Principles of Natural Justice: Definition, Application to Administrative Proceedings and Contours of Application

Introduction

The concept of natural justice is the cornerstone of common law and is enshrined in our country’s Constitution. While this concept may seem nebulous to those outside the legal fraternity, public servants benefit from a granular understanding to make informed decisions when adjudicating cases affecting one or more parties. This article is primarily intended for public servants at all levels and presents a case law-based understanding of applying principles of natural justice to administrative proceedings.

The instant article is written in two parts and seeks to answer the following questions, with case laws/case studies:

(1) What are the principles of natural justice?

(2) Are these principles applicable to administrative proceedings?

(3) If yes, to what extent and in what manner are they to be applied in administrative proceedings?

(4) Do principles of natural justice require an administrative order to be a speaking order?

(5) Is a copy of the investigative report required to be given to the accused, and if not, does it violate the principle of natural justice?

(6) Can the principles of natural justice be read into an Act?

The articles present specific case laws and summarise the position of courts to provide definitive answers to each question.

Part I: Understanding principles of natural justice as applied to administrative proceedings

Evolution of the principles of natural justice

The principles of natural justice have evolved over centuries as fundamental safeguards ensuring fairness, equity, and reasonableness in decision-making. Rooted in common law, these principles were historically shaped by Roman jurisprudence and later refined by English courts to uphold procedural fairness. Over time, they have been universally recognised as essential elements of administrative and judicial processes, transcending legal systems and jurisdictions. The two core tenets — “nemo judex in causa sua” (no one should be a Judge in their own case) and “audi alteram partem” (the right to be heard) have been expanded and adapted to modern governance, reinforcing the need for transparency, impartiality, and due process in legal proceedings and administrative actions.

Nemo judex in causa sua

“Nemo judex in causa sua”, is one of the two fundamental principles of natural justice that translates to “no one should be a Judge in their own case”. This rule ensures that decision-makers remain impartial and free from bias while adjudicating disputes. Rooted in the idea that justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done, this doctrine prevents conflicts of interest, thereby maintaining public confidence in legal and administrative proceedings. Originating in Roman law and later developed in English common law, the principle applies across judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative domains, ensuring fairness and integrity in decision-making. While explaining the principle of nemo judex in causa sua, the Supreme Court of India in P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee¹ held and observed as under:

41. In this case, we are concerned with the application of first of the two principles of natural justice recognised by the traditional English law i.e. nemo debet esse judex in propria causa. This principle consists of the rule against bias or interest and is based on three maxims: (i) no man shall be a Judge in his own case; (ii) justice should not only be done, but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done; and (iii) Judges, like Caesar’s wife should be above suspicion. The first requirement of natural justice is that the Judge should be impartial and neutral and must be free from bias. He is supposed to be indifferent to the parties to the controversy. He cannot act as Judge of a case in which he himself has some interest either pecuniary or otherwise as it affords the strongest proof against neutrality. He must be in a position to act judicially and to decide the matter objectively. A Judge must be of sterner stuff. His mental equipoise must always remain firm and undetected. He should not allow his personal prejudice to go into the decision-making. The object is not merely that the scales be held even; it is also that they may not appear to be inclined. If the Judge is subject to bias in favour of or against either party to the dispute or is in a position that a bias can be assumed, he is disqualified to act as a Judge, and the proceedings will be vitiated. This rule applies to the judicial and administrative authorities required to act judicially or quasi-judicially.

Audi alteram partem

The principle of audi alteram partem is one of the two fundamental rules of natural justice and ensures that no one is condemned unheard. Derived from Latin, meaning “hear the other side”, this doctrine mandates that every individual has the right to a fair hearing before any decision affecting their rights or interests is made. It safeguards procedural fairness by requiring authorities to provide notice, disclose evidence, and allow the affected party to present their case. Widely applied in administrative, judicial, and quasi-judicial proceedings, this principle upholds impartiality, transparency, and the rule of law, preventing arbitrary decisions and ensuring justice is both done and seen to be done. This sub-doctrine of the principles of natural justice has been discussed by the Supreme Court in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy², vide order dated 31-3-2005, as under:

10. … The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated.

In addition to the above, it is not unknown that a wealth of legal literature and case laws have addressed the principles and doctrines contained in the principles of natural justice. There are three most accepted principles of natural justice i.e. no one should be a Judge in his/her own case,³ the affected party must be allowed to meet their case⁴ and enquiries and proceedings should be held in a fair and just manner.⁵

In A.K. Kraipak case⁶, the Supreme Court of India in 1969 while observing that the principles of natural justice undergo a great deal of change, noted as under:

20. … The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included just two rules, namely: (i) no one shall be a Judge in his own case (nemo debet esse judex propria causa); and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice.… The rule that enquiries must be held in good faith and without bias, and not arbitrarily or unreasonably, is now included among the principles of natural justice.

Where in Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd.⁷, Lord Harman J., observed:

What, then, are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind? First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the Tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there really is anything more.

Hence, over the years the principles of natural justice have held on many sub-rules/doctrines and they have evolved over the years, across jurisdictions.

How should principles of natural justice be applied?

While principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings, their application is influenced by the specific circumstances and factors of each case. The overarching philosophy is “principled pragmatism”. Although these principles require public authorities to act fairly and justly, their application should not undermine administrative efficiency by demanding unreasonable procedural formalities. The Supreme Court, in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala⁸, expounded:

The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose.

In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Election Commission of India⁹, the Court held regarding administrative proceedings:

75. … Hearing need not be an elaborate ritual. In situations of quick dispatch, it may be minimal, even formal….

76. Fair hearing is a postulate of decision-making … although fair abridgement of that process is permissible. It can be fair without the rules of evidence or forms of trial.

57. … Lord Denning, with lovely realism and principled pragmatism, set out … The investigation body is, however, the master of its own procedure. It need not hold a hearing. It can do everything in writing. It need not allow lawyers. It need not put every detail of the case against a man. Suffice it if the broad grounds are given. It need not name its informants. It can give the substance only. Moreover, it need not do everything itself. It can employ secretaries and assistants to do all the preliminary work and leave much to them. But, in the end, the investigating body itself must come to its own decision and make its own report.

Courts must be tempered by the thought while compromise on principle is unprincipled, applied administrative law in modern complexities of government must be realistic, not academic. The myriad maybes and the diverse urgencies are live factors. Natural justice should not destroy administrative order by insisting on the impossible.

Additionally, in Board of High School & Intermediate Education v. Bagleshwar Prasad¹⁰, the Court held:

“In dealing with cases like those of educational institutions dealing with matters of discipline like employing unfair means, the problem faced by the educational institutions should be appreciated by the High Court and so long as the enquiry held is fair and affords the candidate an opportunity to defend himself, the matter should not be examined with the same strictness as applicable to criminal trials in the ordinary courts of law.”

The emerging position is that unless specific procedures are mandated, such as in the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, administrative authorities are not required to follow elaborate procedures for hearings, cross-examination, or recording evidence. Instead, they are expected to apply their judgment to the case at hand and act fairly and impartially. If they do so, they are considered to have adhered to the principles of natural justice.

Having expounded on the principles of natural justice and how they have evolved over the years, this article is now directed to the second part of analysis, which enables public servants to understand the contours of applying the principles of natural justice in administrative proceedings. This part henceforth examines specific issues arising in administrative proceedings and studies the guidance provided by our courts.

Are principles of natural justice applicable to administrative proceedings?

Administrative proceedings refer to formal procedures conducted by government authorities, regulatory bodies, or internal organisational committees to ensure compliance with laws, policies, and regulations. These proceedings can arise under statutory provisions or organisational rules. For instance, tax proceedings conducted by tax authorities (e.g., Income Tax Department in India) for assessment, reassessment, and penalties; under the Environmental Protection Act, 1986 businesses must obtain approvals from environmental regulatory bodies before commencing operations; proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Commissioner or Industrial Tribunals; inquiries conducted by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to investigate anti-competitive practices; hearings conducted by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) for violations of securities laws, insider trading, or market manipulation. On the other hand, there are proceedings governed by internal policies, employment contracts, or rules of specific institutions. Some examples include disciplinary proceedings in corporations for employee misconduct, fraud, or policy violations; proceedings by university disciplinary committees for student code of conduct violations; professional conduct investigations by Bar Councils, Medical Councils, or Chartered Accountants’ bodies among others; Internal Review Committees examining fraud cases, loan defaults, and compliance breaches in banking and financial institutions; Grievance Redressal Committees in organisations to address employee grievances related to harassment, wages, or workplace discrimination among others.

In respect of a government servant, serious breach of discipline and conduct by a government servant is dealt with by disciplinary action at the departmental level, which is conducted under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 or other equivalent rules applicable to different services, cadres and organisations like the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, the Army Act, 1950, etc. These proceedings are quasi-judicial, and their conduct is well defined by various government rules and orders. However, other departmental proceedings, whose conduct is not very well defined, can also lead to adverse consequences for a person(s). These proceedings are in the nature of administrative proceedings. They could include consideration of appeals against decisions of departmental promotion committees, investigation of the use of unfair means in examinations by students, adjudication of disputes relating to appointment or service conditions of an employee, etc.

It is normative for principles of natural justice to apply to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, but their applicability to administrative proceedings is often questioned. Public authorities frequently face decisions that may adversely affect parties, raising the question of whether natural justice principles apply to administrative actions and, if so, to what extent and manner.¹¹

A common misconception is that administrative proceedings lack the seriousness of judicial or quasi-judicial ones and are thus exempt from natural justice principles. This belief is incorrect. The Supreme Court of India has clarified this in several judgments, including Union of India v. E.G. Nambudiri¹²:

7. … The purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and the principles of natural justice are applicable to administrative orders if such orders affect the right of a citizen. Arriving at the just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial as well as administrative enquiry, an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry.

8. … Where a vested right is adversely affected by an administrative order, or where civil consequences ensue, principles of natural justice apply even if the statutory provisions do not make any express provision for the same, and the person concerned must be afforded opportunity of hearing before the order is passed.

In A.K. Kraipak case¹³, the Supreme Court observed:

20. … Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries.

The landmark judgment in State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei¹⁴ further affirmed:

9. … If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power.

12. … Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences … must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice….

These judgments demonstrate and further the preposition that there is no iota of doubt that the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings, even absent statutory mandates to act judicially.

The principles are essential when decisions may lead to civil consequences, prompting the following questions: (a) what is a civil consequence?; (b) what does acting judicially mean?; (c) or what is the difference between administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings?

What is a civil consequence?

The definition of a civil consequence is succinctly addressed in Mohinder Singh Gill case¹⁵:

66. … “Civil consequences” undoubtedly cover infractions of not merely property or personal rights out of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence.

Any action impinging on a party’s civil rights constitutes civil consequences. However, “civil consequences” do not merely refer to outcomes that a person dislikes; they involve the potential invasion of civil rights.

What does acting judicially mean?

The distinction between administrative action and quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings was clarified by the Supreme Court of India in Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta¹⁶:

7. … What constitutes “a quasi-judicial act” was discussed in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani¹⁷. The principles have been summarised by Das, J. (as he was then) in these words:

(i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and

(ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.

In simpler terms, acting judicially involves following legal processes akin to those of a court, including framing charges, recording evidence, conducting thorough hearings, cross-examination, and issuing written orders.

Thus, while the principles of natural justice apply equally to administrative, quasi-judicial, and judicial proceedings, their application depends on whether the authority is exercising its functions as an administrative, quasi-judicial, or judicial body.

Building on the foundational understanding of natural justice and its necessity in both quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, it is essential to examine its practical application. As previously noted, the Supreme Court of India in Union of India v. E.G. Nambudiri ¹⁸, “an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry”. We have also examined the contours of the application of the principles of natural justice in administrative proceedings, which provide that the overarching philosophy of applying the principles of natural justice in administrative proceedings is “principled pragmatism”. While these principles require the public authority to act fairly and justly, their application should not prejudicially affect administrative order by demanding unreasonable procedural formalities. As referenced above, “Natural justice should not destroy administrative order by insisting on the impossible.” — Supreme Court of India Mohinder Singh Gill case¹⁹.

Part II: Case studies to answer specific questions

In continuing our examination of natural justice in administrative proceedings, we now turn to some questions that may arise during administrative proceedings and seek to provide answers based on case laws.

Unlike the broader principles discussed above, these questions are specific. For this reason, it has been considered prudent to provide the proper context to the answer by including particular facts of each case being quoted.

Do principles of natural justice require an administrative order to be a speaking order?

In E.G. Nambudiri case²⁰, the Supreme Court was presented with this exact question. The brief facts of the case were that Shri E.G. Nambudiri was a government servant who was given some adverse remarks in his departmental assessment. He submitted a representation against the remarks to his Ministry, which was turned down. The individual also made a memorial to the President of India, whereupon some of the remarks were expunged. He then filed a petition with the Central Administrative Tribunal for the orders made by the Ministry and the President on the grounds that the orders issued by the department did not contain any reasons for rejecting his appeal and, therefore, violated the principles of natural justice by denying him the right to present his case.

The question arises whether a bald administrative order violates the principle of audi alteram partem?

The Central Administrative Tribunal held that it did and struck down the two orders issued by the department. However, the case went into appeal to the Supreme Court of India, which held otherwise. The Supreme Court observed that adverse entries in confidential records of a government employee must be communicated to the employee, who is then afforded an opportunity to provide his representation. The superior authority must consider these representations when deciding upon the case, and these reasons must be available on record. However, there is no general rule that it must record these reasons in the order rejecting the government servant’s representation.

8. … Generally, principles of natural justice require that opportunity of hearing should be given to the person against whom an administrative order is passed…. But principles of natural justice do not require the administrative authority to record reasons for its decision as there is no general rule that reasons must be given for administrative decision. Order of an administrative authority which has no statutory or implied duty to state reasons or the grounds of its decision is not rendered illegal merely on account of absence of reasons. It has never been a principle of natural justice that reasons should be given for decisions.

If the representation is rejected after its consideration in a fair and just manner, the order of rejection would not be rendered illegal merely on the ground of absence of reason. In many cases having regard to infinite variations of circumstances it may not be possible to disclose reasons, for the opinion formed about the work and conduct or character of the government servant.

* * *

If such an order is challenged in a court of law it is always open to the competent authority to place the reasons before the Court which may have led to the rejection of the representation. It is always open to an administrative authority to produce evidence aliunde before the Court to justify its action.

It is important to note that while reasons are not necessary to be stated in the administrative order, they must be available on file notings/other records based upon which the order has been issued. They cannot be constructed at a later stage. The Supreme Court of India in Mohinder Singh Gill case²¹, poetically noted that “orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older”.

8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J., in Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji²²:

Public orders, publicly made, in the exercise of statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effects and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.

Is a copy of the investigation report required to be given to the accused, and if it is not, does it violate the principles of natural justice?

In case the proceedings are purely administrative and not quasi-judicial, a copy of the inquiry report in administrative proceedings not being given does not always violate principles of natural justice, provided the accused has been given an adequate opportunity to present his case. A good reference in this context is Suresh Koshy George case²³, which deals with procedural fairness in the context of disciplinary action taken by a university against a student. The case centred around whether the University had followed due process and adhered to the principles of natural justice in its disciplinary proceedings against George.

In the instant case, Mr Suresh Koshy George was a student at the University of Kerala. He was accused of using unfair means during an examination. Specifically, it was alleged that he had copied from another student’s answer sheet. The University, after conducting an inquiry, found him guilty of misconduct, subsequently cancelled his examination, and barred him from appearing in future exams for a specified period. George challenged the University’s decision, arguing that the inquiry process was unfair and violated the principles of natural justice. He claimed he was not given a proper opportunity to defend himself, as he was not provided with a copy of the report made by the University before he was called upon to submit his explanation in response to the show-cause notice issued to him by the Vice-Chancellor.

The Supreme Court Bench of Justices K.S. Hegde, J.M. Shelat observed that there was no breach of the principles of natural justice in the appellant not being furnished with a copy of the enquiry report before he was called upon to give his explanation since:

7. The appellant had been duly informed of the charge against him long before the inquiry began; the inquiry was held after due notice to him and in his presence; he was allowed to cross-examine the witnesses examined in the case and he was permitted to adduce evidence in rebuttal of the charge. No rule, either statutory or otherwise, required the Vice-Chancellor to make available to the appellant a copy of the report submitted by the enquiry officer.²⁴

All disciplinary proceedings conducted under CCS (CCA) Rules or other equivalent rules are quasi-judicial; hence, a copy of the enquiry report must be provided to the accused. This follows from the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan²⁵.

In such cases, not providing a copy of the enquiry report will violate the principles of natural justice as has been held in Punjab & Haryana High Court, Ram Niwa’s Bansal v. State Bank of Patiala²⁶. In the said case, one Mr Ram Niwas Bansal, an employee of the State Bank of Patiala, faced disciplinary action and was served with a charge-sheet on 20-10-1980, followed by supplementary charge-sheets in January 1981 and January 1982. He responded to these charges, but the enquiry officer, appointed on 21-1-1981, allegedly did not give him adequate opportunity to present his case. The enquiry officer found the petitioner guilty, and on 23-5-1985, the petitioner was informed of his removal from service by the General Manager (Operations), following an order by the Managing Director. Ram Niwas Bansal appealed the decision under Regulation 70 of the Punjab National Bank Officers Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977, but his appeal was rejected, leading to the filing of a writ petition in the Punjab & Haryana High Court. His main grievances included that he was not given a copy of the enquiry report before the punishment was imposed and that the appellate authority did not grant him a hearing despite his request. The High Court observed that:

48. … the copy of the report of the enquiry officer … was not furnished to the delinquent officer along with the order of removal from service … a specific prayer for personal hearing was made by the appellant… no personal hearing was granted nor the impugned appellate order gives any reason for denying the request. It is clear from the admitted facts that the petitioner was denied the benefit of knowing the contents of the report and submitting his version in regard to the appreciation of evidence, correctness of the findings of the enquiry officer and in regard to quantum of punishment. In these circumstances, we have no doubt in our mind in holding that a definite prejudice was caused to the appellant by denial of right of hearing at the appellate stage and more particularly in the facts and circumstances of the case.²⁷

Applying principles of natural justice during the prima facie examination of a case:

In administrative proceedings, the competent authority generally first reviews the facts to decide prima facie whether further administrative action is needed. If the case proceeds further, the affected party can present their case and face the charges against them. The question is, can the administrative authority examine the case ex parte when it is at the prima facie stage? The case laws suggest that it is widely held that where the affected person will get a full opportunity to present his case at a later stage, and no prejudice can be said to be caused to him if the case against him proceeds to the final stage, principles of natural justice need not apply at the prima facie stage. This is especially applicable in cases where there is a need for urgent action. However, if the prima facie decision could result in adverse consequences to a person, then even at the prima facie stage, the public authority has a “residual duty of fairness”, which entails hearing the party being proceeded against. Thus, whether or not the principles of natural justice apply at the prima facie stage would vary from case to case.

In National Securities Depository Ltd. v. SEBI²⁸, the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of audi alteram partem in regulatory and investigatory proceedings, holding that at the stage of issuing a show-cause notice or conducting a preliminary investigation, natural justice does not mandate a hearing for the party being investigated.

The case arose out of actions taken by the SEBI concerning a large-scale scam involving initial public offerings (IPOs) between 2003 and 2005. The scam revolved around multiple entities illegally cornering large shares of IPOs by creating fictitious dematerialised (demat) accounts to benefit from share allotments reserved for retail investors. These entities then sold the shares at a profit immediately upon listing. National Securities Depository Limited (NSDL), one of the two major depositories in India responsible for handling demat accounts, was found to have inadequately supervised the account opening and monitoring process, allowing the proliferation of these fictitious accounts. SEBI, the market regulator, initiated investigations into the IPO scam and issued show-cause notices to various entities, including NSDL, for failing to prevent the scam. NSDL challenged SEBI’s proceedings and orders on several grounds. One key issue NSDL raised was the applicability of the audi alteram partem rule during SEBI’s investigation and preliminary actions. NSDL contended that it was not given a proper opportunity to present its case before SEBI took regulatory action against it.

The Supreme Court ruled that at the stage of a preliminary investigation or the issuance of a show-cause notice, SEBI was not bound to follow the full extent of the audi alteram partem principle:

“The issuance of a show-cause notice or conducting a preliminary investigation does not necessarily mandate the adherence to the principles of natural justice, particularly the audi alteram partem rule. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is not to adjudicate rights but to gather information and determine whether there is a prima facie case. Therefore, procedural fairness, though fundamental, is flexible and does not always require a personal hearing or access to all documents during this stage.”

“While the principles of audi alteram partem ensure fairness, their application may be tempered in the interests of efficient regulatory oversight. At the preliminary stage, the right to be heard can be deferred to a later, more appropriate stage in the proceedings, especially when immediate action is necessary to prevent further market abuse.” In Wiseman v. Borneman²⁹, underscored the point that the audi alteram partem rule may be more limited in cases involving complex administrative decisions, like tax inquiries. However, it is also significant for one of the Lords advocating a more nuanced application of the principles of natural justice. Lord Wilberforce noted that in some cases, the prima facie decision may have severe and substantive effects, which could include denying the person the opportunity to defend himself adequately. Therefore, even at the prima facie stage, the authority concerned has a residual duty of fairness, due to which the principle of audi alteram partem must also apply at the prima facie stage in certain situations.

I cannot accept that there is a difference in principle, as to the observance of the requirements of natural justice, between final decisions, and those which are not final, for example, decisions that as to some matter there is a prima facie case for taking action … in my opinion, a residual duty of fairness rests with the Tribunal. I would, therefore, think them empowered, if in any case where they are exercising their function under sub-section (5) they consider exceptionally that material has been introduced of such a character that to decide upon it ex parte would be unfair, to take appropriate steps to eliminate that unfairness.³⁰

Can the principles of natural justice be read into an Act?

The principles of natural justice are nearly universal but flexible in their application. Their application can be excluded by an explicit mention or under some well-understood constraints like imminent danger, preventive action, or even administrative necessity. The purpose of this article is not to delve into every exception, for abundant literature is available that serves this purpose. It is also generally understood that other than the well-understood exceptions, the principles will be read into the particular Act or rule unless their application is explicitly excluded.

Are there conditions when the principles of natural justice cannot be read into an Act even if their application is not expressly excluded?

Supreme Court of India, Rash Lal Yadav v. State of Bihar³¹, is an interesting case to refer to here.

Dr Rash Lal Yadav, the appellant, was the Head of the Department in Maithili in Kunwar Singh College, Lakhisarai, before his selection and appointment as Chairman of the Bihar School Service Board in 1990. The propriety of his conduct as Chairman came to be questioned in several instances, and consequently, the Government removed him from the position in 1991. The writ petition filed by the appellant against his removal was dismissed by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in 1992. Dr Rash Lal Yadav then preferred an appeal in the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The Bihar School Service Board was constituted and governed under the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act, 1981. Among other things, the appellant contested the applicability of the doctrine of pleasure in his removal and further contended that even if it is assumed that the doctrine of pleasure applied, there being no guidelines prescribed for the exercise of such power, the power could only be exercised consistent with the rule of natural justice. In other words, given that the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act, 1981 did not contain any explicit reference that precluded applying principles of natural justice, the principles should be read into the Act concerning the exercise of the doctrine of pleasure.

On the question of the application of the principles of natural justice, the High Court noticed that while that requirement was specifically found in Section 10(7) of the Ordinance that preceded the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act, 1981, it was deliberately dropped while enacting the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act, 1981, thereby manifesting the legislative intention not to apply the same. The High Court, therefore, rejected the submission that the said requirement must be read into the said provisions to save it from the vice of being ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.

Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Ordinance (No. 146 of 1980):

(7) If the State Government is satisfied that the Chairman or any Member of the Board is incapable of working or refuses to work or works in a manner which in the opinion of the State Government is detrimental to the interest of the Board the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette remove the Chairman or such member from his office at any time:

Provided that before issue of such notification the State Government shall give the Chairman or Member a reasonable opportunity to show cause why he should not be removed.³²

The Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act, 1981 (No. 33 of 1982):

(7) If the State Government is satisfied that the Chairman or any member of the Board is incapable of working, or refuses to work, or works in a manner which, in the opinion of the State Government, is detrimental to the interest of the Board, then the State Government by issuance of a notification in the Official Gazette at any time remove such Chairman or member by giving him one month’s written notice or one month’s pay in lieu of notice with effect from the date mentioned in the notification.³³

Both the High Court and the Supreme Court noted that the Act was passed in the legislature and that the legislature took a conscious decision to do away with the requirement of giving an opportunity to show cause before the exercise of the removal power. This is because the Board is a public authority, and if the conditions precedent are met, public interest may demand the immediate removal of the Chairman.

Conclusion

The principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings, perhaps even more so than to quasi-judicial proceedings, since an unjust action in an administrative enquiry may have a more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. The administrative authority is obligated to apply its judgment and act in a fair and just manner. The application of principles of natural justice to administrative proceedings must be based on pragmatism, ensuring that administrative order remains effective.

Moreover, the principles of natural justice play a fundamental role in ensuring fairness and transparency in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings. Rather than exhaustively sweeping through the gamut of natural justice, this article has focused on specific exceptions and contextual nuances. We discussed the necessity (or lack thereof) of a speaking order in administrative decisions, the relevance of providing a copy of investigation reports, and the application of natural justice principles during preliminary investigations.

As we conclude, several intriguing questions remain for further exploration: How should administrative bodies balance efficiency with fairness when applying natural justice principles? What are the emerging trends in judicial scrutiny of administrative decisions in light of evolving legal standards? And, in an era of increasing regulatory complexity, how can the principles of natural justice be adapted to new forms of administrative action while preserving their core purpose?

These questions invite a deeper examination of how the principles of natural justice continue to evolve in response to the changing landscape of administrative law and practice.