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“Petitioner has established that that it was the prior registered proprietor and prior user of the mark ‘GANESH’ and its other formative marks since 1936. The adoption and use of the mark ‘GANESH HARA MATAR’ by Respondent 1, is likely to create confusion in the market.”
It is submitted that Plaintiff 1 is a ‘celebrity’ and has a valid and enforceable personality right. He satisfies the dual test of personality rights, viz. having a valid and enforceable personality right on account of being a well-known reputed personality and the same is clearly identifiable in the infringing content uploaded by Defendants 1-8 and 13 on their social media accounts.
The rival marks are structurally, phonetically, and visually identical and/or deceptively similar when compared as a whole and the word ‘HIRECT’ is the important, prominent, and essential feature of the plaintiff’s registered mark.
Defendant’s dishonesty is evident as only after defendant received applicant’s cease-and-desist notice, it filed a trade mark application for the impugned mark “JHAMPA” on 05-09-2024, claiming use from 01-01-2024.
The infringers were restrained from using Skechers’ trade mark and artistic works or any other trade mark or artistic work identical or similar to Skechers, till the next date of hearing.
The adoption of plaintiffs’ trade marks and plaintiffs’ artistic works in relation to the impugned goods by defendants is dishonest.
The trade mark/label mark ‘Girnar’ surpasses the scope of merely encompassing products/services sold or rendered under the said trade mark and the recognition, reputation, and goodwill of plaintiff-Girnar Food & Beverages Pvt. Ltd. in its trade mark extended beyond any specific class of goods or services.
Usage of trade mark ‘BURJNOIDA’ was allowed because the residential project had been in construction for the last ten years.
No plausible explanation was provided by the defendants as to why the trade mark ‘AMUL’ was adopted. No written statement was filed on behalf of the defendants. The conduct of the defendants highlighted their mala fide and dishonesty in adopting the same mark, as that of the plaintiffs’.
The trade mark ‘MONSTER’ had been adopted by Monster Energy Co. in 2002 in the United States of America.
The plaintiffs submitted that Defendant 1 is dishonestly using an identical and deceptively similar trade mark as that of the plaintiffs’, so that any ordinary consumer would be misled to believe that Defendant 1’s products are that of the plaintiffs or associated with or emanating from the plaintiffs.
“An average consumer with an imperfect recollection is likely to be deceived into thinking that the plaintiff has opened a new ‘SOCIAL’ outlet in Vadodara, Gujarat where the defendant is operating its outlet.”
The term “Aashiqui” does not describe the general category of goods or services (films) but instead functions as a distinctive brand identifier for the Aashiqui Franchise.
Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provides for taking a registered trade mark off the Register on account of non-use of the trade mark.
It was said that when a mark as distinctive and well-known as “Adidas” is copied, it can dilute the mark’s distinctiveness and harm the brand’s reputation, irrespective of the differences in the product categories.
The brand ‘Peter England’ was introduced in 1997 and later acquired by Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Ltd. in 2000.
Since the rival trade marks were visually and phonetically identical, it would cause confusion and deception amongst the general public, doctors, and chemists.
The Delhi High Court said that while trade mark registration offers statutory benefits, it does not obliterate prior common law rights established through actual use and accrued goodwill in the market.
The hearing in the present matter was concluded on 15-02-2023 and the Senior Examiner of Trade Marks passed the impugned order on 14-02-2024, i.e. after a period of one year.
The Court opined that had the plaintiff disclosed the facts, about the knowledge of the date of usage of the logo, then the ad interim relief without notice would not have been granted to the plaintiff. Even otherwise, the Court opined that the plaintiff had suppressed the material facts.