Bombay High Court: The present petition sought to quash and set aside the FIR dated 1-10-2024 registered against the petitioner-husband alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 3761 and 4202 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’). The Division Bench of Bharati Dangre and Nivedita P. Mehta*, JJ., opined that in the present case, the petitioner’s promise to marry Respondent 3-wife according to religious customs could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be interpreted as a false promise to marry, considering that the marriage between the parties had already been legally registered. The Court held that the offenses of rape and cheating against the petitioner, based on a false promise to marry were not established against the petitioner and the sexual relationship between them was consensual, as they were legally married at the time they engaged in such a relationship. The Court thus quashed and set aside the FIR dated 1-10-2024.
Background
The petitioner agreed to marry Respondent 3 due to constant persuasion and pressure from his father and after his marriage found that Respondent 3 was in relationship with a person and found some disturbing messages between Respondent 3 and two other persons. On confronting Respondent 3, she threatened to involve the petitioner in false criminal proceedings, thus, as a precautionary measure, the petitioner filed a complaint, wherein he stated that due to his ongoing efforts to file a matrimonial proceeding for the annulment of marriage, Respondent 3 was attempting to implicate him in false criminal charges, thereby seeking police assistance if necessary.
On 2-7-2024, the petitioner filed a matrimonial petition before the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division in Panaji, seeking annulment of the marriage. The petitioner stated that the marriage had not been solemnized according to religious practices and that the marriage had not been consummated and that they had not cohabited as husband and wife in the matrimonial home. The petitioner stated that Respondent 3 filed a complaint against him, alleging the commission of offenses under Sections 3753, 376, and 420 of IPC, which led to the filing of FIR, which the present petition seeks to quash.
Respondent 3 denied the allegations and submitted that the petitioner proposed to marry her, claiming that he would inform his parents and marry her once her elder sister got married. She stated that the petitioner promised to marry her and registered their marriage to convince her, assuring that they would solemnize it religiously once he informed his parents. In June 2024, Respondent 3 urged the petitioner to hold a religious ceremony to solemnize their marriage, but the petitioner rejected the request, stopped receiving her calls and stopped visiting her maternal home. Thus, Respondent 3 decided to reside with the petitioner.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Court noted that the petitioner was accused of sexually exploiting Respondent 3, undermining her consent to engage in sexual intercourse with him based on a false promise of marriage, constituting offences punishable under Sections 320 and 376 of IPC.
The Court opined that to establish a false promise to marry, it was essential for the accused to have the intention to deceive the complainant at the time of making such a promise and such deception must persuade her to engage in sexual activities, vitiating her consent due to a misconception of fact.
The Court noted that Respondent 3 did not dispute that she was aware of the legally registered marriage between herself and the petitioner before they engaged in a sexual relationship. Further, she did not even claim that the petitioner misrepresented the status of their marriage registration. Thus, the Court opined that it was sufficient to state that since the existence of a legally recognized marriage was known to both the parties, it could not be said that Respondent 3’s consent to engage in a sexual relationship was vitiated by a promise to marry based on religious customs.
The Court noted that Respondent 3 stated that following the civil registration of their marriage, the parties engaged in consensual sexual intercourse on several occasions and thus the Court opined that this indicated that Respondent 3 was fully aware of the bond of matrimony existing between the parties after the civil registration of their marriage, and consciously decided to engage in consensual sexual interactions. The Court opined that her consent could not be interpreted as being based on a ‘promise to marry according to religious customs’, given that the parties were already legally married.
The Court relied on Manish Yadav v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 363, wherein the Supreme Court held that a breach of promise to marry would stand at a completely different footing from a false promise to marry. The Court opined that in the present case, the petitioner’s promise to marry Respondent 3 according to religious customs could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be interpreted as a false promise to marry, considering that the marriage between the parties had already been legally registered. The Court stated that the petitioner’s actions could constitute a breach of promise to marry, as he refused to solemnize their marriage according to religious customs after discovering the alleged relationships of Respondent 3 with other men.
The Court opined that when exercising its jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which was akin to the former Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’), the Court could not adjudicate the veracity of the allegations, nor could it evaluate the evidence presented. The Court stated that the question that it could address was whether, even after accepting the contents of the FIR and the accompanying material in their entirety, there existed, prima facie, any cognizable offense against the petitioner?.
The Court relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein the Supreme Court examined the scope of the inherent power Section 482 of CrPC and the categories where the High Court might exercise its powers relating to cognizable offences. The Court stated that a straightforward examination of the contents of the impugned FIR, even if taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, did not, prima facie, constitute any offense or established a case against the petitioner and the allegations made in the FIR or complaint did not indicate the commission of any offense by the petitioner. Further, the complaint filed by Respondent 3 revealed that the alleged offences punishable under Sections 376 and 420 of IPC were not constituted.
The Court noted that the complaint was filed by Respondent 3 on 30-9-2024 after being served with the notice in the Matrimonial Proceeding on 5-9-2024. Thus, the Court opined that the initiation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner appeared to be an attempt at influencing the matrimonial proceedings pending before the Court or a vexatious counterblast to the said proceedings.
The Court held that the offenses of rape and cheating based on a false promise to marry were not established against the accused and the sexual relationship between the parties was consensual, given that they were legally married at the time they engaged in such a relationship. The Court thus allowed the petition and quashed and set aside the FIR dated 1-10-2024 and the subsequent chargesheet/final report dated 26-11-2024.
[X v. State of Goa, Criminal Writ Petition No. 999 of 2024, decided on 2-4-2025]
*Judgment authored by: Justice Nivedita P. Mehta
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Petitioner: Vibhav Amonkar, Advocate for the Petitioner.
For the Respondents: Somnath Karpe, Additional Public Prosecutor for Respondents 1 and 2; Shirin V. Naik, Advocate for Respondent 3.
Buy Penal Code, 1860 HERE
1. Corresponding Section 64 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNS, 2023’)
