Allahabad High Court: In an application filed to quash the charge sheet, the cognizance order, as well as the entire proceedings of the criminal case under Sections 147, 148, and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (‘IT Act’), and Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the Single Judge Bench of Saurabh Srivastava, J. held that merely liking a post did not amount to publishing or transmitting the post. Consequently, such an act would not attract the provisions of Section 67 of the IT Act. The Court further concluded that no material was available to connect the accused with any objectionable post, as no offensive content was found on the accused’s Facebook or WhatsApp accounts. Accordingly, it was held that no case was made out against the accused.
The allegation against the accused was that he posted certain provocative messages on social media, which resulted in the assembly of about 600-700 persons belonging to the Muslim community for arranging procession without permission, which caused a serious threat to breach of peace.
Upon examining Section 67 of the IT Act, the Court noted that the provision was attracted only when a person had published, transmitted, or caused to be published or transmitted, in electronic form, any material that tended to deprave or corrupt individuals who read, saw, or heard the content contained or embodied in such material or message.
The Court said that publishing or transmitting obscene material constitutes an offence under Section 67 of the IT Act. A post or message was considered to be published when it was posted and transmitted, when it was shared or retweeted. In the present case, it was alleged that the case diary contained material indicating that the accused had liked a post by one person related to unlawful assembly.
However, the Court held that merely liking a post did not amount to publishing or transmitting the post. Therefore, such an act would not attract Section 67 of the IT Act. Furthermore, based on the material available on record, there appeared to be no message of a provocative nature, and thus, merely liking a message published by some other person would not attract any penalty under Section 67 of the IT Act or constitute any other criminal offence.
The Court took note of Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P., (2023) 4 SCC 1, wherein it was observed that every citizen of India must consciously be restrained in speech, and exercise the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution only in the sense that it was intended by the framers of the Constitution, to be exercised.
The Court further clarified that, in any case, Section 67 of the IT Act pertains specifically to obscene material and not to provocative content. It observed that the terms “lascivious” or “appeals to the prurient interest” refer to material that relates to sexual interest or desire. Therefore, Section 67 of the IT Act does not prescribe any punishment for content that is merely provocative in nature but not obscene.
Thus, the Court concluded that there was no material available to connect the accused with any objectionable post, as no offensive content was found on the accused’s Facebook or WhatsApp accounts. Therefore, no case was made out against the accused.
In view of the above, so far as the accused is concerned, the Court quashed the proceedings in criminal case under Sections 147, 148, and 149 IPC, Section 67 of the IT Act, and Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. However, the Court clarified that the present order would not preclude the trial court from proceeding against the other co-accused persons, provided there was no legal impediment to such proceedings.
Accordingly, the application was allowed.
[Imran Khan v State of U.P, Application U/S 482 No. – 26678 of 2024, decided on 17-04-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case :
Counsel for Applicant: – Abhishek Ankur Chaurasia, Diwan Saifullah Khan
Counsel for Opposite Party: – G.A.
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