the accused’s habits and, therefore, gave her consent to marry him. Upon his request, the victim traveled to Rampur, where she was taken to his village and detained in his house for six months. During her stay, she learned that the accused was a Muslim, which led her to refuse the marriage, as she was a Hindu. On her refusal to marry, the victim was badly beaten by the accused and without her consent, he forcefully established physical relations with her. She was illegally detained for six months and was sexually assaulted by him. He also called his two friends, who forcefully committed rape upon her. The victim managed to run away from there and lodged the present FIR. However, the parties have entered into a compromise, on 25-03-2023.
Issue
Whether in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code (‘CrPC’) the charge sheet as well as the entire proceedings can be quashed in the cases involving an offence of Rape punishable under Section
Analysis and Decision
The Court examined the scope of powers under Section 482 CrPC and highlighted that the inherent power vested in Courts established by the Constitution is a power that naturally belongs to such Courts as Courts of record. This power is specifically granted by the Constitution under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Each High Court, therefore, possesses the inherent power to act ex debito justitiae (out of the necessity of justice) to ensure the real and substantial administration of justice, which is the very purpose for its existence. Additionally, this power is meant to prevent the abuse of the Court’s process.
The Court said that the inherent power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is of wide plenitude, with no statutory restrictions. The only limitations on the exercise of such power are self-imposed restrictions by the Court itself. Any provision in the Code cannot limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. However, the Court emphasized that this power, being extraordinary, should be exercised sparingly, carefully, with caution, and circumspection. It should only be invoked when justified by the specific tests laid down in Section 482 CrPC.
The Court further stated that if there is a specific provision in the statute to address a grievance, the High Court ordinarily refrains from invoking its extraordinary powers. Similarly, the inherent power cannot be exercised in matters where there is a specific bar of law established by the statute. The paramount consideration for the exercise of this power is to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. If the Court identifies any abuse of the process that leads to injustice, it is justified in invoking its inherent powers to prevent such injustice, especially in the absence of any specific provision in the statute to address the issue.
The Court took note of Section 320 (1) CrPC, which provides for compounding of certain offences punishable under IPC.
The Court emphasised that Section 320 of the CrPC does not hinder the exercise of the High Court’s inherent power to quash criminal proceedings. The power of the High Court to quash a criminal proceeding is distinct and separate from the power granted to a criminal court for compounding offences under Section 320 of the CrPC. The inherent power of the High Court is neither limited nor controlled by Section
The Court said that offences which are ‘non-compoundable’ cannot be compounded by a criminal court in the exercise of its powers under Section 320 CrPC. The language of Section 320 CrPC is clear, with no ambiguity, and it does not support a broader interpretation that would include non-compoundable offences in the list of ‘compoundable’ offences. However, the Court clarified that the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence under Section 320 CrPC. does not prevent the High Court from invoking its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC. The inherent powers of the High Court can still be exercised to quash criminal proceedings, even for non-compoundable offences, provided it aligns with the principles of securing justice or preventing the abuse of the Court’s process.
The Court reiterated that, the Court after considering the nature of the offence and the fact that the parties have amicably settled their dispute, with the victim willingly consenting to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, even if the offences are non-compoundable. The Court emphasized that it could evaluate the broader consequences of the offence, beyond the harm to the individual, and adopt a pragmatic approach to ensure that, even if the felony goes unpunished, it does not undermine or paralyze the fundamental objectives of the criminal justice system.
The Court opined that the touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under Section 482 CrPC is to secure the ends of justice. There is no rigid or inflexible line that constricts the Court’s power to do substantial justice. A restrictive interpretation of the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC may result in unjust or artificial justice, which in the context of a specific case could lead to significant injustice.
The Court highlighted that grave or serious offences, or those involving moral turpitude, which have a harmful impact on the social and moral fabric of society or relate to matters of public policy, cannot be viewed as mere disputes between two individuals or groups. Such offences have the potential to affect society at large. Effacing such abominable offences through the quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also grant an undue advantage to unscrupulous, habitual, or professional offenders, who may secure a ‘settlement’ through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes, or other dubious means. The Court emphasized the principle that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.”
The Court remarked that “in a case of rape or attempt of rape, the conception of compromise under no circumstances can really be thought of. These are crimes against the body of a woman which is her own temple. These are offences which suffocate the breath of life and sully the reputation. And reputation, needless to emphasise, is the richest jewel one can conceive in life. No one would allow it to be extinguished. There cannot be a compromise or settlement as it would be against her honour which matters the most”.
The Court clarified that a compromise between the parties cannot be regarded as a determining factor for awarding lesser punishment. Rape is a non-compoundable offence, and it is an offence against society, not something that should be left to the parties to compromise or settle. The Court further stated that it cannot always be certain that the victim’s consent to compromise is genuine, as there is a possibility that she might have been pressured by the accused or that the trauma she has endured over the years could have coerced her into seeking a compromise.
The Court highlighted that the inherent power cannot be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing people for serious offences. The offences under Sections 376 and 392 IPC fall into the category of serious and heinous offences. They are treated as crime against the society and not against individual alone and therefore, the criminal proceeding for the offences under these sections having a serious impact on the society, cannot be quashed in exercise of power under Section
The Court further stated that a conversion to Islam by an individual can be considered bona fide if the person is of legal age, of sound mind, and embraces Islam freely, based on their own faith and belief in the oneness of God (Allah) and the prophetic character of Prophet Muhammad. However, if the conversion is not motivated by religious feelings or undertaken for its own sake, but is instead pursued merely as a means to create grounds for some legal claim, avoid marriage, or achieve a specific goal without genuine faith in the unity of God, then the conversion cannot be considered bona fide. The Court emphasized that for a religious conversion to be valid, there must be a genuine change of heart and sincere conviction in the principles of the new religion, as opposed to merely a formal adherence without true belief.
The Court said that the object of the Act, 2020, is to prohibit unlawful conversion from one religion to another through misrepresentation, force, undue influence, coercion, allurement, or any fraudulent means. In light of the settled position of law, it is clear that unlawful religious conversion, especially when achieved through coercion, fraud, or undue influence, is regarded as a serious offence. Therefore, the Court cannot quash the proceedings solely based on a settlement between the parties in such cases.
[Taufik Ahmad v. State of UP, 2025 SCC OnLine All 1598, decided on 27-03-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Counsel for Applicant :Ved Prakash Mishra
Counsel for Opposite Party : Vijai Kumar Tiwari,G.A.
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