Bombay High Court: The present writ petition was filed praying for directions from this Court to set aside and quash the impugned order dated 30-12-2024 passed by the District Court, Panaji, whereby the impugned order, the petitioner’s application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (‘the 1963 Act’), for seeking condonation of delay of 73 days, was dismissed. A Single Judge Bench of Nivedit P. Mehta, J., opined that to travel abroad, be it for any reason of vacation or to visit family or whether synonymous construction of the terms was symptomatic of prejudice, was a matter of conscious decision. The Court dismissed the petition and held that there was no infirmity in the impugned order and stated that if it was only a matter of a visit to one’s family or the misplacement of the certified copy, or even if both caused the delay, this Court would be in consonance with the submission that the same constituted ‘sufficient cause’ within the meaning of Section 5 of the 1963 Act.
Background
A complaint was filed by Respondent 2 against the petitioner before the Deputy Director of Panchayats, stating that the petitioner had undertaken illegal construction on land in the Village of Uccassaim, Bardez, Goa. The Deputy Director, vide judgment and order dated 12-10-2021, allowed the complaint and subsequently, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Additional Director of Panchayat- I, Panaji, Goa, which was dismissed by the Additional Director vide judgement and order dated 15-3-2024. On 23-8-2024, the petitioner filed a Revision Petition under Section 201-B of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, along with which, he also filed an application seeking condonation of delay submitting that the delay of 73 days was on account of sufficient cause. The District Court vide the impugned order dismissed the application for condonation of delay and being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner sought relief from this Court.
It was submitted that the District Court rendered the decision in the impugned order while bearing in mind a bias stemming from the history of the dispute and was influenced by the merits of the case, whereas it had to restrict judicial scrutiny and determination to whether the period of delay could be explained by what was sufficient cause construed within the meaning of Section 5 of the 1963 Act.
Counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was delay on account of the certified copy being produced belatedly after passing of the judgment and order dated 15-3-2023, because the court was in vacation for the month of May, due to the petitioner’s travels and subsequent recovery from jet lag, due to restriction in movement on account of heavy rainfall in the month of July and finally sought a second certified copy of the judgement and order dated 15-3-2023.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The issue for consideration was “whether the District Court took a view that falls short in giving due credence to the cause behind the delay and instead formulated its opinion based on the merits of the dispute?”.
The Court relied on Mool Chandra v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 625, wherein it was stated that while the court might draw an inference from the length of the period of delay that was sought to be condoned, primacy would still be given to the consideration of sufficiency of the cause behind the delay. The Court opined that under no circumstances could condonation of delay be sought as a matter of right and that no strait-jacketed formula might ever be prescribed in this regard. Therefore, while considering such an application, a Court of law could only conclude after having evaluated each individual reason that accounts for the period of delay.
The Court opined that relief under Section 5 of the 1963 Act was only available to parties that had, out of events or otherwise, circumstances been restrained from agitating their cause in time as prescribed by the applicable law.
The Court opined that to travel abroad, be it for any reason of vacation or to visit family or whether synonymous construction of the terms was symptomatic of prejudice, was a matter of conscious decision making that would necessitate, booking of flights and grant of visa. Further, if one chooses to act on one of two courses of action as a matter of deliberate decision making, it could not be stated to be difficulty in approaching the Courts. The Court stated that the fact that the certified copy of the order that had to be challenged was misplaced only to be found subsequently, in lieu of which a second certified copy had to be sought causing delay, detracts from the case of the petitioner and both the certified copies were then placed as proof with the application to demonstrate that delay was caused on account of having to seek a second copy.
The Court stated that if it was only a matter of a visit to one’s family or the misplacement of the certified copy, or even if both caused the delay, this Court would be in consonance with the submission that the same constituted ‘sufficient cause’. But at least five days elapsed during the petitioner’s recovery from jet lag, and it was principally true that the relaxation from the timelines as prescribed by the law of limitation could not be granted to those who sleep on their rights.
The Court was sympathetic to the difficulty that was cast on the petitioner on account of restricted movement due to hostile weather and old age, but the Court could not understand as to what precluded his counsel from acting on his behalf. The Court noted that the petitioner filed an appeal approximately three months after the vacation concluded without providing an explanation that might account for ‘sufficient cause’.
The Court noted that after all the stages of judicial scrutiny that the order was validated by the petitioner sought to agitate their cause in revisional jurisdiction. The Court opined that this might not be permitted because the law of limitation was rooted in public policy and the spirit of public policy would dictate that legal rights ought to be enforced in a court of law within a time frame and that litigation could not be permitted to be suspended in a state of endless continuity.
The Court relied on Pathapati Subba Reddy v. LAO, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513, wherein the Supreme Court had summarized the law concerning Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The Court dismissed the petition and held that there was no infirmity in the impugned order and that a liberal interpretation of ‘sufficient cause’ could not be harnessed to counteract a want of diligence on the petitioner’s part.
[Adolf Olegario Nazareth v. Village Panchayat, Uccassaim, Bardez-Goa, Writ Petition No. 437 of 2025(F), decided on 21-4-2025]
*Judgment authored by: Justice Nivedita P. Mehta
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Petitioner: J.A. Lobo, Advocate for the Petitioner.
For the Respondents: V.A. Lawande with Atul Sadre, Advocates for the Respondents.