Allahabad High Court: In an application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) to quash the entire proceedings, including summoning order for offences under Sections 166A(b)(c), 167 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) , arising out of first information report under Sections 307, 376D, 302 IPC, and Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. (‘SC/ST Act’), the Single Judge Bench of Raj Beer Singh, J. held that the arguments raised by the accused involved disputed questions of fact, which could only be appropriately examined during trial. Even the legal points raised were better suited for adjudication by the Trial Court. The High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC does not extend to evaluating the credibility or reliability of the prosecution’s version at this stage.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that no grounds existed to quash the proceedings, and the application under Section 482 CrPC was found to be without merit and was therefore dismissed.
Background
On 14-09-2020, around 10:30 AM, an FIR was lodged against one man under Section 307 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. The informant (‘victim’s brother’) alleged that at approximately 09:30 AM, his sister (the victim), while collecting fodder with their mother, was attacked by the man, who attempted to strangle her. Upon hearing the victim’s cries, the mother shouted, prompting him to flee.
On 16-09-2020, the victim regained partial consciousness and disclosed that the man, along with two others, had assaulted her. This was reported to the SP Hathras on 17-09-2020. The victim’s statement was recorded on 22-09-2020 by a magistrate at the hospital. As her condition worsened, she was transferred to Safdarjung Hospital, Delhi, on 28-09-2020, where she died the following day.
The informant alleged that the police forcibly cremated the victim’s body at night, despite the family’s request to wait until morning.
Following the initial investigation, the case was transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (‘CBI’). The CBI registered a fresh FIR on 11-10-2020 under Sections 307, 376-D, and 302 of the IPC, along with Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
The CBI also found negligence on the part of the Station House Officer (present accused), then in charge of Police Station Chandpa. He failed to maintain the confidentiality and dignity of the victim by allowing media access and recording a video of the victim on his personal mobile phone without acting to record her formal statement. Despite the victim uttering the word “jabardasti,” he did not refer her for a medical examination nor arrange official transportation, resulting in her being taken to the hospital via a private shared auto. Additionally, false entries were made in the General Diary regarding the presence and role of a lady constable.
A supplementary charge sheet was filed against the accused under Sections 166A(b)(c) and 167 IPC, with sanction obtained under Section 197 CrPC. Cognizance was taken, and the accused was summoned on 09-01-2023. His discharge application was later rejected by the Trial Court on 17-08-2023.
Analysis and Decision
The Court noted that the CBI objected to the maintainability of the application under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that charges had already been framed by the Trial Court, and the appropriate remedy was to file a revision. However, the Court observed that Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice, notwithstanding any other provisions in the Code.
Relying on precedent, including Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 30, the Court said that the existence of an alternative remedy does not impose a total bar on exercising inherent powers. Where there is clear abuse of process, miscarriage of justice, or procedural irregularity, the High Court has a duty to intervene. The Court emphasized that the label of the petition is not material and that the High Court may act where extraordinary circumstances warrant.
Accordingly, the application under Section 482 CrPC was found to be maintainable, though the exercise of such powers must be cautious and limited, especially when charges have already been framed.
The Court noted that the primary ground for seeking quashing of the proceedings was the argument that no prima facie case had been made out against the accused. Addressing this contention, the Court examined Sections 166 and 167 IPC. While Section 166 IPC broadly deals with the disobedience of legal directions by a public servant, Section 167 IPC specifically targets situations where a public servant tasked with preparing official documents deliberately prepares or frames them incorrectly.
The Court observed that, to attract Section 167 IPC, it must be shown that the public servant knowingly or intentionally framed the document incorrectly, with the knowledge or intent that such action was likely to cause injury. While proof of intent is essential, in cases where the act is inherently unlawful, the burden shifts to the public servant to justify or excuse the conductfailing which, criminal intent may be presumed.
The Court, after examining the record in light of established legal principles, found that the victim, though conscious at the time she was brought to the police station, had her statement neither recorded nor used as the basis for the FIR, which was instead registered on the informant’s written complaint.
It was alleged that the accused refused to provide a police vehicle to take the victim to the hospital, despite two police vehicles being present at the station. Instead, the victim was taken in a shared auto. Further, the accused recorded a video of the victim on his mobile phone, in which she was heard stating, “jabardasti nahi karne diya tasu,” indicating an attempt of molestation. However, the accused failed to act on this statement, no FIR was registered under relevant sections for sexual assault or molestation, and the letter to medical officer for examination of victim was prepared in a routine manner, lacking specific mention of sexual violence.
The Court rejected the accused’s defense that he failed to understand the victim’s statement due to a bona fide error. Citing the Standard Operating Procedure of the Ministry of Home Affairs for handling rape cases, the Court held that the accused was duty-bound to send the victim for medical examination under a properly filled medical sheet, which was not done. The omissions and inaction of the accused, despite having knowledge of possible sexual assault, were found to constitute a prima facie case under Section 166C IPC, which deals with the failure of a public servant to record information relating to a cognizable offence involving a woman.
The Court further found that when the victim was brought to the police station, several media persons and local reporters were allowed access to her. They captured photographs and recorded videos inside the police station premises. Despite being the Station House Officer, the accused failed to prevent the media from approaching the victim or from disclosing her identity.
The Court highlighted that from the video recorded by the accused himself, it was evident that the case involved molestation, thereby invoking specific duties under law and protocol. As per Paragraph 26 of the Standard Operating Procedure issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the victim of a sexual offence must not be produced before the media under any circumstances. The SOP also clearly states that the identity of such victims must be protected at all times.
The Court concluded that the accused had violated these mandatory guidelines by not ensuring the confidentiality and dignity of the victim, thus further reinforcing the prima facie case of negligence and dereliction of duty on his part.
The Court further observed that the investigation revealed deliberate falsification of official records. The Head Constable had made a false entry in the General Diary stating that Lady Constable had accompanied the victim for medical examination. In reality, the victim was still lying on the cemented platform of Police Station at that time, and lady Constable arrived only after the victim had already been taken to the hospital. Another false entry was made stating that there were no injury marks on the victim. The Court stated that under Section 44 of the Police Act (as applicable in Uttar Pradesh), it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to maintain the General Diary accurately. As the Station House Officer, the accused was the custodian of the General Diary, and such false entries could not have been made without his knowledge or consent.
The Court rejected the accused’s argument that these entries were inconsequential and held that this did not absolve him of responsibility under the Police Act and relevant departmental circulars. The Court concluded that these actions brought the accused’s conduct squarely within the purview of Section 167 IPC, as he knowingly caused the preparation of incorrect records with potential to cause injury and failed to ensure a proper examination of the victim for injuries.
The Court remarked that the facts revealed during the investigation not only demonstrated a lack of sensitivity but also constituted a clear dereliction of duty on the part of the accused. The acts and omissions attributed to the accused were found to be in violation of applicable legal provisions and official guidelines. Based on the statements of the complainant and other witnesses, as well as supporting materials such as General Diary entries and CCTV footage from the police station, the Court held that a prima facie case was indeed made out against the accused.
Furthermore, the Court noted that charges had already been framed by the trial court, and the trial was ongoing. In light of these circumstances, the Court declined to interfere at this stage and reaffirmed that the matter should proceed through trial
The Court, referring to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399, reiterated that at the stage of charge or discharge; while considering an application under Section 482 CrPC for quashing proceedings, it is not the court’s role to conduct a mini trial or evaluate the sufficiency of evidence in detail. The prosecution is not required to prove its case at this preliminary stage; rather, the court must only assess whether there is sufficient material to justify proceeding to trial.
In the present case, the Court held that the arguments raised by the accused involved disputed questions of fact, which could only be appropriately examined during trial. Even the legal points raised were better suited for adjudication by the Trial Court. The High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC does not extend to evaluating the credibility or reliability of the prosecution’s version at this stage.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that no grounds existed to quash the proceedings, and the application under Section 482 CrPC was found to be without merit and was therefore dismissed.
[Dinesh Kumar Verma v State of UP, APPLICATION U/S 482 No. – 20057 of 2023, decided on 25-04-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case :
Counsel for Applicant: Ajit Kumar,Rajneesh Pratap Singh
Counsel for Opposite Party: G.A.,Sanjay Kumar Yadav