Allahabad High Court: In a writ petition filed praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding and directing the District Magistrate, to decide their representation dated 30-09-2020, the division bench of Shekhar B. Saraf* and Vipin Chandra Dixit, JJ. reiterated that it is the District Judge, and not the District Magistrate, who possesses jurisdiction under Section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act to adjudicate disputes concerning the adequacy and sufficiency of compensation. In light of this settled legal position and considering that an effective and appropriate alternative remedy was available to the petitioners, the Court found no justification for exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of on the ground of maintainability, and the petitioners were relegated to seek redress before the competent District Judge in accordance with law.
Background
The petitioners were small-scale farmers owning agricultural land in District Bareilly, whose lands were affected by the Northern Region System Strengthening Scheme-XXI, a transmission project approved by the Ministry of Power, Government of India, under Section 68 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. (‘PGCIL’), entrusted with executing the project, exercised powers under Section 164 of the Electricity Act read with Section 10 of the Telegraph Act, 1885, and erected transmission towers on the petitioners’ lands. Although notices were issued in 2014 regarding the removal of trees, and compensation was paid in 2015, discrepancies later arose between compensation given to farmers in Bareilly and those in the adjacent district of Rampur. Following a writ petition filed by similarly situated farmers, the District Magistrate, Bareilly passed orders in 2016 directing parity in compensation, which was upheld by this Court in a challenge filed by PGCIL in 2017. After learning of the enhanced compensation paid to other farmers, the petitioners submitted representations seeking similar relief. Subsequently, in view of the policy framed by the Central Government on 15-10-2015, for compensation related to land damage caused by erection of towers, which was implemented in Uttar Pradesh on 19-11-2019, the petitioners submitted another representation. However, the said representation remained undecided by the District Magistrate, despite the policy being in effect. Aggrieved by this inaction and the denial of fair compensation, the petitioners approached this Court by way of the present writ petition, seeking a direction to the District Magistrate to consider and decide their representation in accordance with the applicable government policy.
Analysis and Decision
The Court took note of Sections 10(d) of the Telegraph Act, 1885, while examining the issue of compensation related to the erection of transmission towers and removal of trees. It observed that Section 10 empowered the Telegraph Authority to place and maintain telegraph lines and posts on private property. However, Clause (d) of Section 10 served as a safeguard by mandating the payment of compensation to individuals whose property was affected during the exercise of such powers. The Court further referred to Section 18(2), which allowed a Magistrate of the first or second class to order the removal of trees that obstruct telegraph communication, based on an application made by the Telegraph Authority. The Magistrate was also responsible for determining and awarding compensation for the removed trees, and such an award was to be treated as final. Additionally, the Court noted that Section 16 addressed disputes arising from the exercise of powers under Section 10. In case of resistance or obstruction, the District Magistrate had the discretion to permit the Telegraph Authority to proceed with the work. Moreover, Clause (d) of Section 16 clarified that if a dispute emerged regarding the adequacy of compensation awarded under Section 10(d), the aggrieved party could seek redress before the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area in which the affected property was located.
The Court said that the 2015 policy, though implemented in 2019, was intended to provide equitable compensation to landowners whose properties were affected by the erection of transmission towers and related infrastructure. It noted that the phrase “with immediate effect,” as used in the communication from the PGCIL to the Chief Secretary, indicated that the policy was to be applied from the date of its implementation, that is 19-11-2019, without delay or procedural lag. The Court further observed that the policy did not restrict its applicability to future projects alone, nor did it contain any express exclusion of projects already completed.
In light of this, the Court opined that the policy was capable of retrospective application, especially in cases where affected landowners had not been adequately compensated under previous mechanisms. The Court emphasized that the underlying purpose of the policy was to ensure fairness and uniformity in compensating individuals whose land and livelihood had been impacted, and that a restrictive interpretation would defeat its objective.
The Court, upon a plain reading of the implementation letter, concluded that the language of the 2015 policy was somewhat ambiguous. The letter did not clearly indicate whether the policy was intended to apply to claimants whose land had already been acquired prior to its enforcement, nor did it specify its applicability to any particular projects undertaken by PGCIL. Additionally, the Court noted that there was uncertainty as to whether the policy extended to farmers who had already received compensation but remained dissatisfied with the amount paid.
At the outset, the Court clarified that matters involving policy formulation rested exclusively with the executive, and judicial intervention would be justified only in cases of manifest arbitrariness, unreasonableness, or a violation of fundamental rights. It reiterated that a Writ Court could not substitute its judgment for that of policy-making authorities unless there existed a constitutional infirmity. Therefore, the writ petition, which primarily sought judicial interference in a policy matter, did not merit the Court’s indulgence at that stage.
The Court further observed that the compensation earlier granted by PGCIL was based on a report from the Conservator of Forests, Moradabad, as claimed in the respondents’ counter-affidavit. However, no supporting records have been annexed. Moreover, the compensation was disbursed without any formal award passed by the District Judge. As such, the Court held that the payment made by PGCIL was a suo moto act under Section 10(d) of the Telegraph Act, and not under Section 18(2), which requires a formal application and a compensation award by a Magistrate.
Consequently, the Court categorically rejected the petitioners’ contention that the compensation had been granted under Section 18(2) of the Act. It concluded that the only legal remedy available to the petitioners, if they were dissatisfied with the compensation already received or sought enhancement, was to approach the District Judge under Section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act by filing an appropriate application.
The Court noted that the Supreme Court, in Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd v. Century Textiles & Industries Ltd., (2017) 5 SCC 143, had unequivocally affirmed that it is the District Judge, and not the District Magistrate, who possesses jurisdiction under Section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act to adjudicate disputes concerning the adequacy and sufficiency of compensation. In light of this settled legal position and considering that an effective and appropriate alternative remedy was available to the petitioners, the Court found no justification for exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of on the ground of maintainability, and the petitioners were relegated to seek redress before the competent District Judge in accordance with law.
[Rajendra Prasad v. District Magistrate, 2025 SCC OnLine All 1635, decided on 02-04-2025]
*Judgment Authored by: Justice Shekhar B. Saraf
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Petitioners: Mr. Udit Chandra, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Mukul Tripathi, Standing Counsel for the State, Mr. J. Nagar, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Prateek J. Nagar, Advocate
